(June 30, 2017 at 8:45 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: "Is God's nature good because it is God's, or is God's nature good because it is morally good (i.e. it conforms to an independent standard of good)?" You see, playing the ontology card has gained you nothing. Just as the Euthyphro dilemma applies to Divine Command Theory, it also applies to the argument that morality is derived from God's nature. Either God's nature is arbitrarily good simply because it is God's, which results in an arbitrary set of morals which by definition is not moral. Or God's nature is good in that it conforms to a standard of goodness that is independent of God, making God's nature superfluous to the question of morals. You have accomplished nothing by your detour into ontology except to confuse the issue. God is still an unsatisfactory source of morality, and you're left empty handed, claiming the existence of objective morals that you can't explain.
See bold.
You have just gutted the dilemma. The unwanted conclusion of the original dilemma was that God could change his mind and good could be redefined. The bold above simply points out in so many words that morality is based on God's nature. Natures don't change. No unwanted conclusion.
Regarding the arbitrary characterization, how much more objective could the nature of an eternal God be?
