If free will was not real

[bennyboy]

In my case, that your experience of being in control of something...and even your actually -being- in control of something, would not demonstrate any free will.  I'll give you some examples of why I think that, as I elaborate on those terms you mentioned.

1. The unmoved mover of mind would be that "x" which, not being forced by any causal factors, effects an action or change.  Classical free will.  This has so far eluded us.

Yeah, sounds a lot like magic, or like God.

2. Retconning is the act of retroactively revising the story of some event.  As in we later remember that we thought/felt/did x, regardless of whether or not we actually did at the time of reference.  A story about having free will, in context, rather than actually having it.  We find this with some regularity.

Well, to me, free will is a word for a category of experience, like the experience of picking my favorite ice cream. This accords well with the way we use other subjective words: nobody says, "It's not REALLY love, it's just hormones," because the experience of the hormones and other sensations are called love.

3. An algorithm, again in context, being an architecture of nuerons that do x in response to y, ultimately resulting in higher order behaviors.  This is the only theory of mind (and I assume that will, free or otherwise would be a part of our minds) for which we have any evidence, however tenuous a person may think that evidence is.  It may ultimately be wrong, but it's possible.

Free will really has under it issues about the nature of agency: are we a collection of QM particles, or are we more than that? The answer is yes and yes. So at the top level, the question is does something happen with a collection of brain functions that is MORE than just the sum of the brain functions? I'd say yes, since individual neurons probably aren't conscious, and since a whole brain is.

So, stepping back out to a larger picture, defining ourselves a certain way...even the truth of that definition (for example..that you and the controller are the same) doesn't really speak to the issue of free will.  If the control we have is 3, the act of 2 can give us the experience of 1...even in the absence of 1.  This isn't to say that we don't have 1, classical free will, only that the experience of having it is not demonstrative of the truth of the contents of that experience.  There's at least one sensible way...well evidenced, that the contents can be manufactured in absentia.

I'm also perplexed by the "magic" view of free will. I see free will as the natural expression of the intent of a personal agent. For sure, that includes feelings, hormones, instincts, the brain, etc. Maybe it includes that mysterious "factor X." But in my view, the latter isn't really necessary. All that's necessary is that I be able to form intent, and to manifest that intent as behavior.