What do you think of this argument for God?

[SteveII]

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The real argument can be formulated as follows:

1- It is possible that a maximally great being exists.
2- If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.
3- If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4- If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.
5- If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists.
6- Therefore, a maximally great being exists.

A. The argument hangs on the concept of necessary (within premise 3) and as such, you need to clearly understand how the word is used. The opposite of necessary is contingent. Since being contingent on something is a defect it would not be considered maximally great to be contingent. A maximally great being would be a necessary being because it could not be contingent on another (then that would be a greater being).  It is important to understand the S5 modal logic that if something is even possibly necessary, it is actually necessary. If God necessarily exists in one possible work, then he exists necessarily in all possible worlds.

B. The key is understanding the difference between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility. Epistemic possibility is simply "for all we know something is possible". On the other hand, to illustrate metaphysical possibility take a math equation 24673244/8=3005567. While we might say "for all we know" this might be true, but if it is true, than it is necessarily true if it is false than it is necessarily false. If a maximally great being exists, it exists necessarily in a metaphysical sense. Therefore, God’s existence is either possible or impossible.

C. When Anselm first wrote this argument, he was careful to distinguish between what we could think of as the greatest possible being and God is the greatest being possible, that is to say, it is impossible for there to be any being greater than God. While greatness might be subjective, maximal greatness is not. If a description of God allowed for a greater being, then God would not be God because that being would be God and the definition becomes a logical impossibility. Even a limited grasp of God's properties does not entail that our conception of God is false because it would be impossible to have full knowledge of God.

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The main problems with this argument is with 1 and 3. First, "great" is a value statement which is contingent upon the subjective viewer. The question is, what constitutes objective greatness? 1 is simply an assertion with no basis in reality than what anyone would personally think to be true.

3 is false since greatness is logically separable from logical necessity. Value statements have no basis in possibility. Just as you can't derive an ought from an is, you can't derive an is from an ought. 

Elvis Presley is a great being to many people, I can say that he is a necessary being. It would be no less accurate to say that than to say God is a necessary being. The assertion that God is necessary has no justification. Maximal greatness is subjective if you accept that greatness is subjective, since the measurement of greatness would be subjective, it would apply to whatever you would measure to be the "greatest".

That is a common objection, but there are answers to it. I posted a response a few pages back that I will repost below. Great making properties of god are not subjective like a preference to Elvis' music. These are not properties subject to tastes, aesthetics, etc. It is also important to note that it doesn't matter to the argument if we can even comprehend them. 

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Consider these three premises from Robert Maydole's Moral Perfection Argument:

M1: A property is a perfection only if its negation is not a perfection.
M2: Perfection entails only perfection
M3: The property of being supreme is a perfection of that property.

Maydole defines a perfection as a property which is better to have than not to have and something is supreme if there is nothing which is even possibily greater or as great as.

Suppose that it is not possible (necessarily so or as you say 'nonsensical) that there exists a being with supreme (maximally great) properties . In that case, for any property x, it is necessarily the case that property x is not an example of being supreme. Well, if that is the case then, necessarily, for any property x, if x is supreme, then x is not supreme.

Now suppose being supreme is a perfection (M3) and that only perfection entails perfection (M2).

If these premises are true, and being supreme is not possible, it follows that not being supreme is a perfection. But if we accept M1, it is also the case then not being supreme is not a perfection. Now we have a contradicion: not being supreme is a perfection and not being supreme is not a perfection. Which one do you want to reject and why? If you can't, you must concede that a supreme property is possible and by extension, that it is possible there is a supreme (maximally great) being.

Now, all I have done (with help) has been to summarize the argument. The actual formal logic is 12 steps long. It then fits into the Ontological Argument, which is another 16 steps long. Since you probably don't have my book, you can get a copy of the argument in the link below.

So, it seems your claim of ability to refute the Ontological Argument "in a couple of sentences" is entirely based on your lack of understanding of the argument. Perhaps if you didn't lecture us like a condescending prick, this wouldn't be so funny.  

Adapted from Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, Wiley-Blackwell 2012 pg. 580 ff. with additional commentary from https://calumsblog.com/apologetics/argum...-argument/ (to help me with some of the symbology)

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