If free will was not real

[Gemini]

The reasons aren't duress if they don't originate from an agent. I think that's the key point in our difference. Yes, the constraints of physics determine my decisions. But since I myself am a physical process, constrained by natural law, I don't consider the constraints of physics to be duress. Only if they are imposed by some other agent would I consider that.

Dont they all...aren't you an agent?  Before it was duress, but now it's agency, and particularly external?  The goalposts are shifting...and still the question remains.  Are you -not- under duress from external "agents" every single day of your life?  What, exactly, are you making decisions -about-?

I'm under pressure from people, but the pressure (usually) falls short of duress. To refer to my conscious decision to, for instance, eat a slice of chocolate cake for breakfast as being made under "duress" simply because it was causally determined and not contra-causal is a category error. Duress applies to coercion or compulsion by threat or force from agents. Since I am identical to the brain processes that determined the decision, there is no imposition of force involved in my decision.

Lets come at it from another angle, again for you both.

Would it be fair to say that neither of you object to casually determistic this and thats as "free will".  As in, if the process were causally deterministic..you're both still comfortable calling it free-in-context?

Would it be fair to say that the local ownership of reasons, parameters, or decision-making criteria and condition are sufficient to consider it your "free" wills, regardless of where or what those things are..and just as above, whether or not they are products - themselves- of causally deterministic this and thats?

That's fair. "Free-in-context" is a good way of putting it.

I think what the debate boils down to is the proper referent of "free will." If it means "what we have that people with frontal lobe damage don't," then it's irrelevant whether or not it's deterministic. If the referent is "the experience of engaging my executive functions in decision making," then the metaphysics of causality is likewise irrelevant.

If free will is defined as, "I can create events that have no causal antecedents out of nothing by the metaphysical power of my spirit," then I'm not sure free will is well defined. What the hell does that even mean?