Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[Neo-Scholastic]

I don't mean to suggest that ideas don't exist. They exist, but they do not exist in the way that physical objects do. Nor do they existence independent of minds to think them. This makes them a very different category of existing then that of physical objects.

As I mentioned before, “existence” is a term of art in philosophy. Without some agreed upon criteria people should use to decide what types of objects fall into or lie outside the category of “things that exist”, it’s a little premature start qualifying the existential status of various objects. There is even some debate about whether or not existence even truly counts as a property.

So given that we both acknowledge that existence is a property that some things have while others do not, it makes sense to me that there are subcategories of existing things depending on what other properties they do or do not have. So while I agree that there are things that exist that are material, like physical objects, I also maintain that things exist that are immaterial, like principles or numbers

Similarly, I actually agree with the statement that immaterial objects do not have independent existence from some mind that conceives them. That said, I am certain that we have very different notions of what constitutes a mind.

I don't see how the ability to translate the word triangle into another language (or to write it rather the say it for that matter) makes the concept independent of the minds that think the concept. And the appellation triangle is a useful concept. But nothing about triangular shaped object is added to the object itself by the children's identification.

True nothing is added by identification. It is the act of identification that recognizes the forms, material, purposes and origins of bodies.

Sensible bodies have objective properties that can be abstracted from and conceived of apart from whatever other properties that sensible body may have. We can conceive of a material, such as metal, without regard for any specific form that metal may take. We can think about its modulus of elasticity, melting point, and atomic weight without thinking about a specific form. Likewise, we can think about forms independent of their material. I can think about I-beams, make moment diagrams about them etc. abstracted from any particular I-beam made of a specific metal. ‘Steel’ is an abstraction every bit as much as the form ‘I-beam’.

My point is this. When we are talking about objective reality that means things that are true about the world regardless of who thinks about them. This includes (but is not limited to) the objective properties of sensible bodies, which is why a group of children can recognize the objective properties of various sensible bodies, including both whether they are described as wooden or whether they are described as triangular. There are real things about those sensible bodies that can be known intellectually. Something must justify the description regardless of whether you are describing its material, form, purpose, or origin.

I'm curious though, if you think the concept triangle exists independent of minds to think it, do you think it began to exist, or do you think the concept is eternal? If you do think it began to exist, when would you say it began? I believe it began to exist when the first mind created the category.

It exists eternally in the mind of God.

Also, do you think that the existence of ideas and objects is similar enough that anything about how one came to be can be usefully compared to how the other came to be? My position is that they cannot and even if I accepted your idea of an independently existing triangle, I still find them too dissimilar for such a comparison.

Forms and Purposes are indispensable to attain knowledge. To use your example, elephants exist. It is extremely difficult, and I believe impossible, to describe what an elephant is by refereeing only to the matter from which it is made and successive states that matter takes. That is what you are asking people to do when you dispense with formal and final causes. No feature known by its form can ‘exist’ – not tusks, nor trunks, nor legs, nor tails. No feature known by its purpose can ‘exist’ – not hearts, nor lungs, nor blood, nor brains. Unless the forms and purposes manifest in the parts of the elephant, the elephant cannot exist.
My position is that considering only the efficient and material causes of things, in the abstract, is useful in natural science, but the ability to make those abstractions must take for granted the reality of forms and purposes.

So ultimately, the objection "those are just descriptions" is a double edged sword for those who use it to dismiss the reality of forms and purposes. Matter is also 'just' a description. There is a relationship between what things are, their existence, and how we describe the existence of those things. The decision to call some of those descriptions real while asserting that others are not is completely arbitrary. You need to give me some reason why the abstracted conception of a thing's matter is any more real than the abstract conception of it's form.