Consciousness Trilemma

[bennyboy]

Without an appreciation of the subjective capacity, in particular for the experience of suffering, then this view negates any meaningful sense of morality.

I don't think so, but assuming it did, so what?  

Nah, you're equivocating.  In establishing a moral system, we do so in recognition largely of the fact of subjective suffering.

-or the compelling illusion of subjective suffering as it expresses itself in behavior.  Honestly, Benny, it doesn;t matter.  I don't think you have anything here, but if you did...that wouldn't make EM any more or less true.

But let's examine even your definitions of harm.  They are only "harm" because they matter to a subjective agent who feels value in things.  Sure, you might have a philosophical zombie who acts like it cares about "X," but since it cannot experience the harm of damage to "X," in what sense does it matter whether its behavioral goals are or aren't achieved?  What, morally, distinguishes between a blue Earth and one covered pole to pole in nuclear craters?

Meh, let's not.

Why are you referencing my feelings at all, moral or otherwise, or referring to the concept of evil?  All these things, I'm pretty sure, are illusory by the standards of EM, no?

...because nothing about this life or my experience ...or yours, changes on account of any particular theory of mind being true or false.  We, both, are what we are regardless.

Our capacity for moral feelings, and their resulting behaviors, are real enough, are they not?  If you have a theory of mind to which morality is irrelevant, but the reality is that it IS relevant, then your theory of mind is incorrect or incomplete.