Hello All,
I realise I arrive late to this thread, but if you'll permit me I'd just like to add a few observations I've picked up on while reading through it. There have been a number of posts that have piqued my attention but I think for the sake of clarity I'm just going to discuss one or two of the main points.
I should probably say that I only have a passing understanding of presuppositionalism and therefore do not claim any real ability to pontificate on the subject.
1. Morality in the absence of a creator deity.
I think it was Statler who raised a question earlier in the tread regarding the justification of moral claims in the absence of the transcendental moral laws of his espoused faith.
Personally I believe that a moral system cultivated by man has much greater power than he would like to believe. A moral system based around the universal acknowledgement of rights (derived from natural rights, utility or similar) would provide a rigid framework within which individuals could be afforded maximum liberty so long as they did not infringe on the rights of any other individual. Such a framework would allow moral claims to be adjudicated simply and justly. In the case of Mr. Waldorf’s hypothetical about the Marquis De Sade; society and his victim would have a legitimate moral claim (cause to exercise control) over him because he infringed on the rights of another. His own complicity in similar acts upon himself is irrelevant as preventing an individual of sound mind and maturity from harming themselves is not sufficient grounds for societal intervention.
2. The preconditions of intelligibility and non-Christian 'worldviews’.
In my understanding the crux of the presuppositonalist argument is that only the Christian 'worldview' can adequately account for certain axiomatic principles which are necessary for valid or rational enquiry to occur. I hesitate in starting my reply as I have been unable to find an exhaustive list of what these principles are. Perhaps someone would be kind of enough to furnish me with one?[/i]
Perhaps you will indulge me and allow me to start simply. With the Three Classical laws of Thought which given their eminence as the axiomatic rules on which philosophy and rational discourse are based I assume feature in the aforementioned preconditions. These are;
-The Law of Identity
-The Law of Noncontradiction
-The Law of The Excluded Middle
One would think that the Law of Identity and its two correlates mentioned above need no foundation as proposed in this thread i.e. in the Christian God but are in fact simple codifications of the nature of reality. That a thing must be itself and cannot be both itself and not itself at the same time is a necessity of reality. One could also suggest (as I believe Locke did) that these principles are not [i]a priori[i] principles but ideas about that nature of reality which were arrived at by critical philosophical thought.
Anyway, those are my initial thoughts; I felt a need to get them down on paper, as it was. That being said it’s quite late and I’ve been at work all day so i reserve the right to add to amend this ramble later.
Sam
I realise I arrive late to this thread, but if you'll permit me I'd just like to add a few observations I've picked up on while reading through it. There have been a number of posts that have piqued my attention but I think for the sake of clarity I'm just going to discuss one or two of the main points.
I should probably say that I only have a passing understanding of presuppositionalism and therefore do not claim any real ability to pontificate on the subject.
1. Morality in the absence of a creator deity.
I think it was Statler who raised a question earlier in the tread regarding the justification of moral claims in the absence of the transcendental moral laws of his espoused faith.
Personally I believe that a moral system cultivated by man has much greater power than he would like to believe. A moral system based around the universal acknowledgement of rights (derived from natural rights, utility or similar) would provide a rigid framework within which individuals could be afforded maximum liberty so long as they did not infringe on the rights of any other individual. Such a framework would allow moral claims to be adjudicated simply and justly. In the case of Mr. Waldorf’s hypothetical about the Marquis De Sade; society and his victim would have a legitimate moral claim (cause to exercise control) over him because he infringed on the rights of another. His own complicity in similar acts upon himself is irrelevant as preventing an individual of sound mind and maturity from harming themselves is not sufficient grounds for societal intervention.
2. The preconditions of intelligibility and non-Christian 'worldviews’.
In my understanding the crux of the presuppositonalist argument is that only the Christian 'worldview' can adequately account for certain axiomatic principles which are necessary for valid or rational enquiry to occur. I hesitate in starting my reply as I have been unable to find an exhaustive list of what these principles are. Perhaps someone would be kind of enough to furnish me with one?[/i]
Perhaps you will indulge me and allow me to start simply. With the Three Classical laws of Thought which given their eminence as the axiomatic rules on which philosophy and rational discourse are based I assume feature in the aforementioned preconditions. These are;
-The Law of Identity
-The Law of Noncontradiction
-The Law of The Excluded Middle
One would think that the Law of Identity and its two correlates mentioned above need no foundation as proposed in this thread i.e. in the Christian God but are in fact simple codifications of the nature of reality. That a thing must be itself and cannot be both itself and not itself at the same time is a necessity of reality. One could also suggest (as I believe Locke did) that these principles are not [i]a priori[i] principles but ideas about that nature of reality which were arrived at by critical philosophical thought.
Anyway, those are my initial thoughts; I felt a need to get them down on paper, as it was. That being said it’s quite late and I’ve been at work all day so i reserve the right to add to amend this ramble later.
Sam
"We need not suppose more things to exist than are absolutely neccesary." William of Occam
"Our doubts are traitors, and make us lose the good we oft might win by fearing to attempt" William Shakespeare (Measure for Measure: Act 1, Scene 4)
"Our doubts are traitors, and make us lose the good we oft might win by fearing to attempt" William Shakespeare (Measure for Measure: Act 1, Scene 4)