Van Tillian/Clarkian Presuppositional Apologetics.

[Ryft]

Attempting to prove the existence of anything by positing an argument is "arguing x into existence" by definition.

No, sir. Arguing a thing into existence implies that it did not exist prior to said argument. An argument that regards the existence of S is very different from arguing S "into existence."

I listed the fallacies in [Matt Slick's] version of TAG, a common version of the argument we see often.

Slick is only marginally better informed on this issue than Sarfati; he is considerably better in the arena of theology (having earned a Masters of Divinity from Westminster Theological Seminary). It is curious that so much is said about Van Tilian presuppositionalism with references to just about anyone but Van Til (or Bahnsen, Frame, Oliphint, etc.), particularly when those references point to the weakest arguments. Is that how we conduct rational inquiry and scrutiny of competing views, by seeking out the weakest arguments? You keep asking me to post a "refined" presuppositional apologetic, but I fail to see the need to repeat the work already done by Van Til and others. If you want the strongest arguments, then go and seek them out; they have been in print for a very long time. Here are some recommendations:

- Cornelius Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 4th edition. (Ed.) K. Scott Oliphint.
- Greg Bahnsen, Presuppositional Apologetics: Stated and Defended. (Ed.) Joel McDurmon.
- K. Scott Oliphint, Reasons for Faith: Philosophy in the Service of Theology.
- John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought.

If I used the wording you began with in our conversation and simply changed God to L. Ron Hubbard, you would be similarly unable to pick apart the argument.

Because you say so?

"And how do we know that The Bridge of Fire is a credible source of information?" -- Irrelevant question (your own tactics).

Incorrect. I did not identify your question as an irrelevant issue but rather as a separate issue. It is an obfuscating categorical error to confront a metaphysical point with an epistemological counter, because metaphysics and epistemology, although related, are separate categories. In discussions I tend to insist that separate categories remain, well, separate. It is my hope that with this correction in place you will not misrepresent me in the future. (For those reading this thread, he was referring to a conversation we had in a Google Plus hang out.)

"And when his writings conflict with observed reality?" -- Do they? You have misunderstood (your own tactics).

Again, incorrect. I did not say that you misunderstood. You said that Genesis 1 says such-and-such and I replied, "Does it?" I wanted you to make your case that Genesis 1 does in fact say that; since you refused to make that case, I am incapable of determining whether or not you misunderstood the text. You may or may not have. You would need to make your case in order for that to be determined. (He is referring to that same conversation.)

If you wish to use this argument then you must also allow Scientologists to use this argument.

What makes you think I do not allow them to? They are free to try. And they will fail.

Can both Scientology and Christianity be true?

You know very well that it is impossible for both X and not-X to both be true.

Your premise is in effect "God exists." It is therefore unsurprising that your conclusion is "God exists."

It seems you do not understand what a presupposition is. If X is a conclusion drawn, then by definition it is not an axiom presupposed. The truth of God and his word is not something we conclude, it is something we presuppose; specifically, it is prior to even the criteria by which anything is concluded (given its nature as the necessary precondition of intelligibility). Your misrepresentations of presuppositional apologetics suggests that you have not even read Van Til or Bahnsen, etc.

That is the point of my comment about invalidating logic. If we allow arguments to contain fallacy, and if we allow such massive presuppositions—pregnant, as you would say—then any false statement can be proven true.

You repeat this point without having addressed my response to it.

I'm sure you would lose your shit if materialists used your exact presupposition and replaced "God" with "metaphysical naturalism."

That is quite a comedic error. If they replace God with anything not-God, then they are not using my presupposition (much less exactly).

Back to TAG, the explanation of numbers assumes nothing; it merely states that these things are observations that would exist even if there were no transcendent minds.

Umm, if there are no minds (transcendent or otherwise), then how are these things "observations"?

There may be such a mind ...

Saying that there "may be" such a mind demonstrates that you have not turned our attention "back to TAG" at all, for God is necessary being (cf. actus purus).

... but using logical absolutes as proof of such a mind is bad practice for exactly those reasons stated.

Presuppositional apologetics does not reason from logic to God, but from God to logic. You really need to read Van Til (et al.).

They do not REQUIRE such a mind.

That may be true on YOUR presuppositions, but not on the presuppositions of those you are arguing against. Ergo, your statement begs the very question. As Frame said, regarding logic being grounded in the nature and character of God, "If logic cannot exist without God, then to deny that God exists while affirming the law of contradiction is like denying the existence of the sun while affirming the existence of its rays. Of course, you will deny my view that logic cannot exist without God. But that is what we are debating, and you should not therefore beg that question."

It isn't incumbent upon me to explain the preconditions of knowledge; I need only show that there is no requirement of God—

—which you have not in fact shown, but merely asserted. The question in our present context is the presupposition of God being the necessary precondition of intelligibility, which cannot be denied by simply begging the very question.

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If [the TAG] goes through, it would mean that in some way logic depends on God and is thus contingent. But to state this appears to be self refuting because it would mean logical truths aren't necessarily true, but are instead arbitrary ...

That does not follow. Logic "depends on God" in the sense that it is grounded in the nature and character of God; thus it cannot be arbitrary and cannot fail to be necessarily true, as God himself is necessary being (cf. actus purus).