RE: Atheism
July 5, 2018 at 1:28 pm
(This post was last modified: July 5, 2018 at 1:32 pm by Angrboda.)
(July 5, 2018 at 11:23 am)SteveII Wrote:(July 4, 2018 at 10:04 am)Jörmungandr Wrote: Because when one infers a cause, one is making a connection between the cause and effect, but in supernatural causation, there is no demonstrable connection between the cause and the effect by definition. The very way you've defined the supernatural rules out any reasonable inference. What exactly would such an inference be based on? It seems there are only three or four possibilities, a) prior belief, b) assumption, c) empirical knowledge, or d) supernatural knowledge. The first two are not a justification for the inference, the third is ruled out by the definition, and the fourth brings us back to a case of begging the question. Exactly how are you proposing these inferences are being made? It does no good to present a laundry list of examples in which such inferences were made unless somewhere in that laundry list is an example where the inference was justifiably made without recourse to either supernatural knowledge or mere assumption. The enterprise of science differs categorically in that it invokes the relevant connections between cause and effect in its explanations, something not possible under the definition of supernatural which you are employing (in addition to which, the epistemology of science rests on two key assumptions, that there exists a real world independent of our minds, and that this real world is knowable via the contents of our experience; the attempt to make inferences to the supernatural doesn't draw on either of these assumptions, but rather simply makes a third, namely the existence of the supernatural, which is the very assumption under debate, so can't be introduced as an epistemological assumption but must be argued for on independent grounds which themselves are shared).
I'm not going to respond to your list unless you can be more specific about any particular example. Your listing natural theology arguments as an effect seems to indicate you're just spewing potential cases in a shotgun pattern in the hopes that you might hit something.
For those following, first a definition: Inductive reasoning (as opposed to deductive reasoning or abductive reasoning) is a method of reasoning in which the premises are viewed as supplying some evidence for the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument may be probable, based upon the evidence given.
P1. Miraculous effects have been specifically attributed to God (a supernatural being). Example, the paralytic healed by Jesus: "Mark 2:10...but I want you to know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins.” So he said to the man, 11 “I tell you, get up, take your mat and go home.” 12 He got up, took his mat and walked out in full view of them all...". There are a hundred such examples in the NT where supernatural causation was declared or unmistakably inferred from the context.
P2. The resurrected Jesus was seen by as many as 500 people. Recently crucified people do not walk around and declare that they have conquered death and provided a way for man's redemption and as such, this is an obvious, rather big, supernatural claim.
In support of P1 and P2, we have the following:
a. Jesus most certainly was born, baptized, and died in the time period claimed. (other sources)
b. Pete, James and John were known eyewitnesses to both the public and private events of Jesus' three year ministry (every other NT writer)
c. They presided over the early church (Paul, Acts, first/second century docs)
d. This early church instructed Paul (Paul, Acts)
e. As evidenced by Paul's letters, this early church believed the claims later outlined in the gospels (long before they where written). We can infer from this the source of these beliefs were a critical mass of people who believed these events really happened which actually prompted immediate and significant action on their part--to evangelize the Roman world.
f. Peter, James and John eventually wrote letters emphasizing the themes found in the gospels
g. Luke wrote Luke and Acts with the purpose of outlining the events from the birth of Christ through his present day
h. The editors of Matthew, Mark, and John were all alive during the lifetimes of these people above (it is unknown if the actual people with the pen were eyewitnesses)
i. The editors would have been know to the recipients of the gospels. The books were name by which apostle influenced that particular book
j. The early church, who we know believed the claims of Jesus already, accepted the gospels. There is nothing in the early church writings that questioned them.
k. The gospels dovetail nicely with Paul's writings based on his training directly from all the eyewitnesses (completing a loop)
l. Alternate theories of the NT and early church provenance lack explanatory power of the evidence on all sorts of levels
P3. The main promise of the NT is a series of specific supernatural effects on a person
P4. An untold number of people have reported such effects
P5. An untold number of people have reported minor miracles (defined as person-oriented miracles for which the goal is very narrow -- as opposed to the NT miracles which had broad application and goals). Ranges from healing, bringing about events/experiences/encounters/open doors, extraordinary strength/peace/perseverance, evangelistic success, etc.
P6. The question why anything at all exists has no naturalistic explanation (and most likely none forthcoming).
P7. The question of why the universe exists has no metaphysically sound naturalistic explanation. There is no reason to think one will be forthcoming.
P8. The question of why our universe has the narrow range of physical constants which seem necessary to form matter and conserve energy but under naturalism has no other explanation than fantastically amazing chance that would not be accepted in any other case.
P9. The question of why our minds seem non-physical but have causal powers over the physical undercuts hard naturalism and seems to have parallels to the concept of the supernatural (not that they are necessarily supernatural).
P10. The question of why there seems to exist a knowledge of basic morality in most people and most people believe it to be based on an objective set of principles (moral Platonism) not derived from any evolutionary process.
P11. There is physical evidence for the supernatural (from P1, P2)
P12. There is a persistent, growing, unbroken chain of personal reports of the supernatural (from P4, P5)
P13. There are reason to think that naturalism is an insufficient worldview and the existence of the supernatural has better explanatory powers in a variety of these gaps. (from P6, P7, P8, P9, P10)
THEREFORE: There are multiple lines of evidence/reasoning that infer the supernatural. Bayes showed us that that more data points that you have that infer a conclusion, the higher the probability the conclusion is true. Additionally, you can apply the math the other direction and examine the probability of these events all happening/reasoning given that the supernatural does not exist. I think there has also been sufficient connections made between cause and effect to understand the framework. Claiming that because the supernatural-->natural cause/effect have a different relationship than natural-->natural cause/effect and therefore somehow lacks sufficient connection, is a category error.
To the PeanutGallery™: You can call into question any of the premises above, but unfortunately for you, they increase each other's probability, so you have to show how almost all of them are untrue or unlikely with logical reasons and/or evidence (as opposed to asserting). Simply claiming that each one separately has not been "proven" may be true, but nevertheless is simply inadequate argumentation.
For an inductive argument to be persuasive it both needs data points and an absence of defeaters. I'll ignore the latter for the moment. As regards to your list, the only data point in that list appears to be the cases argued in the bible, which has problems which I won't go into here. The other observations of the supernatural fail, generally, because the inference to the supernatural doesn't have a rational foundation. If a man in Bedlam believes he is Napolean Bonaparte because he's insane, that doesn't count as an inductive data point for the proposition that he is Napolean Bonaparte. If people inferring the source of their experience was supernatural exists because of previous belief, assumption, or error in their thinking, it doesn't count toward the conclusion. You only get to count those data points that are arrived at through rational justification, which gets back to the problems outlined before. As to the occurrence of post-biblical miracles, the general pattern is one where there is no foreknowledge that the events are going to occur, as well as the inference being made on the basis of an argument from ignorance (we can't explain it naturally, therefore it's a miracle). So those aren't justified inferences either. As far as the natural theology arguments, while I haven't conducted the relevant survey, they all seem to follow the same general pattern as post-biblical miracles in asserting that because there is no natural explanation for some fact or phenomena, the explanation must be supernatural. None of the aforementioned data points really count as any kind of contribution to an inductive argument, or at the very least, they are so insignificant that they generally can be dismissed.
Now, as to whether the accounts in the bible count as justified inferences to the supernatural or not, I'm currently mulling that over some more, so in the meantime, we'll simply have to agree to disagree. I think we're both aware of the problems involved in using the bible to make a strong inductive argument. Regardless, at the very least, I've demonstrated an argument, successful or not, against accepting the personal experiences argument that doesn't rely on question begging. I can think of another such argument, but since the debate was about Mathilda's conclusion, I'll leave her to make her own case. So, from my perspective, there do appear to be legitimate non-question-begging arguments for Mathilda's conclusion. Whether her argument is one such, I don't know. Nonetheless, your jumping to the conclusion that her argument was necessarily question begging appears not to have been sound, and, dependent on whether or not your rephrasing of her argument was valid or not, was likely a result of either flawed thinking or uncharitable interpretation. So, it remains to be seen whether your characterization of her argument was or was not a straw man. But it seems to be the case that you haven't shown that it wasn't with your "almost all universal negative claims" argument. You actually need to engage with her argument, as I stated before.
Now, given that I'm still mulling over certain relevant issues, specifically whether the biblical testimony can count towards the conclusion that the supernatural exists on a naive acceptance of its reports, and that this was essentially aimed at supporting Mathilda's arguments in the first place, I'm going to bow out of this discussion for now.