What do you think of this argument for God?

[Nonpareil]

Because I'm bored and have some time to kill, let's go over the various ontological arguments and their failings in more detail.

For those who have never really studied the term before, an ontological argument is a specific type of theistic argument that attempts to establish the existence of God using nothing but a priori knowledge - that is, nothing but pure logic, entirely independent of any need for actual evidence.

In practical terms, this means that an ontological argument is an argument that attempts to define God into existence. They all essentially boil down to this:

1. We define "God" as "something that must exist".
   
2. Therefore, God exists.

But, in order to make them look more impressive than they actually are, they usually take this form:

1. We define "God" as "something that, if it is possible for it to exist or be conceived of, must exist".
   
2. It is possible that God exists and/or can be conceived of.
   
3. Therefore, God exists.

This is every single ontological argument at its core. Everything else is window dressing.

The various forms of the ontological arguments, then, are different theistic philosophers' attempts to rephrase this basic premise in order to get rid of the different issues that other variants have run up against. Unfortunately, none of them actually address the central problem with the idea of any ontological argument: it utterly fails to establish its conclusion.

This is because ontological arguments, by definition, are only capable of using two things: definitions and pure logic. They cannot actually make use of evidence or reference the real world. This means that, while they might be valid, they not only will never but can never be sound.

(For those who have not heard those terms before, "valid" means that, given that an argument's premises are true, its conclusion must be true. "Sound", on the other hand, means that an argument is valid and that its premises are actually true, so it has actually established the truth of its conclusion. As an illustration, "All men are green + a pterodactyl is a man = a pterodactyl is green" is valid, but not sound; its conclusion follows from its premises, but its premises are not true, so it has not actually established its conclusion to be true.)

This is the fatal flaw for all variants of the ontological argument, because it is in the very definition of "ontological argument": even if the premises are coherent and the conclusion follows, by definition the argument has still not established that its conclusion is true. Ontological arguments are, at best, ipse dixit (a specific variation on the bare assertion fallacy, basically equal to bare assertion that has become dogma). They utterly fail to actually prove their conclusion, to the point that even Alvin Plantinga, a theistic philosopher responsible for one of the more popular modern versions of the ontological argument, says: "Our verdict on these reformulated versions of St. Anselm's argument must be as follows. They cannot, perhaps, be said to prove or establish their conclusion."

(In the interest of completion, it must be noted that Plantinga then goes on to say: "But since it is rational to accept their central premise, they do show that it is rational to accept that conclusion.", but this is exactly the ipse dixit mentioned before; there is no way to show that the central premise - God's necessity, possibility, conceivability, or what-have-you, according to the specific variation of the argument - is actually true, he is forced to fall back on "but I think it's true anyway, even though I can't show how, so you should all accept it, too".)

And this is ignoring all the issues with specific variations, which always end up making a mess of their premises. They don't even get as far as simply failing to establish their soundness. They collapse at the first hurdle, with incoherent terms and nonsensical leaps.

For example, Steve's favored version:

1- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.

"Greatness" is a value judgment. Value judgments are inherently subjective. "Maximally great" is a nonsensical contradiction in terms, even ignoring its complete lack of an actual, coherent definition (it never supplies any way to actually measure "greatness", so it's a complete non-starter).

This is also where the ipse dixit comes in, and why I mentioned bare assertion when examining this premise above. There is no reason to accept that it is possible that a "maximally great being" exists.

2- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

Again, ipse dixit - there is no reason to accept that this premise is true. Nor does "possible world" have any actual, coherent meaning (this could imply an attempt to tie into modal logic, in which case this specific premise would be slightly less incoherent, but the argument as a whole still collapses).

3- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

And another unjustified leap. The asserted basis for this is that, if a being does not exist in every possible world, then it isn't "maximally great" - but, again, there's no actual established way to judge "greatness".

Theists attempt to get around this by saying, as Steve already helpfully asserted:

While greatness might be subjective, maximal greatness is not.

Unfortunately, this is utterly nonsensical. "Greatness" is not an objective quantity, and no actual coherent method of measurement can be supplied. Simply asserting that "maximal greatness" is not an incoherent concept does not actually make it so. Nor does trying to say that it is objective rather than subjective.

Also note the way that Steve's chosen "real" variation of the ontological argument fits into the condensed version that I supplied at the beginning of this post. "God" is defined as "a maximally great entity"; the rest of the argument, then, is spent trying to show how a "maximally great entity" is defined as existing, without at any point even attempting to establish that a maximally great entity is actually possible. It simply asserts that it is, and expects to be taken at face value.

It's the same issue every time, in every variation of the ontological argument. There is always, at one point or another, a complete ipse dixit moment, whereupon it collapses on its face. And, again, that's without getting into the completely incoherent mess that is the actual premises. This is why the ontological arguments have never been relevant in philosophy outside of theistic circles that refuse to let them die because they're desperate for anything that they can lay their hands on.

The ontological arguments are always, invariably, regardless of specific wording, worthless.

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First, I did not start this thread

It's an open forum. If you don't want replies, don't post.

BTW, he knows how to have a discussion without sounding like a condescending prick.

I'm sorry that you consider bluntness and directness to be equivalent to condescension, but it doesn't make you any more right.

Regarding the Ontological Argument, philosophers on both sides in every generation for a thousand years have been discussing this argument

No. A small but vocal crowd of rather silly people on the theist side have refused to let it die because they really, really wish it was true.

To people who actually study and understand philosophy, regardless of whether they are theist or not, the various formulations of the ontological argument are little more than historical curiosities. As are the rest of Anselm's works. Important from a historical standpoint, but not actually compelling.

and you can dismiss it in a few sentences.

Anyone can. I just happen to be the one doing it.