Is atheism self-contradictory ?

[Amarok]

Essentially he and the OP are trying to push the EEAN. By making up absurd unrealistic scenario's that evolution would not favors. Or has no context in evolution(his stupid burger idea) .To prove that false idea's can be survivable. Mixed with the idea of trying to divorce math and logic from the realm they apply . All to push the baseless idea that a magic sky fairy can make a reliable mind.  While still ignoring why a god would create I brain needs to learn. everything from logic math etc or why it took thousands of years to think up said systems . rather then have them be pre programmed into us at conception.

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Pretty much . Ether a so called perfect mind done it or it can't be relied on . Of course they need to assert it exists first .

And to find a way to justify how it terminates the infinite regress without simply special pleading.

They will just assert divine revelation or the sensuous derpious or gods design . Even thou those all beg the question "how do you it's true" And again why would a good care about giving you truth . Without assuming he cares or values true over lies.

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Another blow of course is the fact academia has already answered this objection for instance

De Cruz, H., M. Boudry, J. De Smedt, and S. Blancke. 2011. “Evolutionary Approaches to Epistemic Justification.”

or

Maarten Boudry and Michael Vlerick paper Natural Selection Does Care about Truth

Abstract

True beliefs are better guides to the world than false ones. This is the common-sense assumption that undergirds theorizing in evolutionary epistemology. According to Alvin Plantinga, however, evolution by natural selection does not care about truth: it cares only about fitness. If our cognitive faculties are the products of blind evolution, we have no reason to trust them, anytime or anywhere. Evolutionary naturalism, consequently, is a self-defeating position. Following up on earlier objections, we uncover three additional flaws in Plantinga's latest formulation of his argument: a failure to appreciate adaptive path dependency, an incoherent conception of content ascription, and a conflation of common-sense and scientific beliefs, which we diagnose as the ‘foundationalist fallacy’. More fundamentally, Plantinga's reductive formalism with respect to the issue of cognitive reliability is inadequate to deal with relevant empirical details