Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[SteveII]

Well, Spinoza thought it was an axiom (Axiom 7). In fact, I read in some places he says it is a necessary truth. 


In all of our observations, something has never come from nothing. Everything as always come from something. Is that enough evidence for the principle: being comes from being?

I don't think Spinoza is who you want to consult for support, Steve. The same SEP article you quote says:

Spinoza allows for one unique item to be without a cause. In §70 of this treatise, Spinoza argues:

[T]hat Thought is also called true which involves objectively the essence of some principle that does not have a cause, and is known through itself and in itself. (II/26/33–4. Our emphasis)

That makes sense doesn't it. "One unique item" is without cause. But that is a rather unique an mysterious item that doesn't have a cause isn't it? We mortals could hardly fathom such a thing. The KCA places a god in the fog of our bewilderment. That's the whole problem with premise 4.

First, (4) is not a premise. I numbered it for reference, but clearly kept it separate from the 3-part argument that ended in a 'therefore'. It is the conclusion of what type of cause must be the first cause, because really, that is the point of this whole endeavor. In other words, the KCA seeks to show that a cause is needed for the universe. Only then, can we discuss what attributes that cause would have.

Regarding Spinoza's quick reference to God, all he has done is describe a necessary being (versus a contingent being). Since a necessary being never begins to exist, it, by definition, does not have a cause. You cannot infer any properties of God from that quick reference. The inference to what properties a cause of the universe might have is discussed down below. 

"To stop an infinite regress of causes, the cause of the universe (or it's predecessor) is an uncaused, personal Creator of the universe exists who sans the universe is beginningless, changeless, immaterial, timeless, spaceless and enormously powerful."

Where does one gather that this uncaused cause must have all these properties? Show me the logic. I simply don't see it.

I like Spinoza's version way better: "does not have a cause, and is known through itself and in itself." That's all. And, yes, Spinoza does call this principle God, but it isn't any God that theists talk about.

1. Spinoza's God is not personal. It does not care about the affairs of mankind. It isn't self-aware of itself in the sense that we are. It doesn't care about your life or anyone else's.
2. It is not a creator. It is "nature being nature." It is itself all that is. It did not deliberately create the cosmos. God just "happened" and we are all part of it.
3. As for beginingless, I cannot say. I'd have to look it up.
4. Spinoza's God is not changeless. It changes.
5. Spinoza's God is not immaterial. In fact, Spinoza's God literally is all material. It's not just material. It is infinite and encompasses all things whether material or immaterial. But to Spinoza, the coffee cup in your hand is God. So is every one of your pubic hairs.
6. Timeless I don't know. What does timeless even mean in this context? Put this one down for a maybe.
7. Spinoza's God is not spaceless. It is space and everything within it. And anything that might exist outside spacial dimensions is also God.
8. I'll give you enormously powerful again because Spinoza's God is all power everywhere. Since it actually is all power, it follows that "enormously powerful" is an appropriate descriptor.

So out of 8 qualities, 2 might match up to Spinoza's conception. Like I said, Spinoza doesn't really help your case. In fact, he obliterates premise 4 by postulating an entity with virtually none of the qualities listed in it.

Where did this list of properties in premise 4 come from? Where are they demonstrated to be necessary in the argument? You see my problem. Give me some logic.

I answered this directly to you in Post#2546:

A cause of the universe must be:

Changeless/timeless: these go together. To be in a timeless state, there can be no change. Since time itself came into existence at the first moments of the universe, prior to that must be a timeless state. 
Immaterial: Since space came into existence at the first moments of the universe, the cause must not be made of at least the material in our universe. Material/physical object need space in which to exists and then you have the question that if space exists, then time exists. 
Personal: Rather than me reword WLC explanation of Ghazali's explanation, here it is:

Finally, Ghazali argued that this Uncaused First Cause must also be a personal being. It’s the only way to explain how an eternal cause can produce an effect with a beginning like the universe.

Here’s the problem: If a cause is sufficient to produce its effect, then if the cause is there, the effect must be there, too. For example, the cause of water’s freezing is the temperature’s being below 0 degrees Celsius. If the temperature has been below 0 degrees from eternity, then any water around would be frozen from eternity. It would be impossible for the water to begin to freeze just a finite time ago. Now the cause of the universe is permanently there, since it is timeless. So why isn’t the universe permanently there as well? Why did the universe come into being only 14 billion years ago? Why isn’t it as permanent as its cause?

Ghazali maintained that the answer to this problem is that the First Cause must be a personal being endowed with freedom of the will. His creating the universe is a free act which is independent of any prior determining conditions. So his act of creating can be something spontaneous and new. Freedom of the will enables one to get an effect with a beginning from a permanent, timeless cause. Thus, we are brought not merely to a transcendent cause of the universe but to its Personal Creator.