(December 17, 2016 at 10:51 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote:(December 16, 2016 at 10:48 am)SteveII Wrote: Molinists say the logical ordering of events for creation would be as follows:
1. God's natural knowledge of necessary truths.
2. God's middle knowledge, (including counterfactuals).
---Creation of the World---
3. God's free knowledge (the actual ontology of the world).
So, at step 2, the counterfactual "if Judas was in circumstance C, he would freely do A", can be true or false only if that statement is determinate in the sense that C is fully specified. Being fully specified is not the same as being causally determined. Because of the ordering of God's knowledge (1-3), at step 2 there will be an unimaginable number of counterfactuals that will have truth value that will never be actualized.
Your response doesn't in any way answer my objection. Judas' actions must be determined in order for there to be a counterfactual for God to know. But if his actions are determined, he doesn't have libertarian free will. You can't have both, knowable counterfactuals and libertarian free will.
The answer to your question is in the order of God's knowledge. If we image trillions of possible worlds branching from every decision ever made where, up unit that point, all circumstances C were fully specified (including God knowing your thoughts). I think you would agree (let me know if you don't) that in considering all these timelines, God is observing libertarian free will. God surveyed all those worlds in #2--prior to creation.
He chose to actualize one of them.
God's Free Knowledge (#3) or foreknowledge stemming from #2 of what will happen does not change the fact that we are still making choices for internal reasons not causally determined from outside ourselves--therefore libertarian free will.
