Physical idealism

[Mudhammam]

You seem to think I'm against materialism when I use the word "idealism" but I'm not-- because to me, they are not mutually exclusive.

I'm a bit confused as to what you mean by these terms. My understanding is that they are mutually exclusive: materialism, at the very least, proposing matter to be a substratum of all being, in which case ideas may or may not be reducible to a physical process (perhaps mind is a non-reducible property of matter); idealism, however, putting forth the contrary notion that ideas, or formal principles, are the fundamental and immaterial substance from which matter derives its being and acquires its particular attributes (there is a explanatory gap problem either way this is approached); these being alternatives to substance dualism which says mind and matter are both fundamental and non-reducible substances upon which all else is predicated (though an interaction problem still surfaces), or neutral monism, which suggests that neither mind nor matter are fundamental but that each are distinct and non-reducible properties or attributes of a single, unknown substance. And metaphysical views that do away with substances altogether and take the "qualities" of objects to be all that reality consists of, I think, must be, or probably tend to be, idealistic. At least those are the primary alternatives as I see them.