RE: Fundamental Arrogance in Christianity
March 2, 2017 at 2:48 pm
(This post was last modified: March 2, 2017 at 2:49 pm by Neo-Scholastic.)
(March 1, 2017 at 9:20 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: Attributing them [epiphanies] to the divine requires the same justification. You don't get something for free just because there exists a tradition of attributing it to the divine. There also exists a tradition of not attributing it to the divine.
Wikipedia Wrote:In inferential statistics, the term "null hypothesis" is a general statement or default position that there is no relationship between two measured phenomena, or no association among groups...The null hypothesis is generally assumed to be true until evidence indicates otherwise.
That's all fine and good in the abstract but it doesn't work as a universal principle. Deferring to the null hypothesis is an epistemological preference within a specific discipline. You have extrapolated a methodological preference to cover the evaluation of all binary propositions and at the same time tacitly introduced an ethical obligation.
The general question is whether for any given proposition of P versus not-P, in which there is insufficient evidence to justify either P or not-P, someone should always assume not-P to be the case. In isolation, if there is no compelling reason to accept either P or not-P, it does not mean one should accept not-P. That is an unjustified move from 'is' to 'ought'. The position that not-P "should" always be preferred is flawed unless it is conditioned by the content of the proposition. Justification for having a default stance includes things like self-evidence, prior experience, instinct, and expediency.
For example, suppose the proposition is "There is a bear in this dark cave." If the default is not-P then a skeptic would be justified, though highly ill-advised, to enter the dark cave without checking for danger. After all, he lacks any burden of proof, doncha' know?
Clearly not all the default positions are correct. An uniformed person, having no awareness of arguments to the contrary, would be justified believing that living systems are designed. There is no burden of proof to defend the proposition that "Living things are designed" but there is a burden of proof to not accept reasonable defeaters once someone becomes aware of and understands them. In a post-Darwin world, the defeaters are compelling.
So I say that in the absence of sufficient defeaters, belief in God is justified as the default position for a variety of reasons, not the least of which are peak experiences, transcendent bliss, and encounters with the ineffable all of which have been commonly and consistently reported throughout human history. Likewise, apprehension of ourselves in relation to being-as-such is both powerful and primal. The issue is not whether those experiences are to be trusted, but rather why we should not trust them.
You apparently believe that things like optical illusions, hard-wired instincts, metal illnesses, and logical paradoxes are reasonable defeaters for respecting the authenticity of subjective experiences and the efficacy of reason. I respect your opinion enough to give an account for my incredulity. Nevertheless I find those objections neither sufficient nor significant enough to overcome the default position that "God exists."