Consciousness Trilemma

[Edwardo Piet]

If consciousness was not actually what people thought it was, would there be any point in adhering to that definition?   

It is what people think it is. People think consciouisness is subjective experience. It is subjective experience. I already explained all this.

What can you possibly mean by bullshit?  Dennet makes the comment explicit in multitudinous ways, that you yourself have quoted.  

I already explained. That wasn't what I said was bullshit. Read back again. You suggested that the only alternative was for me to believe in Cartesian Dualism but I already explained that I'm a realist about subjective experience and I don't have to believe in Cartesian Dualism to do that.

Your subjective experience™ is real, OFC it is, it's just not what you think it is?

Right, it's not an illusion regardless of how mistaken about the details of it I am. Same with you. Your subjective experience is not an illusion, it's a reality. And yet Dennett claims that consciousness is an illusion because he thinks subjective experience is incompatible with science. Which is an irrelevant conclusion because the reality of subjective experience is much more knowable than science is.

He thinks that those traditional definitions of consciousness hinge on a naive understanding of the mind.  He's trying to explain the same thing as those, in his estimation, naive theories of mind are trying to explain...so he uses the shared term.  I guess he could have used a different word, but Ham, cmon...lol?

Yes he should have used a different word instead of pretending to be talking about consciousness.

Come on, non-Rhythm.

What ridiculous position?

The ridiculous position of pretending to talk about consciousness without talking about consciousness.

Here's a quote from Wikipedia, quoting John Searle

To put it as clearly as I can: in his book, Consciousness Explained, Dennett denies the existence of consciousness. He continues to use the word, but he means something different by it. For him, it refers only to third-person phenomena, not to the first-person conscious feelings and experiences we all have. For Dennett there is no difference between us humans and complex zombies who lack any inner feelings, because we are all just complex zombies. ...I regard his view as self-refuting because it denies the existence of the data which a theory of consciousness is supposed to explain

 

Why can't the specific aspects of specific types of specific descriptions of consciousness....what he is actually and explicitly addressing in that segment...be illusory?

For something to be an illusion it has to seem one way but be another way. Indeed we may seem to be experiencing many things and instead be experiencing many other things.. but the fact we are experiencing something cannot be an illusion. I.e. consciousness cannot be an illusion.

We could actually be dreaming right now. But we are experiencing something even if this is all a dream. The experience is not an illusion even if what we think is happening is. Obviously we really are experiencing this even if 'this' is not realling happening.

It's not rocket science, and I've explained it all before. Come on non-Rhyhtm. Stop being dense.

Do you think that the experience you have, of how it feels to be the humonculus, will map to a discrete mental state analogous to the humonculus?

I don't have to have any theory of consciousness at all, Cartesian or non-Cartensian to be a realist about my subjective experience. All of that is irrelevant.

I know that I am really experiencing something. The fact I really am means it's not an illusion.

What would it mean for me to not really be experiencing anything at all? Do you realize that that's impossible without me being a philosophical zombie yet? Do you realize that Dennett is wrong about us all being zombies yet? Do you realize that not experiencing at all and only SEEMING to experience something is identical to REALLY experiencing something thereby making his whole claim that consciousness is an illusion utter nonsense?

Will we find the little man in the brain region of the brain?  Is there such a region?  This, is what Dennet, in those things specifically, -and explicitly- has been expressing skepticism with regards to.  

All this is irrelevant repetitions of Dennett's shite.

We don't need any theory of consciousness to be a realist about our subjective experience.

I understand that you're trying to have an argument with me about something entirely irrelevant to dennets statements as they regard -our- disagreement (you see, I;m not arguing that dennet is right, I;m suggesting that you are mistaken regarding the contents of dennet's position, for whatever reason).

I am not mistaken about Dennett's position. I am very familar about his position. He has literally said things like you can experience a red stripe that doesn't exist. That's nonsense. Even illusions exist, they just aren't real. He conflates illusoriness with nonexistence which is exactly what you falsely accused me of doing.

 I also understand that you really, really believe that you're right.

I KNOW I'm right. Consciousness isn't an illusion any more than bachelors are married.

Will we find a discrete mental state of Ham being right, in hams brain?

Irrelevant. My subjective experience itself is not an illusion regardless of if we can find specific states.

Dennett talks about all these irrelevant details and talks about what we think about the mind and what we think about our subjective experience but he fails to address the fact that it doesn't matter how many cognitive or phenomenological illusions we experience... we still really experience them. Our consciousness itself must be real.

I will ask you the question again... if ALL your subjective experience is an illusion.... then what is the difference between that and all your subjective experience being real? There's literally no difference. You can't apply the real/illusory distinction to consciousness itself because the very concept of real/illusory depends on it. Nothing is more real than consciousness.

 Or might it be possible, that the feeling you have, ham being right, is not, in fact, any discrete mental state, but a misapprehension of hams brain that, nevertheless...manifests itself as a genuine experience?  

You just proved my point. It still nevertheless manifests itself as a genuine experience. It doesn't matter what mental states I am wrong or right about or whether confused I am or not. I could even be 100% confused... I still get a manifestly genuine experience. I really do. And that's really consciousness.

Defending a quotemine is worse.

I already explained that I didn't quotemine because I provided the source to give full context.

And what I said out of context doesn't change the meaning of what he said at all.

You're such a prick.