Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[vulcanlogician]

I don't like the Wikipedia formulation. Here is the one I use:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

and what must that cause be like:

4. To stop an infinite regress of causes, the cause of the universe (or it's predecessor) is an "uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful." (from your quote above)

This avoids a misunderstanding of the argument and also eliminates parody attempts like above. 

The KCA is an inductive argument. This is an important point. "Inductive reasoning (as opposed to deductive reasoning or abductive reasoning) is reasoning in which the premises are viewed as supplying strong evidence for the truth of the conclusion.While the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument is probable, based upon the evidence given." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning

Which number(s) do you think are false?

Until I looked it up, I assumed the KCA was deductive (as most cosmological arguments are), but you are right. It's inductive. It wouldn't have killed WLC to use the word probably or likely. It's worded like deductive logic, so please forgive my error. It doesn't really matter though. My problem isn't with the conclusion.

Let's look at the part of the argument that deals with contingency first. I'll quote your post below, with my commentary in bold.

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause. This is true of things within the universe, yes.
2. The universe began to exist. This is fine, though it isn't necessarily true.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. This does not follow because premise 1 is not necessarily true of the entire universe--composition fallacy.

I omitted the contingency part of the argument because in my first response because it has little to with the point I was trying to make--that the cosmological argument is god of the gaps argument. This part of the argument has no god of gaps reasoning, yet it is still problematic because of the composition fallacy. As a youtube video I once saw put it, the composition fallacy works in some cases but not all. If the individual bricks in a wall are red, it follows that the wall itself would be red. True enough. But what if the individual bricks are small? Would it follow that the wall that the wall itself would be small? Not necessarily. You could have a large wall made up of small bricks. https://youtu.be/ppBxkTTGoRQ

Bertrand Russell accused the cosmological argument of the composition fallacy:

But why should we think that the cosmos is contingent? Defenders of the view contend that if the components of the universe are contingent, the universe itself is contingent. Russell replies that the move from the contingency of the components of the universe to the contingency of the universe commits the Fallacy of Composition, which mistakenly concludes that since the parts have a certain property, the whole likewise has that property. Hence, whereas we legitimately can ask for the cause of particular things, to require a cause of the universe or the set of all contingent beings based on the contingency of its parts is mistaken.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmo...-argument/
Now for the second part:

4. To stop an infinite regress of causes, the cause of the universe (or it's predecessor) is an "uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful." (from your quote above)

I already explained this in my last post. Just take the words "personal creator" out and it still works. Some Hindus see God as an impersonal force from which all things emanate. Their concept, Brahman, would just as adequately satisfy this portion of the argument as Yahweh. Similarly, any other descriptor "beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless..." needn't be a property of this being. I'll give you "enormously powerful"... that's the only property required of such a force.

Taking all this into account, you could rephrase the premise like this:

4. To stop an infinite regress of causes, the cause of the universe (or it's predecessor) is an uncaused, enormously powerful force.

I don't see any materialist taking issue with the premise when worded like this. To reason any further than this is god of the gaps reasoning.