I need help with refutations for this

[Eleazar]

That's my bad actually, I posted that before I noticed your saying you don't support the argument.

And now you are assuming that I don't support the argument! Oh boy. I've not stated either way.

I largely agree with that, but not as far as reformed Epistemology is concerned, when you can produce an argument as absurd as the Great Pumpkin Objection that is perfectly consistent with the argument then you have, in my opinion, destroyed it - An argument that can produce a potentially innumerable number of contradictory and intentionally absurd conclusions simply cannot be thought of as legitimate.

What is your understanding of the Great Pumpkin Objection? Why do you think it is a refutation of Plantinga's position?

That is not true, his argument, the "Reformed objection", was not against Evidentialism but Natural Theology and Classical Foundationalism. The purpose of Reformed Epistemology was to provide a cop-out for theists being unable to produce any argument for the existence of God while still calling themselves rational.

If it were truly the case that it was merely a parallel argument then Plantinga wouldn't be espousing it as a positive position, which he does. Fuck, he doesn't even claim that Reformed Epistemology demonstrates belief in God to be "properly basic" - He claims that under certain specific circumstances it "can" be properly basic.

Have you actually read any Plantinga? He rejects Natural Theology (at least a particular understanding of it) because it accepts evidentialism, and he attacks classical foundationalism because he sees it as a presupposition of evidentialism. He is responding to the Evidentialist Objection* not by defending against it (i.e. providing an apologetic against the minor premise) but by attacking it (i.e. giving a polemic against the major premise). I was not claiming that he is parodying the objection. Your reading that Plantinga is purely on the defensive because theists cannot produce arguments for God's existence is obscure - I mean, he spends a whole book arguing that proper functionalism (a view which presupposes theism) is the correct account of warrant (and is thus provided a transcendental argument for the existence of God); he developed and defended a modal version of the ontological argument; he did a whole series of lectures listing "two dozen (or so) theistic arguments" which he considered to be "good". If you think that Plantinga accepts the minor premise, you are very much mistaken! What he does say though, is that there aren't any arguments that will demonstrate to any reasonable person that God exists.

*For those who are unfamiliar, the EO typically runs as follows:
Major premise: One ought not believe anything upon insufficient evidence.
Minor premise: There is insufficient evidence that God exists.
Conclusion: Therefore, one ought not believe that God exists.

They are (or should be) synonyms in all work, ideally, that is why I have a problem with Plantinga maintaining that his belief is "rational" despite his admission that he can offer no argument or evidence in support of his belief (justification).

He doesn't admit this (if he does, please state where and give your interpretation of the theistic arguments that Plantinga provides in his work), and you are assuming evidentialism when you define justification to involve argument or evidence.

And so what if he raises the objection in his own work? Many scholars anticipate and try to quell objections in their publications, some times the arguments they content in their works are the very arguments that defeat their positions despite their efforts. Plantinga was not the one who came up with the objection either, it was raised prior to publication and by many different people in various forms. Anyway, it matters not if he raised the objection in his own work, what matters is that the contention stands and defeats his argument.

The earliest reference I'm aware of is his article "On Reformed Epistemology" in Reformed Journal, published 1982. If you are aware of earlier references to the objection then I apologise, and would be interested in reading them! In any case, my point really is that Plantinga has given a response to the objection - obviously you didn't find it convincing, but why?

Plantinga simply HAS NOT provided a fully articulated and comprehensive criteria for proper basicallity and that is because he simply cannot muster it, if he could he would but that he cannot only suggests that any attempts defeat his own argument.

I don't see how comprehensive criteria are necessary for his argument; the argument only requires a single sufficient criterion for proper basicality and a demonstration that, if theism is true, it satisfies that criterion.

Just to name a few... Fales, Fitelson, Ramsey and Law. I have a collection of essays on the matter if you'd like, I might be able to send you the PDF.

I've encountered some but not all of these - PDF would be much appreciated if you have it! What for you, amongst these responses, is the single best "refutation" of EAAN?

I have no doubts that he knows how to use it, the issue is more that he uses it in a way that appears intentionally misleading, for starters he does not explain how he obtains his prior probabilities, you would think that this would be a rather serious problem, no?

The substance of his argument is that P(R|N&E) is low, which doesn't involve prior probabilities. Whether that implies P(N&E|R) is low is going to depend on one's assessment of the prior P(N&E). Plantinga arguendo assumes P(N&E) and P(Theism) are "comparable" - there's no decent way of judging the prior probability that I can think of, but the point of this kind of Bayesian argument is to show that there is a significant difference between the prior P(N&E) and the posterior P(N&E|R) given a generous range of possible priors (at least, that's how I interpret Plantinga's argument).