The Problem of Evil (XXVII)

[Gemini]

What is wrong with the idea of a Multiverse in which all possible worlds are exhasted and we just got a crumby one?

I don't see how full on modal realism could contribute a solution to the logical problem of evil. Logically impossible universes, such as those containing a tri-omni God and pointless suffering, still wouldn't exist, for the same reason that there would be no universes containing married bachelors.

Nor does that offer any advantage over "utilitarian" multiverse theodicies. If universes with on balance more good than evil increase the total goodness of the multiverse, then God might be justified creating them, even if some included a great deal of pointless suffering (and if I was going to argue against the logical problem of evil, that's the approach I would take).

I don't think those theodicies succeed, though, because God could create infinitely many universes with no pointless suffering, so creating universes which merely had on balance more good than evil wouldn't increase the quantity of good in the multiverse. Another objection would be that this just pushes the problem back a step. Instead of asking why God created a universe with evil in it, we're asking why God created a multiverse with evil in it.