Emotions are intrinsically good and bad

[Edwardo Piet]

My analogy was stating that blind people could think of colors in their mind without visualizing them. 

Well, no, they can't.

In that same regard, you could still think of things having good value even without your euphoria and act, make decisions, etc. accordingly.  So, just use the version of my sight analogy that says that a blind person can think of colors, but not visualize them

And even if they could.... your analogy is terrible again. Saying "They could work it out so I could work it out even though I haven't even made an argument yet" doesn't work. Stop using analogies because you clearly don't know how to use them.

Again, as I have repeatedly made crystal clear: The premise "Emotions are intrinsically good and bad" doesn't entail "Time is more important than intensity." and giving a shitty analogy that doesn't even work won't do you any good. And even if your analogy wasn't a false analogy and we accepted your point that you could work it out.... the fact you have to work it out and use common sense is just admitting that your premise for intrinsic value is insufficient because you also need common sense.

And once again: you're wrong. Intensity is more important than time. And I actually have arguments to support that position... unlike yourself.

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It was a great metaphor that described what my positive emotions are for me. 

No it's an awful metaphor because it's as obnoxious as the image it's based on. This "inner light" shit is vile so why would you want that as a metaphor? It stinks of religion, spirituality, superstition and woo. If you really did have a half-decent position why would you want to relate it to religion???? Wtf.

Instead of your disgusting metaphors and failed analogies... how about you actually make a sound argument for once. And instead of having a position disgustingly reminiscent of a religion... why not actually have a respectable philosophical position?

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Drug Addicts Know The Truth And They Wish To Sell It To You:  When the drug addict gets a blissful high, he would report that this blissful high is like a whole new perception of good value and beauty that goes beyond any thought form.

And a whole lot of pain, depression and addiction too.

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I don't think I am the disabled one here.  I think I am the transcended one here.  Hence my username "Transcended Dimensions." 

No. I am the transcended one here. In fact I am both more disabled and more transcended than you. And I don't need a username to tell everyone that

You're so subpar in your enlightenment level that I look at you and laugh to myself thinking "Sheeez... I remember when I was like that. How embarrassing. I've moved on from that by quite a lot now haven't I?".

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Meanwhile people who think that subjective experience can't be objectively good or bad because it's "subjective" are failing to spot their own equivocations.

Nope.  It's not in the experience, it's in the definition of "good."  That word can be defined however anybody wants, and that is the definition of subjectivity.  Something which is intrinsically good is good without being defined so by somebody-- and there's no such thing.

Nope. Fail. Because in that case science and logic aren't objective because we have to define that objectivity with words that can be defined how anybody wants.

Words themselves aren't objective. It's what they mean after you define them that's objective.

And the point is that epistemic objectivity is different to ontological objectivity so there's no contradiction when someone claims that something ontologically subjective can be epistemically objective.

Any time anybody says that objective morality can't meet their standards of 'objective' they fail to acknowledge that science can't even meet their standards of 'objective' either. It's just special pleading.

Sam Harris dealt with this in detail:

https://www.samharris.org/blog/item/clar...-landscape

This destroys even the best arguments against objective morality. It's an article in response to an essay that got voted as the best argument against Sam's argument. And it's the same standard shit argued against objective morality only it goes into great detail. Sam then shows why all those arguments misfire.

Also, this article, Clarifying The Landscape really does clarify things. His original case is strong but despite already refuting a lot of counter arguments within it when read more closely... it doesn't clearly knock down all the counter arguments. But this article, Clarifying The Moral Landscape, does.

And I would say that this article I have linked, Clarifying The Moral Landscape, is actually better than his book. As clearly and convincingly defeating all the counter arguments is more important to me than him speculating about the implications of his argument. Especially when I don't even agree with him on 100% of the implications because I don't believe in aggregation of utility, for instance.

So his book is pretty good but nothing special. But this article is brilliant.

In case you don't want to read the whole article... here's one of the best sections from it:

Ryan wrote that my “proposed science of morality cannot offer scientific answers to questions of morality and value, because it cannot derive moral judgments solely from scientific descriptions of the world.” But no branch of science can derive its judgments solely from scientific descriptions of the world. We have intuitions of truth and falsity, logical consistency, and causality that are foundational to our thinking about anything. Certain of these intuitions can be used to trump others: We may think, for instance, that our expectations of cause and effect could be routinely violated by reality at large, and that apes like ourselves may simply be unequipped to understand what is really going on in the universe. That is a perfectly cogent idea, even though it seems to make a mockery of most of our other ideas. But the fact is that all forms of scientific inquiry pull themselves up by some intuitive bootstraps. Gödel proved this for arithmetic, and it seems intuitively obvious for other forms of reasoning as well. I invite you to define the concept of “causality” in noncircular terms if you would test this claim. Some intuitions are truly basic to our thinking. I claim that the conviction that the worst possible misery for everyone is bad and should be avoided is among them.

Contrary to what Ryan suggests, I don’t believe that the epistemic values of science are “self-justifying”—we just can’t get completely free of them. We can bracket certain of them in local cases, as we do in quantum mechanics, but these are instances in which we are then forced to admit that we don’t (yet) understand what is going on. Our knowledge of the world seems to require that it behave in certain ways (e.g. if A is bigger than B, and B is bigger than C, then A will be bigger than C). When these principles are violated, we are invariably confused.

So I think the distinction that Ryan draws between science in general and the science of medicine is unwarranted. He says, “Science cannot show empirically that health is good. But nor, I would add, can science appeal to health to defend health’s value, as it would appeal to logic to defend logic’s value.” But science can’t use logic to validate logic. It presupposes the value of logic from the start. Consequently, Ryan seems to be holding my claims about moral truth to a standard of self-justification that no branch of science can meet. Physics can’t justify the intellectual tools one needs to do physics. Does that make it unscientific?

Q.E.D.