The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[SteveII]

So really you are making the claim that God should not permit suffering as a result of natural disaster and it is illogical that an omnibenevolent God would do so. What "ought not be" "ought not be permitted". I am confused on a particular point: do you think God should prevent all natural "disasters", just those that harm people, or miraculously save people during such an event?

It would be trivially easy for a theodic God to construct a world in which natural disasters didn't happen without sacrificing any benefits. We might not even know they were a possibility, but when the problem of evil came up, people could say, 'hey, it seems like all the suffering there is, is what we do to ourselves and each other'. The very notion that an omnipotent being can't construct a planet that is more hospitable or people who are more durable is laughable. To explain the problem of evil for a theodic God requires a justification for allowing pointless suffering, not quips like it's unreasonable to expect such a being to work miracles or take time out of his busy schedule to save us: miracles and time are supposed to be the hallmarks of a theodic God. You can never be too busy or too preoccupied for anything if you're omniscient and omnipotent.

Probability doesn't enter into it, the difficulty is in reconciling the existence of the God of theodicy with a universe that doesn't seem to be the kind of universe a theodic God would be expected to devise. You either have to cut a leg off the tripod of theodicy (God can be omnipotent, omniscient, or omnibenevolent; pick two), or there has to be a justification for seemingly pointless suffering that omnibenevolence requires, and omnipotence and omniscience can't get around.

You are positing a unviverse that has no ability to cause human suffering. It is not apparent that having a universe with a set of natural laws can avoid natural events that can cause suffering. Something as simple as gravity kills an awful lot of people. Wind and water kills people. Where do you draw the line between what "ought not be" and what is permissible for God to allow to happen? 

Also, there is a bluring of the line between free will and suffering at the hands of nature. People decide where to be and live, people decide how to construct homes and vehicles, and people decide what to do in every particular situation facing them. It is not like there is no safe place. There are many places on the planet that provide protection from serious natural disasters. 

I do not think that omnibenevolence requires intervention to save human life. That would put safety at the top as the greatest good. I think there are at least two things higher than that: 1) There is the greater good of free will and 2) there is the greatest good of each person's knowledge of God. It is not obvious that a universe that achieves these could also be a universe where there is no suffering from natural causes.