Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[Jenny A]

I don't mean to suggest that ideas don't exist.  They exist, but they do not exist in the way that physical objects do.  Nor do they existence independent of minds to think them.  This makes them a very different category of existing then that of physical objects. 

It might help instead to think of persistent patterns and you can then see that ideas are on the same scale as anything else that exists.

Take a table or inanimate object. That's actually at one end of the scale as it has the same atoms at the beginning of the stage where we would call that collection of atoms a table (as opposed to a tree for example) as it does at the end (before it becomes firewood or compost).

We exist as people, but we replace almost every cell in our body over a cycle of several years, except for neurons in the cerebral cortex. So even people are actually a persistent pattern that exists for a certain period of time. What's more that pattern changes quite radically over the course of its lifetime, from a single fertilised egg to someone dying of old age.

Clouds are the same. Air rises to the height where it reaches the dew point and it becomes too cold for the air to contain the water that it does so it condenses out to become the white vapour. This releases energy which allows the air to rise again continuing the process for a little bit further. A time lapse video of clouds developing into Cumulonimbus clouds is a quite example. What's more the air and water molecules can get replaced with new air depending on the cloud type.

As the saying goes, you can't step into the same river twice. Water is being flushed down and replaced with more water from higher above. It also flushes away the silt exposing more silt that was part of the river's environment that then becomes part of the river. It also changes shape throughout its lifetime, meandering through a field say or growing larger over time or drying up.

Societies or economies are made up of groups of people and businesses that form, die off, get replaced, or create new ones. Or can become part of it via immigration. So they too are persistent patterns.

A memory is a persistent pattern of neuronal firing. It changes each time it is recalled and restored. This memory can be written down but then when read can evoke similar patterns in the brain. Same goes for an idea.

The same applies for a concept, symphony, book or religion. It's on the other end of the scale from the table but they are still patterns that can persist through many different forms. But the crucial point is that they are persistent patterns reliant upon structures of matter and energy like anything else that exists.

It would be completely arbitrary and unwarranted to draw a distinction between all these examples of existence. If something exists then it does so because it is a persistent pattern. But different things change more or less radically throughout their lifetime or can exist in more or fewer different forms.

It does and doesn't help.  Clouds, people, tables, nebula , and other physical objects are all identifiable by their physicality.  Elephants gain and loose cells, molecules and atoms, but only certain kinds of cells, molectules and atoms.  And the structure remains much the same.  Clouds grow and shrink, it's going to be h2o that primarily makes them up.  We identify these things by shape, composition, material continuity.


An idea is dependant on physical things, a brain (biological or artificial, to create; a brain and perhaps other things such as speech or writing to preserve it. But we identify it by it's meaning,  not it's composition or shape.

Ideas are dependant on physical matter, but on what physical material it might be dependant on is limitless. And so is the shape of the the physical things which carry the idea.  We can write it on anything, dirt, DNA, steel, a chalkboard, papirous, dust. We can store it electronically. Or we can pass it by word of mouth or sign language or Morris Code.  We can translate it it into a different languages. In short what physical form it takes is essentially arbitrary.  But it's meaning remains regardless of its physical form.  And it is it's meaning is not it's physical form.

It exists, but it's not really a physical existence, though it is dependant of physical things to understand it and communicate it.

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I don't mean to suggest that ideas don't exist.  They exist, but they do not exist in the way that physical objects do.  Nor do they existence independent of minds to think them.  This makes them a very different category of existing then that of physical objects.

As I mentioned before, “existence” is a term of art in philosophy. Without some agreed upon criteria people should use to decide what types of objects fall into or lie outside the category of “things that exist”, it’s a little premature start qualifying the existential status of various objects. There is even some debate about whether or not existence even truly counts as a property.

So given that we both acknowledge that existence is a property that some things have while others do not, it makes sense to me that there are subcategories of existing things depending on what other properties they do or do not have. So while I agree that there are things that exist that are material, like physical objects, I also maintain that things exist that are immaterial, like principles or numbers

Similarly, I actually agree with the statement that immaterial objects do not have independent existence from some mind that conceives them. That said, I am certain that we have very different notions of what constitutes a mind.

You keep insisting that by stating the physical existence of objects and the existence of ideas are different,  that I'm denying the existence of abstract ideas,  I am not.  But they are very different.  And my point to Steve concerning that difference is it's is too great a difference to material objects to lump them both into one category, when determining if they need a cause and what kind of cause.

I don't see how the ability to translate the word triangle into another language (or to write it rather the say it for that matter) makes the concept independent of the minds that think the concept.  And the appellation triangle is a useful concept.  But nothing about triangular shaped object is added to the object itself by the children's identification.

 
True nothing is added by identification. It is the act of identification that recognizes the forms, material, purposes and origins of bodies.

Sensible bodies have objective properties that can be abstracted from and conceived of apart from whatever  other properties that sensible body may have. We can conceive of a material, such as metal, without regard for any specific form that metal may take. We can think about its modulus of elasticity, melting point, and atomic weight without thinking about a specific form. Likewise, we can think about forms independent of their material. I can think about I-beams, make moment diagrams about them etc. abstracted from any particular I-beam made of a specific metal. ‘Steel’ is an abstraction every bit as much as the form ‘I-beam’.

My point is this. When we are talking about objective reality that means things that are true about the world regardless of who thinks about them. This includes (but is not limited to) the objective properties of sensible bodies, which is why a group of children can recognize the objective properties of various sensible bodies, including both whether they are described as wooden or whether they are described as triangular. There are real things about those sensible bodies that can be known intellectually. Something must justify the description regardless of whether you are describing its material, form, purpose, or origin.

Indeed they are.  Whether we have a way of measuring it or not, the speed of light remains the same,  the ratio of a circle' s circumference to its diameter would be the same with or without  human knowledge of pi .  But except as a human idea the speed of light is a physical thing, not an abstraction.  Ratios are a function of two and three dimensional space.  No more than the physical world in which they are true is necessary for them to be true.  No mind, God's or anyone else's is necessary.

I'm curious though,  if you think the concept triangle exists independent of minds to think it, do you think it began to exist, or do you think the concept is eternal?  If you do think it began to exist, when would you say it began? I believe it began to exist when the first mind created the category.

It exists eternally in the mind of God.[

As noted above, I disagree.  But again, I'm curious.  What else, do you think is eternal?  Just math and god, or are there more things that exist which you consider to be eEternal?

Also, do you think that the existence of ideas and objects is similar enough that anything about how one came to be can be usefully compared to how the other came to be?  My position is that they cannot and even if I accepted your idea of an independently existing triangle, I still find them too dissimilar for such a comparison.

Forms and Purposes are indispensable to attain knowledge. To use your example, elephants exist. It is extremely difficult, and I believe impossible, to describe what an elephant is by refereeing only to the matter from which it is made and successive states that matter takes. That is what you are asking people to do when you dispense with formal and final causes. No feature known by its form can ‘exist’ – not tusks, nor trunks, nor legs, nor tails. No feature known by its purpose can ‘exist’ – not hearts, nor lungs, nor blood, nor brains. Unless the forms and purposes manifest in the parts of the elephant, the elephant cannot exist.
My position is that considering only the efficient and material causes of things, in the abstract, is useful in natural science, but the ability to make those abstractions must take for granted the reality of forms and purposes.

So ultimately, the objection "those are just descriptions" is a double edged sword for those who use it to dismiss the reality of forms and purposes. Matter is also 'just' a description. There is a relationship between what things are, their existence, and how we describe the existence of those things. The decision to call some of those descriptions real while asserting that others are not is completely arbitrary. You need to give me some reason why the abstracted conception of a thing's matter is any more real than the abstract conception of it's form.

An interesting idea, but not really responsive to my question.  

Can you name anything you consider to "begin to exist," that does not have a physical cause?  And, are you suggesting that everything must have a formal and a final cause, or are there things for which a material cause and a sufficient cause are sufficient? (I didn't set out to pun, but I won't disown it).