Actual Infinity in Reality?

[polymath257]

Interesting point.  Do you imagine that the natural laws that govern the universe reflect the universe's intention?  Or do such laws just reflect the brute nature of stuff and how it interacts with other stuff?

Both seem like loaded questions (though probably not intentionally so). My only point was that the discussion gets derailed when people fail to distinguish between the description of a thing and the thing itself. In this particular case, I am asserting that some qualities have ontological status.

When someone says that a sensible body is triangular, they are describing that body as having a distinct quality that is shares with other triangular bodies. Saying that something is triangular is an acknowledgement that it shares a certain kind of about-ness with other similar bodies, i.e. triangularity. It's simply not enough to say the word "triangle" is what we call the set of three-sided bodies. You also have to recognize that you are referring something which gives those objects similarity - the quality of triangularity they all share.

If qualities don't exist, then descriptive words do not refer to anything.

In what sense do they exist?  As something outside of us, something in our minds, or as simple language conventions?

Whether something is a triangle or not isn't a matter of it sharing 'triangularity' with other triangles. It is a matter of having three straight sides, etc as in the definition of a triangle. It is a propositional statement and not a statement about something shared with an existing object.

Why *isn't* it enough to simply say that 'triangle' is a word we associate with certain three-sided bodies? it is a concept *we* define: a language convention *we* use to help us understand.

Descriptive words simply say that an object meets the criteria for some definition. It isn't about 'sharing' an 'about-ness'.

Platonism is the first BIG philosophical mistake.

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Both seem like loaded questions (though probably not intentionally so). My only point was that the discussion gets derailed when people fail to distinguish between the description of a thing and the thing itself. In this particular case, I am asserting that some qualities have ontological status.

When someone says that a sensible body is triangular, they are describing that body as having a distinct quality that is shares with other triangular bodies. Saying that something is triangular is an acknowledgement that it shares a certain kind of about-ness with other similar bodies, i.e. triangularity. It's simply not enough to say the word "triangle" is what we call the set of three-sided bodies. You also have to recognize that you are referring something which gives those objects similarity - the quality of triangularity they all share.

If qualities don't exist, then descriptive words do not refer to anything.

Do those qualities exist solely in our shared collective minds?
Or do they exist independently of our minds?

A triangle would still be a triangle, if no mind was to exist... but would that triangularity exist?
Is triangularity discovered or invented?

I'll go for invented for $1000, please.