Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[GrandizerII]

As you might learn from Neo, your use of the word "existence" is not fully developed. The fact that we can use 'exist' in separate ways does nothing to the KCA because all that meant is that anything that begins to exists (in any senses of the word) has a cause of its existence.

I don't know why I have to say this a zillion times, but here goes. Be clear on the definition of each important word being used in the argument before adamantly defending it. What do you mean by "thing"? And what do you mean by "cause"? Because if it includes material cause, then the universe (being defined "as all there is at any time") must be eternal. I have yet to see an argument on your side that debunks the necessity or sufficiency of material causation in all cases of things "beginning to exist". Note that by things, I mean things that exist in the physical/material world (abstract descriptions or conceptions of actual objects are not included because they don't really exist in the same way that physical/material objects exist, and the argument is after all concerned with the non-abstract).

And even if efficient cause could be argued to be "sufficient cause" rather than "material cause" or "efficient cause + material cause", efficient cause need not be a personal agent. The universe itself could be the container of all possible efficient causes.

And this argument assumes the A-theory of time to be true (which is rather problematic as it's not backed by the current science). Under the B-theory of time, "beginning to exist" carries a different meaning, and in this sense, one can "begin to exist" without having an [efficient] cause at all.

So there are various problems with the KCA right from the very start, and I see it as utterly indefensible at this point.

x begins to exist if and only if x exists at some time t and there is no time t* prior to t at which x exists.

This can be used for ALL real objects and abstract objects. Any further differentiations you want to make about beginning to exist is unnecessary. You seem to want to because you think it makes a difference to the argument. You can't show an exception or even reason into an exception, there is not category error or special pleading. The premise is sound.

Steve, the problem with the definition as it is now is that God must, therefore, also have a beginning to its existence. This is why WLC actually adds one more piece to the definition to give God an "out", namely that there must not be a state of affairs in the actual world in which x exists timelessly. The definition also assumes that "begins to exist" is a tensed fact (in other words, the A-theory of time is true, which I repeat is very problematic).

But that aside, we have no experience of anything coming into being at the first point of time, so you can't even argue that it's intuitive that some things began to exist at the first moment of time. If your main defense of premise 1 is that it's intuitive, then you're wrong here as well.

Again, all that is needed is that everything shows some type of cause. You cannot limit it to a material cause, so you fail to establish a category error or special pleading. This objection fails with the rest of them.

But all things that begin to exist must have a material cause is intuitive. And one does not need to limit causation to material causation. You could argue that things that begin to exist must require both efficient and material causes (and perhaps other types of causes as well), but it would mean that the universe could not have had a beginning to its existence. Let me remind you that Aristotle himself who came up with these notions of causality was compelled by the same sort of logic you have borrowed from him to conclude that the universe/world must be eternal.