Disproving Odin - An Experiment in arguing with a theist with Theist logic

[Jenny A]

 No. There is no "category error" unless the premise only applies to one category and not the other. That is not the case here. 

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Just because you can come up with categories, your "category error" charge is nonsense unless there is a category that somehow does not have a causal principle. Is there a category that has no causal principle? 

Quantum level particles.

But  setting that aside, each of my categories has a different kind of cause.  Placing the universe in the right category tells you what kind of cause to look for.  If the universe physically exists, you need a physical cause.  If it began to exist before time and space, than "cause" makes no sense. Cause and effect requires time.

1. What Do You Mean By Exist?

The first catagory error is equating the existence of physical objects, energy, with the existence of ideas. These are two very different meanings of the word "exist."  To see how different they are, all you have to do is ask where does it exist?  Physical objects have an identifiable location.  Where is my pencil, or where's the dog  are rational questions. Where is the English language? Where is The Pythagorean Theorem?   Or where is Beethoven's Fifth are not.  At best you might say Engish is spoken in these places, or Pythagoras's  Theorim is set out in my math book, or my score of the Fifth is over there on the desk.  But that's only physical places where the ideas are recorded.  They don't exist except as recorded in a brain or someother physical object.  In the sense that your pencil exists, ideas don't exist at all.  It's as if instead of asking for a pencil, you asked for pencilness.

The trouble with talking about the existense of ideas goes beyond the fact that they must be recorded.  To exist they must also be understood by someone.  Consider for example the possibility that if DNA were taken to represent a letter system in Hitite, English, or some language not yet spoken but which will be spoken in the future, that a sequence of DNA somewhere would spell out an intelligible sentence, maybe even a poetic one, such "eyes like liquid fire."   Would you say that that poem existed before someone worked out the "meaning" of that sequence? I wouldn't.  But I would have no trouble saying that the DNA sequence itself existed whether someone sequenced it or not.

The universe potentially poses a third kind of existence.  Where is the universe?  Well, unless there is something outside it, the answer is it's not in a place, it is the collective of all places and things. When we ask where, we are asking where in the universe?  To ask where is the universe is an as odd a question as where is the Pythagorean Theorem.  But unlike the theorem, the universe obviously  has  a physical existence and it's existence is not contingent on someone's knowing about it.

These two or three uses of the word exist are so different that using the word existence to mean both the existence of physical objects and the existence of ideas is a category error.

As you might learn from Neo, your use of the word "existence" is not fully developed. The fact that we can use 'exist' in separate ways does nothing to the KCA because all that meant is that anything that begins to exists (in any senses of the word) has a cause of its existence. 

The universe does not has a special kind of existence. It is a unique object, but that does not require a special category of existence. It either exists or does not exist. Asking "where" is just a nonsensical question that does not apply--much the same as what was it like 12 hours before the big bang. 

For the twelfth time, it is an objective feature of reality that everything that begins to exist has a cause of its existence. There are no exceptions and it seems that existence without a causal principle is not even coherent. You avoid answering this point because you think there has got to be something wrong with the form argument because you don't like the conclusion. There is nothing wrong with the argument. 

Rather than complain about my analysing what is meant by existence, I suggest YOU define it for purposes of the KCA.  

And, yes, there are things that happen at the quantum level that appear to be without cause.  Before your first premise  can be accepted, you'll need to explain quantum level causation.

 2.  What Do You Mean By Begin to Exist?

Here's where the multiple meanings of the word exist begin to create real havoc.  You and Craig insist that elephants don't appear out of nothing.  This is because elephants, have, as Aristotle would say, a material cause, i.e. they are made of something.  All physical objects are.  It's not the creation of an elephant that's  startling, it's the creation of the matter out of which the elephant is made. Elephants made out of material not previously existing in the universe would indeed be unprecedented.

This is because all physical objects have a material cause in the Aristitileon sense of the word, that is to say they are made of something.  And when we say something begins to be an elephant we mean that the matter out of which the elephant is made took the form of an elephant.  We don't mean new matter popped into existence and became an elephant.

The universe,  is physical in that it is made of material, meaning that in the Aristitileon sense, it has a material cause.  But you state that unlike the matter that makes up an elephant, the matter that makes up the universe did not exist prior to the universe.  That is an entirely different meaning of to begin to exist.  It is in fact the very kind of beginning to exist that you keep telling me elephants do not ever do.  And  also the very kind of begin to exist appears to occur at the  subatomic level which you say does not actually happen because it is too improbable.

Ideas on the other hand have no material cause in the Aristotelian sense.  That is to say that they have no material substance in that they are not made of anything only recorded in things.  You don't propose that a poem won't suddenly appear in my backyard because poems don't appear anywhere at all.  Poems  don't exist the way elephants do. But even though a poem is not made of something physical, it is created by something physical.  A poem not conceived or recognised by a brain (including artificial brains like computers) would simply not be in any sense of the word to exist.  It comes into being when it is recognized by someone as a poem.

So, just as you have conflated multiple meanings of exist, you have gone on to conflate multiple meanings of  of the phrase "begin to exist."

x begins to exist if and only if x exists at some time t and there is no time t* prior to t at which x exists.

This can be used for ALL real objects and abstract objects. Any further differentiations you want to make about beginning to exist is unnecessary. You seem to want to because you think it makes a difference to the argument. You can't show an exception or even reason into an exception, there is not category error or special pleading. The premise is sound. 

Are you being deliberately obtuse?  The point is not when, but what counts as beginning to exist.  An elephant is born out of existing matter.  Other than those quantum particles you keep ignoring, what do you know of that is ever made without preexisting material?  I don't think anything made out of stuff already in existence can be compared to the appearance of new things not made out of preexisting stuff. Why should we make that leap?

 3. What Do You Mean By Cause?

Not surprisingly using  multiple meanings for exist, and begin to exist leads to multiple kinds of causes for existence.  This is exacerbated by your insistence on using Aristotle's categorisation of causes as the be all end all way to describe cause.  

Aristotle predates Newton by a millennium. Of his terms, formal cause has long since been abandoned. We no longer say that an octave is caused by a 2:1 ratio.  Rather we say that the 2:1 ratio describes the octave.  Ratios do not cause anything.  They do describe the relationship between things.  And although we speak of the purpose for things we no longer talk about a ball having a purpose of getting to the bottom of a ramp. End purpose is only relevant to things created by a sentient being for a purpose.  An extraordinarily small portion of the present shape of things in the universe was formed for a purpose even though most of the objects used by humans were formed by humans for a pupose.  Purpose is an attribute assigned by people, an idea attached to the object as it were.

So, with regard to the types of beginning to exist discussed above, we know all physical objects in the universe which like an elephant are created out existing matter have a material cause (it's definitional). Physical objects at the human scale also have what Aristotle called an agency cause, or a sufficient cause, tellingly, also called a moving cause.  That is to say, an elephant is in it's particular place and in it's particular shape because of forces outside of itself.  In the case of physical objects, like an  elephant or a ball, or a mountain those outside forces are physical forces acting on the physical material that makes up the object. And really it's not a cause  but a myriad of material and moving causes.  

This does not necessarily hold true at the subatomic level where, while everything still is made of something, some particles appear not to be made from preexisting material.  And they appear to move without outside force.  If they have a cause, it's a very different meaning than the cause we mean when we look for the cause of an elephant. It's not even clear if cause is a relevant term.  You could say they have a material cause in the Aristitileon sense but that isn't really more that stating that they physically exist.

If, as you profess, the universe is not made of preexisting material and consists of matter that wasn't previously something else, then it too does not have cause in the way an elephant does.  What kind of cause is it that makes objects appear out of nothing?  

Ideas have no material cause in the Aristitileon sense as they are not made of anything.  They have no moving cause either as they have on material to be acted upon by outside forces.  Yet to the extent they can be said to exist, it is only because they can be recorded in physical objects and understood by physical beings.  They created and maintained by thought.  I suppose you could say they have an end cause.  But they also have a physical cause in that they are created by physical activity in  brains and communicated by physical means.

Again, all that is needed is that everything shows some type of cause. You cannot limit it to a material cause, so you fail to establish a category error or special pleading. This objection fails with the rest of them. 

The universe is material.  Name a single material thing without a material  cause. Hint, there are those pesky particles.  But if you ignore them, then we are back to all material things need a material cause.

4. Innapropriately Conflating Different Of Meanings With A Single Term is Category Error.

You have at least two different meanings of exist, at least two meanings of begin to exist, and many meanings of cause used in you proposition.  Saying l mean all of those doesn't solve the category error.

Nope. You unnecessarily created the distinctions, I didn't. Again, no category error because Premise (1) applies to all categories--so I am not treating them differently. [/Qoute]

The distinctions matter  I didn't create them, just pointed them out.  

If I say

All pets pant,
Goldfish are pets
Therefore goldfish pant

The problem is not solved by saying pets includes both dogs and goldfish, and panting includes all forms of breathing whether by mouth or by gills.  When talking about categories animals for purposes of animal physiology pets in an inherently bad category.  And using pant when what you mean is breath, is disingenuous.

The difference between physically existing and the existence of ideas; the difference between the creation of new matter and reforming of existing matter; and the difference between reshaping matter, having ideas and making new matter appear; are too dissimilar to be usefully refered to by the same names in form

Your little example is an affirming the consequent fallacy. That is not the form of the KCA so I really can't see your point. 

Answer this: are you going to claim that some sort of causal principle is NOT an objective feature of reality and seems absolutely necessary for any existence? Yes or No.

Think a little harder, it may come to you yet.