Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[SteveII]

Regarding, "begins to exist", that can be dealt with in two ways.

1) is to provide a univocal meaning of the phrase in both premises. So, let's go with comes into being. 
2) is to provide a more detailed meaning that would apply to both premises: x begins to exist if and only if x exists at some time t and there is no time t' prior to t at which x exists.

either one eliminates your objection. 

Either you are being disingenuous, or you don't understand the objection.  I'll explain it again.  When you say in premise 1 that all things that begin to exist have a cause, you are making an statement about the transformation of matter and energy from one form to another. If you include the universe in the set of all things that begin to exist then you are also talking about the creation of new matter.  The two  types of beginning to exist are fundamentally different. We see things in the universe transform all the time, and often can show the cause (really causes) of that transformation.   We do not see matter itself begin to exist.  We cannot say whether such a creation has a cause.  

Changing your phrase from beginning to exist to coming into being doesn't help you, because you are still talking about to fundamentally different types of comming into existence.

Matilda gets at this problem when she asks when a snowflake begins to exist.  It's rather hard to say as it doesn't spring into existenceall at once.  The crystalline shape of the water forms becomes a snowflake bit by bit. Water is added as it forms.  Similarly, a person is formed slowly over a long gestation period during which material is is continuously added.  Even after a person comes into existence material continues to be added and subtracted.  There is no precise beginning or end to this kind of material transformation.  And all of the little bits of transformation have their own causes.

The universe began with all of its material parts and it still had all of its material parts.  It began at a discrete time, i.e the first moment of time.  Prior to that there was no time.  

Your second more precise definition actually makes the problem clearer.  Because time begins with the beginning of the universe, it makes no sense to discuss whether there was a time before the universe existed.

What you have have here is an elementary category error, in that you have  a set which includes the set as a member of the set.  Your set incudes all material things, and the universe which is the set of all material things. Anytime you include a set in it's own set it leads to logical error.  For example, if you describe the set of all whole numbers and include set of of all whole numbers within the set then you end up with syllogisms like this.

All whole numbers are finite
The set all whole numbers is a whole number
Therefore the set of all whole numbers is finite.

I understand your point. You are pointing out the difference between inside the universe and outside the universe and then insisting that it matters. You don't give reasons why it matters. Later on, you just say it is a category error. It's not, because I don't need a specific kind of cause to be true or to create "sets" with them. All that is needed to span any difference is that a causal principle is an objective feature of reality. This would apply both in and out of the universe. There are good reasons to believe this exists and no good reasons to think that it does not.

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quent:

P implies Q
Q 
therefore P

Also called the fallacy of the converse. An example is:

1. If Bill Gates owns Fort Knox (P), then Bill Gates is rich (Q).
2. Bill Gates is rich. (Q)
3. Therefore, Bill Gates owns Fort Knox. (P)

This is the KCA

P implies Q 
P 
therefore Q

1. Everything that begins to exist (P) has a cause. (Q)
2. The universe began to exist. (P)
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. (Q)

Nope. Definitely not Affirming the Consequent. 

You point out two possibilities: those things that don't begin to exist and those things that do. That is very simply put the distinction between something that is necessary and something that is contingent. You could insert the phrase "All contingent objects" in the Premise (1) and it would mean exactly the same thing. The universe by definition is a contingent object. The reason that Premise (1) is formulated that way is because necessary objects don't have a cause--so don't belong in Premise (1)

You may be correct on this technically not being affirming the consequent, but it still smuggles the conclusion into the first premise.

The problem is, even if the terms are changed to contingent and necessary, the problem remains.

The formulation of premise 1 is the problem. Just because it does not explicitly contain the term "necessary" (or, things that don't begin to exist), does not mean it is not implicitly there. You can't create a set of "all things that begin to exist" without implicitly creating the set of "things that do not begin to exist".

It stands to reason that if you define something you exclude everything else that does not meet that definition. Does this mean you are making some sort of claims about everything else that does not fit the definition or does it give the everything else so sort of status that it did not have before? No, that's silly. 

And, if the theist using this argument only believes one thing (his or her god) is in the set of all things that don't begin to exist (or necessary), the the first premise (implicitly) contains the conclusion.  

Even if I am wrong here, KCA also contains an equivocation fallacy in the second premise, so it still fails.

Regarding equivocation between "Begins to Exist" in Premise 1 and 2, that can be dealt with in two ways. 

1) is to provide a univocal meaning of the phrase in both premises. So, let's go with comes into being. 
2) is to provide a more detailed meaning that would apply to both premises: x begins to exist if and only if x exists at some time t and there is no time t' prior to t at which x exists.

either one eliminates your objection.