Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[SteveII]

Remember, the premise does not have to be 100% proven. It just has to be more likely than not. On this point, I would say it exceeds that threshold and is near the "almost definitely true" end of the spectrum. 

I remember no such thing.  And I'm going to start here, because I find this statement flabergasting.   

We are rehashing things already discussed. I cannot possibly know what posts you have read. Here is the very first paragraph under the article of Inductive Reasoning:

Inductive reasoning (as opposed to deductive reasoning or abductive reasoning) is a method of reasoning in which the premises are viewed as supplying strong evidence for the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument may be probable, based upon the evidence given.[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inductive_reasoning

More likely than not is not the standard for premises in syllogisms.   (I'll get to whether your premises exceed that standard in minute). If your standard is, "more likely than not," then you are obliged to add more likely than not to each conclusion following from that premise.  If more than one of your premises is merely "more likely than not" the chances of  the conclusion following from those premises will fall below 50%.  For example, if the chance premise A is correct is 51% and the chance premise B is correct is also 51%, then the chances that they are both correct is just 26%. Even if the chances that each premise is correct are 70% the chances of both premises being correct drops to 49% and thus becomes less likely than not.

Just about everything in that paragraph is wrong--starting with your requirements about premises in a syllogism. Read the link above to learn more about an inductive argument. 

As to the percentage question, you do NOT multiply probabilities together to come up with a net probability in a syllogism. The conclusion's probability is equal to the lowest of the premise probabilities. Think about it--the more premises you have that are likely true would reduce the net probability if you multiplied them together. 

This is the point at which you are not understanding me. I am not extrapolating rules.  That would actually be a composition fallacy and not a category error--but that is beside the point. Premise 1 does not say: Everything that begins to exist in the universe has a cause. It it making a general statement that is meant to apply to all possible worlds, all possible universes, all possible states of reality that may have come prior to a particular universe. It is a metaphysical statement that applies to any existence -- not a scientific one which would only apply within our universe. 

WLC, the foremost authority on this argument, said it this way in an article:

That is where we disagree.  The concept that something cannot come from nothing is an empirically based idea.  Craig asserts it as an empirically based idea in his third reason,  "Common experience and scientific evidence confirm the truth of premise."  It comes from observation of things within the universe.  (Interestingly, it may not be true even within the universe at the quantum level.  https://www.scientificamerican.com/artic...icles-rea/)  For this inductive reasoning to follow, one must take it as proof that the universe was made of something that predated the universe.

While the "concept that something cannot come from nothing" has empirical support, it also has metaphysical support (WLC reasons 1 and 2). His exact quote in his third reason is "Common experience and scientific evidence confirm the truth of premise (1). Premise (1) is constantly verified and never falsified." In other words, even science agrees to this principle. You cannot fashion from this some argument from composition. 

Let's take a look at Craig's other arguments for the premise that something cannot come from nothing

f something can come into being from nothing, then it becomes inexplicable why just anything or everything doesn't come into being from nothing . . .  Why is it only universes that can pop into being from nothing? What makes nothingness so discriminatory? There can't be anything about nothingness that favors universes, for nothingness doesn't have any properties. Nor can anything constrain nothingness, since there isn't anything to be constrained!

Interestingly, it still  seems Craig is asserting that the universe was created from something. The actual argument doesn't work though.  The discriminating factor could simply be that something only comes into being in actual  nothingness.  The universe is something, so things cannot spontaniouly begin to exist within it.

No, he is not asserting anything of the kind. He is outlining the problems you have if you are going to go the route that things can begin to exist without a cause. Regarding the last sentence, are you saying that the universe somehow has the property of shielding us from things popping into existence and without it, that shield is gone? 

But let's assume for a moment that Craig is right that something can never come out of nothing. Lets take that a little further, as I did before:

You could of course argue that the universe is made up of pre-existing matter.  But if you go that way, then you will have to add all existing matter to the set of things that did not begin to exist in which case under your formulation, matter being eternal  would not need a cause.)

To which you responded

I wouldn't go that way.

I don't think Craig would go that way either.  But all of his arguments in favor of the premise that all things that begin to exist have a cause are nothing more than arguments that something cannot come out of nothing. Coming into existence in his arguments is merely assuming a new form.  It's a rearangement of the existing molecular furniture.  Matter can only come from matter is the jist of his argument not that all matter has a cause.  If matter cannot come from nothing, than the obvious conclusion is that the matter that makes up the world in this universe has always existed whether it was a universe or not.  Other than it doesn't require God, what troubles you about this conclusion?

You missed something along the way. There is no 'jist' that "matter can only come from matter'. You read in your own meaning to something somewhere. Look back over the reasons and realize that each word was chosen on purpose. You are probably getting your 'jist' from the answer you would give to his questions. Go ahead, paste the precise quote that suggests what you are talking about and I will show you where you are wrong. 

The idea that matter is it's own first cause of its current form is no less logical than that was also a preexisting thing that created the existing universe out of prexisting matter.  In fact it's more likely as it only requires stuff that we know exists to have existed eternally and not that a thing we don't know exists to have existed externally.

If you reject the notion that the universe is made of preexisting stuff, than you are back to comparing  what we know about the transformation of stuff from one form or another to the actual creation of stuff.  Adding a magician (or god) to create stuff out of nothing is not helpful. It's merely a place holder for we don't know how stuff is created.

I won't think what we know about the transformation of stuff has any application to the actual creation of new material or whether the material out of which the universe is eternal.

There are several possibilities:

(1) The material out of which the universe is made is eternal and it's  interactions with itself are it's  own cause; or

(2) Something, i.e. the material out of which the universe is made, can begin to exist spontaneously,  but actual nothing is required for spontaneous existence which is why stuff doesn't spontaniouly exist within the universe;

(3) Only the smallest most basic particles can spontaneously  begin to exist.  The universe began from the spontaneous generation of micro particles.  That has the advantage of considering the spontaneous creation of virtual particles observed by physicists.

(4) A prexisting agency (you can call it god if you like, but I wouldn't as it's only attribute appears to be the abilty to create matter) of some kind created matter out of nothing.

(5) A preexisting agency of some kind created the universe out of prexeisting matter.

Of the five, I find 4 or 5 the least likely because they require the existense of something beyond what we know to exist.

1. Except the concept that matter existing for an infinite amount of time has logical problems all through it. There is no concept that would allow for matter that could have traversed an actual infinite number of causes/effects to get to the beginning of our universe. 

2-3. Are basically the same thing. Believing that seems to be the result of not wanting the argument to succeed. I am not even sure anyone seriously believes this let along get it to the threshold of "likely". This violates every thread of reasoning ever--because, again, causality seems to be an objective feature of reality and you want to deny that to salvage an argument. 

4. No that would not be it's only attributes. This has been discussed already too (twice): 

A cause of the universe must be:

Changeless/timeless: these go together. To be in a timeless state, there can be no change. Since time itself came into existence at the first moments of the universe, prior to that must be a timeless state. 

Immaterial: Since space came into existence at the first moments of the universe, the cause must not be made of at least the material in our universe. Material/physical object need space in which to exists and then you have the question that if space exists, then time exists. 

Personal: Rather than me reword WLC explanation of Ghazali's explanation, here it is:

Finally, Ghazali argued that this Uncaused First Cause must also be a personal being. It’s the only way to explain how an eternal cause can produce an effect with a beginning like the universe.

Here’s the problem: If a cause is sufficient to produce its effect, then if the cause is there, the effect must be there, too. For example, the cause of water’s freezing is the temperature’s being below 0 degrees Celsius. If the temperature has been below 0 degrees from eternity, then any water around would be frozen from eternity. It would be impossible for the water to begin to freeze just a finite time ago. Now the cause of the universe is permanently there, since it is timeless. So why isn’t the universe permanently there as well? Why did the universe come into being only 14 billion years ago? Why isn’t it as permanent as its cause?

Ghazali maintained that the answer to this problem is that the First Cause must be a personal being endowed with freedom of the will. His creating the universe is a free act which is independent of any prior determining conditions. So his act of creating can be something spontaneous and new. Freedom of the will enables one to get an effect with a beginning from a permanent, timeless cause. Thus, we are brought not merely to a transcendent cause of the universe but to its Personal Creator.

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writings...-argument/

---

@steve

I’m very interested in your explanation for how events can happen absent time.

They can't

---

Did someone say “more likely than not”?

Firstly, there’s no possible way to evaluate the probabilities for the KCA premises (if they even make sense). But let’s say each one was 3/5 likely to be true, and they are independent.

That gives a probability that both are true of 9/25, meaning there’s a 16/25 chance the conclusion is wrong even though the premises are most likely true.

Except that is NOT the way a deductive argument works. The probability of the conclusion is equal to the lowest probability of the premises. By your method, you could have 20 reasons to believe something is true and the probability would be way way way smaller than if you gave 2. So, obviously that is not the way it works.