Consciousness Trilemma

[Angrboda]

So it's a nonsensical neologism coined by John Searle.

No it's not. The fact you don't understand what "ontologically subjective" means and I give you John Searle's explanation of it doesn't mean he "coined it".

Obviously ontological subjectivity isn't defined as one separate term. Each of those words mean things seperately and make sense put together. You don't need Searle for that. I used his explanation because he explains it well and instead you just pretend he "coined it" and ignore what ontological subjectivity obviously is.

Ontology is about being. About entities, about something that exists. Something that exists either has subjectivity or it doesn't. Its ontology is either subjective or it isn't. It either has conscousness or it doesn't. Obviously the ontology of consciousness is subjective. What is your problem with things that are just true by definition? Next you'll be asking me to prove that consciousness is subjective. You literally repeatedly do the equivalent of asking me to prove that all squares have four sides.

You're full of crap.  It's a composite term whose meaning is not encapsulated by the individual terms.  Simply combining the terms leaves you with "a being that exists dependent upon the attitudes and opinions of a subject," which is complete gibberish.  No, it's got Searle's fingerprints all over it.  Cite another philosopher using the term who isn't explaining some aspect of Searle's meaning.

 It isn't a sensible definition because it endorses the conclusion that ontologically subjective phenomena are not also ontologically objective.

No it doesn't. Nowhere does he say that something can't both be ontologically objective and subjective.

All ontology is objective but some of it is also subjective. There are conscious objects and unconscious objects. Consciousness is by definition a conscious object. It has subjective ontology. It's ontologically subjective.

Bull balls.  If something is both an objective and a subjective fact, there is no distinction in terms of its ontology.  The distinction only occurs in Searle's contention that first person subjective experience is not accessible by third person inspection.  I'm not enough of a stranger to Searle's absurd locutions to fall for this.

In other words, it's nothing more than the mysterians' claim that consciousness has no third hand objective description.  That's begging the question on Searle's part and being stupid about philosophy on your part.

No this is your own misrepresentation. Nowhere does Searle say that something can't  both be ontologically objective and ontologically subjective. And if he did say that, he'd be wrong.

Some entities, such as pains, tickles, and itches, have a subjective mode of existence, in the sense that they exist only as experienced by a conscious subject. Others, such as mountains, molecules and tectonic plates have an objective mode of existence, in the sense that their existence does not depend on any consciousness.

http://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/~pa...e/csc1.pdf [emphasis mine; you do know what the word 'only' means, don't you?]

And the reason you can't be wrong is what?  Stop bleating and start backing up some of these statements.

I can't be wrong because I'm stating tautologies or following logical lines with premises that are tautologically true.

You are asking me to prove something true by definition is true. Like I said you may as well ask me to prove that all squares have four sides.

It's neither tautological nor a definition of consciousness that it cannot be other than what it appears.  Consciousness is an appearing to be, of sorts, so obviously there is a something which it appears to be which is left undisturbed by your talking about 'experience' and 'consciousness'.  There is nothing tautological about claiming that this 'appearing to be' can't be other than what it appears to be.  That's your lack of imagination combined with fuzzy thinking about what consciousness appears as that makes you think there's anything tautological or definitional here.  It is not an analytical truth by any stretch of the imagination.  Consciousness has an appearance, and that appearance may be wrong, that's what you're disputing.  There is no tautology which says that the appearance of consciousness reflects what it really is.  That's just an absurd claim on your part.  Until you back that up, you're just making noise with empty predicates.  Or are you suggesting something other than that "consciousness is what it appears to be?"

And the misrepresentations just keep on coming.  You have presented no argument.  You've claimed consciousness itself, not the thing in its intentionality, cannot be an illusion.

I have repeatedly explained why that position is tautologically true. Let me spell it out for you again. For something to be illusory it has to be the case that something is not what it appears to be. But consciousness is by definition subjective appearance to the self. Consciousness is what something seems to be to someone, so that itself cannot be an illusion. You can't say that the reality of the appearance of something to someone isn't what it is when what it is is the appearance of something to someone.

The bolded part is almost correct, consciousness is an appearance, and appearances have particulars.  The particulars of that appearing may be other than what they appear to be.  That's the illusory part.  If all that you're saying is that "appearing to" is "appearing to", you haven't touched upon the subject of consciousness in any way.  You're just mouthing empty predicates.  The part in blue simply doesn't follow and is thus a non sequitur.

You're literally arguing that illusions themselves aren't really experienced which makes the illusion itself an illusion of an illusion and thereby not really an illusion. If you're telling me that something isn't really not real you're telling me it's real. A double negative equates to a positive.

No, you're misunderstanding what I am saying, and resorting to the typical straw man that eliminative materialism, by saying that consciousness is an illusion is saying that it isn't "real" -- whatever the fuck that means in context.  Since 'real' doesn't pick out the distinction between being and appearing to be, it's a term best avoided.  And more word games.  What is it with you and semantic arguments?  I'm not telling you "that something isn't really not real".  That's your own locution which incorporates a straw man.

When the testimony of the witness is impeachable, we must rely on other facts for the truth.  That isn't acting as if first hand experience isn't real, it's acting as if first hand experience is illusory.

I don't think you understand what I am saying. I have tried to explain it many times... I am not saying that the first hand experiences aren't mistaken about external reality, and I am not saying that they aren't mistaken about the nature of internal subjective reality either... I'm saying that that however our experiences really seem to be that's how they really seem to be. Do you spot the tautology yet?! Saying that they don't really seem how they really seem and that what you really seem to be conscious of is not what you really seem to be conscious of is just akin to saying that a square doesn't really have four sides.
........................

And you wonder why I claim you're spouting empty predicates?  Really seem to be.  Let's unpack that.  First, we have the word 'really' which is once again implying that there is a real seeming to appear and an unreal seeming to appear.  As noted, this is unhelpful as what's in dispute is the contours of that seeming, not any ontological claim about its reality.  Seem.  Can you have a seeming to be without that seeming to be having a distinct appearance?  Consciousness feels unified, as if it occurs in the moment, as if it is a point phenomena occurring in a sort of non-space.  These are all characteristics of what this appearing "seems to be."  Is your claim is that none of the properties of this seeming can be illusory? because it is not tautological or definitional that these properties are backed by anything 'real'.

 

The point that Dennett makes in the video is telling in that regard.  Consciousness must take both time and space inside the brain to develop.  It makes no sense to talk of a 'now' in which you are experiencing something.

It doesn't matter what the mechanics or the structure of it is. See above. I'm merely being a realist about the fact that however consciousnes does appear to be that is how it appears to be. And however it seems to us that is indeed how it seems to us. We can't be mistaken about however it appears to us, we can only be mistaken about our memories of how it did appear, or our expectation about how it will appear or other details like that. If consciousness is however things appear to us then it is however things appear to us.

Things appear to us in a way that is likely distinct from how things appear to say a bat, in terms of the intentional subjects of consciousness.  However our intentionality has properties which are invariant as to whether we are experiencing a dream, or a sunset, or even the contents of our imagination.  It is the seeming to be of these properties which is under dispute, and that seeming to be is inseparable from consciousness qua consciousness.  If you are talking about consciousness, you are talking about those properties (or saying nothing at all).

Yes I agree that consciousness takes both time and space to develop. But all that exists in the present is now. Once again that's something else true by definition that you will have a problem with (do you have a problem with the notion of squares having four sides too?)...

Your sarcasm is neither relevant nor helpful.  Your analogy to a square having four sides is a false one as that is an analytical truth, whereas it is not an analytical truth that the properties of consciousness qua consciousness are as they appear.

You may think it's absurd to speak of consciousness 'now' but it's just as absurd to speak of it existing in the future or past but not in the present.

Your argument from incredulity is rearing its ugly head again.

Obviously consciousness takes many steps to develop but each step is very real and can be divided into smaller steps. Every pulsing moment is relevant. Consciousness is happening now. It will happen in the future and it has happened in the past. This is all true by definition provided that you assume that consciousness isn't going to disappear forever everywhere in the future and that the fact it existed in the past is not merely a false memory. But even if the past is all false memories and never happened, and even if the future never arrives... one thing we do know is that consciousness is happening now. And now. And now. In the present moment. We are experiencing it now. It is ongoing.

It doesn't matter how mistaken we are about the details. I will repeat it again. However consciousness really seems to us that is how it really seems to us. That's just a tautology but have fun banging your head against the equivalent of the fact that a square has four sides.

The details are all we have when it comes to consciousness, but by all means continue mouthing empty predicates that mean nothing, occasionally spicing it with false analogies.

 You can bleat all you want about how it's not an illusion,

I've already repeatedly admitted that those details can be illusory. You still haven't explained how the way things really do subjectively appear to us can't be how they really subjectively appear to us. And do you see how you're never going to do that? You may as well be saying that objects that really have four sides don't really have four sides.

I've explained it several times.  You can't have any "appearing to be" that isn't appearing to be in some particular way.  You keep avoiding that central point because it opens up the possibility that the way things really appear to us subjectively, as a phenomenon having invariant properties, does not really appear to anyone in that specific way.  You keep retreating to empty predicates which say nothing because they leave out the particularity of the phenomenon.  With consciousness, that particularity is all we've got, so you're not addressing anything real, you're just pushing placeholders around.  That's like saying, "It is what it is," without ever specifying what the 'it' is.  It's not philosophy.  It's masturbation.

You make the silly mistake that because everything real is physical and consciousness itself is mental instead of physical then consciousness can't be real. But obviously it's the equivocation fallacy to think that consciousness itself cannot be physical.

That's not the equivocation fallacy.

You ought to know what the term means simply by understanding the words separately, putting them together grammatically and reading them.... I mean... that's what I do

You're doing it wrong.  

As I have said... however consciousness really appears to us that is how it really appears to us. Consciousness experience itself cannot be illusory regardless of us being wrong about any specific details. We KNOW we are experiencing SOMETHING WHEN we DO EXPERIENCE SOMETHING.

The blue sentence does not follow from the red sentence.  The details are what makes it conscious experience, as opposed to say a subconscious event.  You're talking around the subject and not really saying anything.

That's because ontologically subjective doesn't mean anything.  It's a stand-in for Searle's assertions about consciousness.

Doesn't mean anything?



You're bascically saying that the ontology of consciousness isn't subjective because the very idea of any ontology being subjective "doesn't mean anything". You're saying that no one is conscious.

Bullshit.  You come up with the weirdest straw men in your attempt to avoid saying anything.  I nowhere gave any indication that I thought "no one is conscious," so you can just shove that crap.  I'm saying that as a composite term it has no meaning unless you incorporate Searle's absurd distinctions.  His distinctions are incoherent, so the composite term is incoherent.

Let me quote back something of yours I already quoted in this post... and enbolden your most epic fail of all in this thread, which completely betrays your undervaluing of tautological truths and your failure to recognize that words actually mean things... and this really does just show what nonsense you're talking about.

He is the one making a distinction between first and third hand knowledge whereas Dennett acts as if first hand experience isn't real and that all that matters is third person knowledge.

When the testimony of the witness is impeachable, we must rely on other facts for the truth.  That isn't acting as if first hand experience isn't real, it's acting as if first hand experience is illusory.

My bold. [my context restored]

I don't... I don't even.

It isn't acting as if first hand experience isn't real it's acting as if first hand experience is illusory? You do realize that an illusory experience is an experience that isn't real and an experience that isn't real is an illusory experience? That's what an illusion means: an experience that isn't real. And yet you say I play word games.....

That's not been the operating definition of what it means for something to be an illusion as it has been used in this thread, nor is it reflective of either my or Rhythm's position on the subject of consciousness.  By bandying about the word 'real' in this careless haphazard manner is nothing but an empty appeal devoid of substance.  (It's also a distortion of context, which I didn't catch on my first pass. That's very dishonest of you. It's misquoting, and that's a form of lying. I was saying that the dichotomy you were attributing to Dennett was false. And what is my reward? You redraw the context leaving out that particular. Tsk. Tsk. Not very sportsmanlike.) What it means for something to be real is not the issue.  Seemings to be are real whether or not they are illusory, so yes, again you're just playing word games.  'Real' or 'not real' isn't the debate.  Whether the seeming that is consciousness is what it appears to be is.  And my "biggest fail" (in your words) ends up being you just jacking off about a straw man.

So you and Dennett can redefine your ass off as much as you like and pretend you're being scientific... but pretending words mean things that they don't mean isn't what science is about. Sure, if it gets the science done. It doesn't change the matter of philosophical truths. Science isn't about philosophical truths. Just because atoms in the scientific sense are splittable doesn't mean atoms in the original sense of the word aren't unsplittable. So if the objective of the study of atoms was to try and prove that atoms in the original sense of the word were splittable... science would fail by definition. The difference between science and the elimativists, is science actually recognizes when it's changing the subject and actually knows its limits and what it can test and can't test. Unlike yourself and Dennett.

You're deluded.  Dennett and Rhythm and myself aren't "redefining" things so much as defining them, in the only language that is available to us, the details and properties of this seeming to be.  That isn't changing the subject, except when your only contribution to the question is the empty platitude, "I yam what I yam."  Well Popeye, consciousness qua consciousness is more than just an empty placeholder which you assure me is identical to itself.  Well, duh.  And schmurm is schmurm, and gorple is gorple.  You haven't said anything about a subject that most assuredly has properties if you're omitting those properties as belonging to the subject.  You haven't addressed the real subject at all, consciousness.  You've just jacked off to your own cleverness in not saying anything at all.

There's that assertion again that experience can't be illusory.  Shame you've got nothing to back it with.

We can experience illusions, yes. But that is not the same thing as all experiences being illusory... because that would include even illusory experiences being illusory. Take note of that. If no experiences are real then experiences that are unreal aren't really unreal. Which makes them real. But keep trying to have your cake and eat it too.

More semantic bullshit.  Arguments from grammar aren't really arguments, or at least it's not philosophically sound.  But keep on making them, and I'll continue to point out that it's just dicking around with words.