Consciousness Trilemma

[bennyboy]

Mind -is- behavior, from this pov.  Both the behavior of the system, and the behavior of the creature /w the system.  

Without an appreciation of the subjective capacity, in particular for the experience of suffering, then this view negates any meaningful sense of morality.

OFC harm still has meaning.  The same meaning.  We talk about harming ecosystems, harming the planet, harming this that or the other not-even-a-p-zombie thing.  

Nah, you're equivocating. In establishing a moral system, we do so in recognition largely of the fact of subjective suffering.

But let's examine even your definitions of harm. They are only "harm" because they matter to a subjective agent who feels value in things. Sure, you might have a philosophical zombie who acts like it cares about "X," but since it cannot experience the harm of damage to "X," in what sense does it matter whether its behavioral goals are or aren't achieved? What, morally, distinguishes between a blue Earth and one covered pole to pole in nuclear craters?

Lay all of that aside though.  Let's suppose that it's not wrong to harm others for fun because harm has no meaning in a universe where em is true.  So what?  It would still be true.  Similarly, regardless of whether or not we lived in a universe where there was no clean cut moral answer to the question of eating babies...you'd probably still feel bad about it.  The moral angle just isn't relevant with regards to the truth of any theory of mind.  Even an evil creatures immoral mind would still need to be explained.  To a functional theory, the moral status of the mind or it's actions make no difference.

Why are you referencing my feelings at all, moral or otherwise, or referring to the concept of evil? All these things, I'm pretty sure, are illusory by the standards of EM, no?