(March 7, 2017 at 12:52 pm)SteveII Wrote: The real argument can be formulated as follows:
1- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
Incoherent terms, bare assertion.
(March 7, 2017 at 12:52 pm)SteveII Wrote: 2- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
Non sequitur.
(March 7, 2017 at 12:52 pm)SteveII Wrote: A. The argument hangs on the concept of necessary (within premise 3)
The argument does not make use of the "necessary" concept.
Even if it did, it would remain nonsensical. A being that is possibly necessary in one world is not... well, necessarily necessary in other worlds, as there is possibly a world where it is not necessary.
This is why the modal ontological argument is such complete bunk; even granting that its definitions are coherent (and they aren't), it fails to establish that they actually apply.
(March 7, 2017 at 12:52 pm)SteveII Wrote: While greatness might be subjective, maximal greatness is not.
Asserting this does not make it true. "Greatness" is still a value judgment. It is still subjective. Adding "maximal" to it does not make it any less so.
"Owl," said Rabbit shortly, "you and I have brains. The others have fluff. If there is any thinking to be done in this Forest - and when I say thinking I mean thinking - you and I must do it."
- A. A. Milne, The House at Pooh Corner
- A. A. Milne, The House at Pooh Corner