If free will was not real

[Arkilogue]

A man walks into an ice cream parlor.  He chooses between chocolate and vanilla ice cream.  He chooses chocolate.  Later, as he's eating the chocolate ice cream, he says to himself, "I could have had vanilla."  Is that a true statement under determinism?  No it is not, assuming the brain to be a deterministic thinking machine.  The phenomenology of free will is a lie.  He could not have chosen vanilla in that actual world, despite what might occur in possible worlds.  So are we talking about possible worlds when we refer to the experience of choice?  Or are we talking incorrectly about the actual world?

At that time, the sum total of his nature was such that he preferred chocolate ice cream (very sensible choice, I might add).  For him to be free of that, he'd have to be free of his own agency-- choose not to like the things he likes, etc.  But that's a misshapen view of free will in my opinion.

Determinism or not, soul or not, a man's gonna eat what he wants to eat.  How/why would he want to be free of that?

How does he know he's craving the sweets and it's not the Candida that has colonized his body and brain?