Atheism

[I_am_not_mafia]

Pay attention. The claim was that the type of religious experiences were largely determined by CULTURE. A defeater for that is any large conversion of people from another culture. I have such a defeater: CHINA.

But you can still immerse yourself in Xtian culture in China in the same way that you could immerse yourself in a Hindu or Muslim culture in say Scotland if you wanted.

What you haven't shown is that people immersed in one culture with no exposure to Xtian imagery are having religious experiences consistent with the Xtian mythos.

[SteveII]

Why can't we have natural effects that infer supernatural causes? The whole enterprise of science infers causes from their effects. List of effects:

1. The contents of the NT
2. The first century church (independent of the NT)
3. Individual personal experience as predicted by the NT
4. Other people we trust personal experience
5. Personal miracles (private, specific events that seemed to have a purpose against all odds)
6. Natural theology arguments

Because when one infers a cause, one is making a connection between the cause and effect, but in supernatural causation, there is no demonstrable connection between the cause and the effect by definition.  The very way you've defined the supernatural rules out any reasonable inference.  What exactly would such an inference be based on?  It seems there are only three or four possibilities, a) prior belief, b) assumption, c) empirical knowledge, or d) supernatural knowledge.  The first two are not a justification for the inference, the third is ruled out by the definition, and the fourth brings us back to a case of begging the question.  Exactly how are you proposing these inferences are being made?  It does no good to present a laundry list of examples in which such inferences were made unless somewhere in that laundry list is an example where the inference was justifiably made without recourse to either supernatural knowledge or mere assumption.  The enterprise of science differs categorically in that it invokes the relevant connections between cause and effect in its explanations, something not possible under the definition of supernatural which you are employing (in addition to which, the epistemology of science rests on two key assumptions, that there exists a real world independent of our minds, and that this real world is knowable via the contents of our experience; the attempt to make inferences to the supernatural doesn't draw on either of these assumptions, but rather simply makes a third, namely the existence of the supernatural, which is the very assumption under debate, so can't be introduced as an epistemological assumption but must be argued for on independent grounds which themselves are shared).

I'm not going to respond to your list unless you can be more specific about any particular example.  Your listing natural theology arguments as an effect seems to indicate you're just spewing potential cases in a shotgun pattern in the hopes that you might hit something.

For those following, first a definition: Inductive reasoning (as opposed to deductive reasoning or abductive reasoning) is a method of reasoning in which the premises are viewed as supplying some evidence for the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument may be probable, based upon the evidence given.

P1. Miraculous effects have been specifically attributed to God (a supernatural being). Example, the paralytic healed by Jesus: "Mark 2:10...but I want you to know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins.” So he said to the man, 11 “I tell you, get up, take your mat and go home.” 12 He got up, took his mat and walked out in full view of them all...". There are a hundred such examples in the NT where supernatural causation was declared or unmistakably inferred from the context. 
P2. The resurrected Jesus was seen by as many as 500 people. Recently crucified people do not walk around and declare that they have conquered death and provided a way for man's redemption and as such, this is an obvious, rather big, supernatural claim. 
     In support of P1 and P2, we have the following:
     a. Jesus most certainly was born, baptized, and died in the time period claimed. (other sources)
     b. Pete, James and John were known eyewitnesses to both the public and private events of Jesus' three year ministry (every other NT writer)
     c. They presided over the early church (Paul, Acts, first/second century docs)
     d. This early church instructed Paul (Paul, Acts)
     e. As evidenced by Paul's letters, this early church believed the claims later outlined in the gospels (long before they where written). We can infer from this the source of these beliefs were a critical mass of people who believed these events really happened which actually prompted immediate and significant action on their part--to evangelize the Roman world.  
     f. Peter, James and John eventually wrote letters emphasizing the themes found in the gospels
     g. Luke wrote Luke and Acts with the purpose of outlining the events from the birth of Christ through his present day
     h. The editors of Matthew, Mark, and John were all alive during the lifetimes of these people above (it is unknown if the actual people with the pen were eyewitnesses)
     i. The editors would have been know to the recipients of the gospels. The books were name by which apostle influenced that particular book
     j. The early church, who we know believed the claims of Jesus already, accepted the gospels. There is nothing in the early church writings that questioned them.
     k. The gospels dovetail nicely with Paul's writings based on his training directly from all the eyewitnesses (completing a loop)
     l. Alternate theories of the NT and early church provenance lack explanatory power of the evidence on all sorts of levels 
P3. The main promise of the NT is a series of specific supernatural effects on a person
P4. An untold number of people have reported such effects
P5. An untold number of people have reported minor miracles (defined as person-oriented miracles for which the goal is very narrow -- as opposed to the NT miracles which had broad application and goals). Ranges from healing, bringing about events/experiences/encounters/open doors, extraordinary strength/peace/perseverance, evangelistic success, etc.
P6. The question why anything at all exists has no naturalistic explanation (and most likely none forthcoming). 
P7. The question of why the universe exists has no metaphysically sound naturalistic explanation. There is no reason to think one will be forthcoming. 
P8. The question of why our universe has the narrow range of physical constants which seem necessary to form matter and conserve energy but under naturalism has no other explanation than fantastically amazing chance that would not be accepted in any other case.
P9. The question of why our minds seem non-physical but have causal powers over the physical undercuts hard naturalism and seems to have parallels to the concept of the supernatural (not that they are necessarily supernatural). 
P10. The question of why there seems to exist a knowledge of basic morality in most people and most people believe it to be based on an objective set of principles (moral Platonism) not derived from any evolutionary process. 
P11. There is physical evidence for the supernatural (from P1, P2)
P12. There is a persistent, growing, unbroken chain of personal reports of the supernatural (from P4, P5)
P13. There are reason to think that naturalism is an insufficient worldview and the existence of the supernatural has better explanatory powers in a variety of these gaps. (from P6, P7, P8, P9, P10)


THEREFORE: There are multiple lines of evidence/reasoning that infer the supernatural. Bayes showed us that that more data points that you have that infer a conclusion, the higher the probability the conclusion is true. Additionally, you can apply the math the other direction and examine the probability of these events all happening/reasoning given that the supernatural does not exist. I think there has also been sufficient connections made between cause and effect to understand the framework. Claiming that because the supernatural-->natural cause/effect have a different relationship than natural-->natural cause/effect and therefore somehow lacks sufficient connection, is a category error. 

To the PeanutGallery™: You can call into question any of the premises above, but unfortunately for you, they increase each other's probability, so you have to show how almost all of them are untrue or unlikely with logical reasons and/or evidence (as opposed to asserting). Simply claiming that each one separately has not been "proven" may be true, but nevertheless is simply inadequate argumentation.

[I_am_not_mafia]

Oh fuck we're back to Bayes theorem to string together loads of unrelated premises to argue that somehow this proves something.

[SteveII]

Aside from your claim that Christians 'really' encounter the Holy Spirit (as opposed to interpreting their experiences through a NT lens), I don't see where you provided Simon Moon's friend any reason to doubt his experience of Krishna or whatever. "You don't need to meditate or perform any particular discipline (or concern yourself with strict observance of the Law, in Paul's view)" is a good marketing gimmick, but it makes for a lousy measure if we're concerned about the truth or falsehood of one's interpretation of experience.

The doubt of Simon's friend should arise from the overall worldview. 

1. Is Hinduism theology internally consistent?
2. Does it have a coherent understanding of reality?
3. Is there some sort of body of natural theology that support the tenent of the faith?
4. Are the facts of Krishna's life believable (as a god)? (demons, killing, war, wives, children, died of an arrow wound)

In ALL cases, religion has to be a cumulative case.

---

Pay attention. The claim was that the type of religious experiences were largely determined by CULTURE. A defeater for that is any large conversion of people from another culture. I have such a defeater: CHINA.

But you can still immerse yourself in Xtian culture in China in the same way that you could immerse yourself in a Hindu or Muslim culture in say Scotland if you wanted.

What you haven't shown is that people immersed in one culture with no exposure to Xtian imagery are having religious experiences consistent with the Xtian mythos.

Classic example of moving the goal post: Now the premise seems to be that you need people who becomes Christians without knowing anything about Christianity. Forget the pages of claims of cultural influence.

[Angrboda]

Because when one infers a cause, one is making a connection between the cause and effect, but in supernatural causation, there is no demonstrable connection between the cause and the effect by definition.  The very way you've defined the supernatural rules out any reasonable inference.  What exactly would such an inference be based on?  It seems there are only three or four possibilities, a) prior belief, b) assumption, c) empirical knowledge, or d) supernatural knowledge.  The first two are not a justification for the inference, the third is ruled out by the definition, and the fourth brings us back to a case of begging the question.  Exactly how are you proposing these inferences are being made?  It does no good to present a laundry list of examples in which such inferences were made unless somewhere in that laundry list is an example where the inference was justifiably made without recourse to either supernatural knowledge or mere assumption.  The enterprise of science differs categorically in that it invokes the relevant connections between cause and effect in its explanations, something not possible under the definition of supernatural which you are employing (in addition to which, the epistemology of science rests on two key assumptions, that there exists a real world independent of our minds, and that this real world is knowable via the contents of our experience; the attempt to make inferences to the supernatural doesn't draw on either of these assumptions, but rather simply makes a third, namely the existence of the supernatural, which is the very assumption under debate, so can't be introduced as an epistemological assumption but must be argued for on independent grounds which themselves are shared).

I'm not going to respond to your list unless you can be more specific about any particular example.  Your listing natural theology arguments as an effect seems to indicate you're just spewing potential cases in a shotgun pattern in the hopes that you might hit something.

For those following, first a definition: Inductive reasoning (as opposed to deductive reasoning or abductive reasoning) is a method of reasoning in which the premises are viewed as supplying some evidence for the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument may be probable, based upon the evidence given.

P1. Miraculous effects have been specifically attributed to God (a supernatural being). Example, the paralytic healed by Jesus: "Mark 2:10...but I want you to know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins.” So he said to the man, 11 “I tell you, get up, take your mat and go home.” 12 He got up, took his mat and walked out in full view of them all...". There are a hundred such examples in the NT where supernatural causation was declared or unmistakably inferred from the context. 
P2. The resurrected Jesus was seen by as many as 500 people. Recently crucified people do not walk around and declare that they have conquered death and provided a way for man's redemption and as such, this is an obvious, rather big, supernatural claim. 
     In support of P1 and P2, we have the following:
     a. Jesus most certainly was born, baptized, and died in the time period claimed. (other sources)
     b. Pete, James and John were known eyewitnesses to both the public and private events of Jesus' three year ministry (every other NT writer)
     c. They presided over the early church (Paul, Acts, first/second century docs)
     d. This early church instructed Paul (Paul, Acts)
     e. As evidenced by Paul's letters, this early church believed the claims later outlined in the gospels (long before they where written). We can infer from this the source of these beliefs were a critical mass of people who believed these events really happened which actually prompted immediate and significant action on their part--to evangelize the Roman world.  
     f. Peter, James and John eventually wrote letters emphasizing the themes found in the gospels
     g. Luke wrote Luke and Acts with the purpose of outlining the events from the birth of Christ through his present day
     h. The editors of Matthew, Mark, and John were all alive during the lifetimes of these people above (it is unknown if the actual people with the pen were eyewitnesses)
     i. The editors would have been know to the recipients of the gospels. The books were name by which apostle influenced that particular book
     j. The early church, who we know believed the claims of Jesus already, accepted the gospels. There is nothing in the early church writings that questioned them.
     k. The gospels dovetail nicely with Paul's writings based on his training directly from all the eyewitnesses (completing a loop)
     l. Alternate theories of the NT and early church provenance lack explanatory power of the evidence on all sorts of levels 
P3. The main promise of the NT is a series of specific supernatural effects on a person
P4. An untold number of people have reported such effects
P5. An untold number of people have reported minor miracles (defined as person-oriented miracles for which the goal is very narrow -- as opposed to the NT miracles which had broad application and goals). Ranges from healing, bringing about events/experiences/encounters/open doors, extraordinary strength/peace/perseverance, evangelistic success, etc.
P6. The question why anything at all exists has no naturalistic explanation (and most likely none forthcoming). 
P7. The question of why the universe exists has no metaphysically sound naturalistic explanation. There is no reason to think one will be forthcoming. 
P8. The question of why our universe has the narrow range of physical constants which seem necessary to form matter and conserve energy but under naturalism has no other explanation than fantastically amazing chance that would not be accepted in any other case.
P9. The question of why our minds seem non-physical but have causal powers over the physical undercuts hard naturalism and seems to have parallels to the concept of the supernatural (not that they are necessarily supernatural). 
P10. The question of why there seems to exist a knowledge of basic morality in most people and most people believe it to be based on an objective set of principles (moral Platonism) not derived from any evolutionary process. 
P11. There is physical evidence for the supernatural (from P1, P2)
P12. There is a persistent, growing, unbroken chain of personal reports of the supernatural (from P4, P5)
P13. There are reason to think that naturalism is an insufficient worldview and the existence of the supernatural has better explanatory powers in a variety of these gaps. (from P6, P7, P8, P9, P10)


THEREFORE: There are multiple lines of evidence/reasoning that infer the supernatural. Bayes showed us that that more data points that you have that infer a conclusion, the higher the probability the conclusion is true. Additionally, you can apply the math the other direction and examine the probability of these events all happening/reasoning given that the supernatural does not exist. I think there has also been sufficient connections made between cause and effect to understand the framework. Claiming that because the supernatural-->natural cause/effect have a different relationship than natural-->natural cause/effect and therefore somehow lacks sufficient connection, is a category error. 

To the PeanutGallery™: You can call into question any of the premises above, but unfortunately for you, they increase each other's probability, so you have to show how almost all of them are untrue or unlikely with logical reasons and/or evidence (as opposed to asserting). Simply claiming that each one separately has not been "proven" may be true, but nevertheless is simply inadequate argumentation.

For an inductive argument to be persuasive it both needs data points and an absence of defeaters. I'll ignore the latter for the moment. As regards to your list, the only data point in that list appears to be the cases argued in the bible, which has problems which I won't go into here. The other observations of the supernatural fail, generally, because the inference to the supernatural doesn't have a rational foundation. If a man in Bedlam believes he is Napolean Bonaparte because he's insane, that doesn't count as an inductive data point for the proposition that he is Napolean Bonaparte. If people inferring the source of their experience was supernatural exists because of previous belief, assumption, or error in their thinking, it doesn't count toward the conclusion. You only get to count those data points that are arrived at through rational justification, which gets back to the problems outlined before. As to the occurrence of post-biblical miracles, the general pattern is one where there is no foreknowledge that the events are going to occur, as well as the inference being made on the basis of an argument from ignorance (we can't explain it naturally, therefore it's a miracle). So those aren't justified inferences either. As far as the natural theology arguments, while I haven't conducted the relevant survey, they all seem to follow the same general pattern as post-biblical miracles in asserting that because there is no natural explanation for some fact or phenomena, the explanation must be supernatural. None of the aforementioned data points really count as any kind of contribution to an inductive argument, or at the very least, they are so insignificant that they generally can be dismissed.

Now, as to whether the accounts in the bible count as justified inferences to the supernatural or not, I'm currently mulling that over some more, so in the meantime, we'll simply have to agree to disagree. I think we're both aware of the problems involved in using the bible to make a strong inductive argument. Regardless, at the very least, I've demonstrated an argument, successful or not, against accepting the personal experiences argument that doesn't rely on question begging. I can think of another such argument, but since the debate was about Mathilda's conclusion, I'll leave her to make her own case. So, from my perspective, there do appear to be legitimate non-question-begging arguments for Mathilda's conclusion. Whether her argument is one such, I don't know. Nonetheless, your jumping to the conclusion that her argument was necessarily question begging appears not to have been sound, and, dependent on whether or not your rephrasing of her argument was valid or not, was likely a result of either flawed thinking or uncharitable interpretation. So, it remains to be seen whether your characterization of her argument was or was not a straw man. But it seems to be the case that you haven't shown that it wasn't with your "almost all universal negative claims" argument. You actually need to engage with her argument, as I stated before.

Now, given that I'm still mulling over certain relevant issues, specifically whether the biblical testimony can count towards the conclusion that the supernatural exists on a naive acceptance of its reports, and that this was essentially aimed at supporting Mathilda's arguments in the first place, I'm going to bow out of this discussion for now.

[LadyForCamus]

Ok... so you appear to be saying, that it would be incorrect to even ask for evidence or the supernatural (as many atheists do) depending on ones definition.

Correct.

As I have said, I don't get too caught up on the terms supernatural vs natural. And I believe that you are the one who brought up the term supernatural

I think that what one means by ‘supernatural’, is a necessary clarification in a discussion about evidence.  As I said in my previous post, if we are defining supernatural as ‘not natural’, then it would be a category error to ask for evidence of that which cannot be evident by its own definition. This is why I walked back on my proposition: supernatural claims require extraordinary evidence.

OTOH, if you’re defining ‘supernatural’ as an extension of the natural world, then it would fall into the category of ‘natural things’, or just, ‘things’, and its interactions with other things that exist could produce evidence.

What I would consider supernatural, would be something outside of the natural universe.

Where is ‘outside the natural universe’ besides ‘not in the universe’? Is it a physical space? If ‘not-natural’ things exist there, what are they made of? Matter? Something else that’s different from matter but also physical? What qualities or attributes eliminate these things from the category of ‘natural’? Where is this line of demarcation, and what is the rational justification for drawing one at all?

These are not ontological explanations. They’re merely negative descriptions of things we already know exist.  You’re saying what they’re not, instead of what they are. That’s like someone asking me to explain what light is, and I answer: ‘Well, light is...not-dark.’ So, I still don’t understand what you mean by ‘supernatural’.

In any case, if the thing, which is being described if it can interact with the natural universe, it would seem that it can have evidence of that interaction.

I agree. As I said above, whatever effects it has on the world that it belongs to would fall under the purview of science, and if these interactions leave behind physical evidence, we may have access to it.

Something could be seen or experienced, which that information could be transmitted to others and be evidence for what is not able to be seen.

Correct.  That would be considered personal testimony.

there could be other evidence left behind, which could be evaluated.

Correct.  Ofc, physical evidence, and enough of it, makes a much stronger case for any claim than testimony.  I can’t imagine that would be in dispute, would it?

If there is evidence for something, and you reason that natural forces are incapable of producing this effect, then that leaves you with either some unknown natural occurrence, or something outside of the natural which caused the effect.

This statement is problematic for a couple of reasons:

1. We haven’t adequately defined what ‘supernatural’ is, or what ‘outside the natural world’ is. As someone else mentioned in another post, a logical, causal connection between a natural effect and a supernatural cause cannot be made if that cause can’t even be properly defined, or described. Any argument that claims the cause of an effect must be ‘not-natural’ because we don’t know of a natural explaination, is an argument from ignorance.  

2. You’re propping up these ‘extra-natural’ claims on testimony alone, while failing to consider in context, the well-evidenced facts about the world that disagree with them.

So, have you noticed what happened here? I conceded to your argument that there is no category error by way of allowing the definition of supernatural to mean: an extension of, but still included in, the category of natural things. My concession now allows us to reasonably apply the principles of evidence and evidence analysis uniformly across all claims. This is what you were arguing for at the beginning of the discussion.

The result?  Lack of evidence is still a major problem for biblical claims.

It is a scientific fact that human semen is necessary for human conception. The body of high-quality, scientific evidence supporting this fact is overwhelming. It lands itself at the very top of the evidence hierarchy.  In order for that fact to be overturned, you would need a body of evidence at least as strong as the evidence that supports it. Testimony, at the bottom of the hierarchy, doesn’t even come close.

[Angrboda]

Aside from your claim that Christians 'really' encounter the Holy Spirit (as opposed to interpreting their experiences through a NT lens), I don't see where you provided Simon Moon's friend any reason to doubt his experience of Krishna or whatever. "You don't need to meditate or perform any particular discipline (or concern yourself with strict observance of the Law, in Paul's view)" is a good marketing gimmick, but it makes for a lousy measure if we're concerned about the truth or falsehood of one's interpretation of experience.

The doubt of Simon's friend should arise from the overall worldview. 

1. Is Hinduism theology internally consistent?
2. Does it have a coherent understanding of reality?
3. Is there some sort of body of natural theology that support the tenent of the faith?
4. Are the facts of Krishna's life believable (as a god)? (demons, killing, war, wives, children, died of an arrow wound)

In ALL cases, religion has to be a cumulative case.

Your arguments against other religions all seem to revolve around criteria that are favorable to your religion, and seem -- at least superficially -- hostile to theirs. If that's the case, as I think it is, that's simply another version of special pleading. I don't offhand know what the proper evaluation of a religion or its claims should be, aside from an obvious correspondence to the real world, but your criteria seem unnecessarily biased.

[Crossless2.0]

Aside from your claim that Christians 'really' encounter the Holy Spirit (as opposed to interpreting their experiences through a NT lens), I don't see where you provided Simon Moon's friend any reason to doubt his experience of Krishna or whatever. "You don't need to meditate or perform any particular discipline (or concern yourself with strict observance of the Law, in Paul's view)" is a good marketing gimmick, but it makes for a lousy measure if we're concerned about the truth or falsehood of one's interpretation of experience.

The doubt of Simon's friend should arise from the overall worldview. 

1. Is Hinduism theology internally consistent?
2. Does it have a coherent understanding of reality?
3. Is there some sort of body of natural theology that support the tenent of the faith?
4. Are the facts of Krishna's life believable (as a god)? (demons, killing, war, wives, children, died of an arrow wound)

In ALL cases, religion has to be a cumulative case.

1. Hindu "theology" strikes me as having pretty much the same internal consistency as Parmenides, with some added mythical bells and whistles.

2. I'm sure there are plenty of scientifically literate Hindus who can square the mythical circle with the best of the Abrahamists.

3. I wouldn't know.

4. I can say without hesitation that, no, the alleged facts of Krishna's life are not believable. You, on the other hand, are on much shakier ground on that point.

What do you mean, "In ALL cases, religion has to be a cumulative case"? When one seeks to provide justification for the beliefs after their adoption, or prior to adopting those beliefs? I ask because I've never met one believer who came to their faith by way of a cumulative inferential case. Not one. But I've encountered plenty of apologists who concoct their philosophical cases after already having made an emotional commitment that cries out for a rationale.

[SteveII]

---

For those following, first a definition: Inductive reasoning (as opposed to deductive reasoning or abductive reasoning) is a method of reasoning in which the premises are viewed as supplying some evidence for the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a deductive argument is certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument may be probable, based upon the evidence given.

P1. Miraculous effects have been specifically attributed to God (a supernatural being). Example, the paralytic healed by Jesus: "Mark 2:10...but I want you to know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins.” So he said to the man, 11 “I tell you, get up, take your mat and go home.” 12 He got up, took his mat and walked out in full view of them all...". There are a hundred such examples in the NT where supernatural causation was declared or unmistakably inferred from the context. 
P2. The resurrected Jesus was seen by as many as 500 people. Recently crucified people do not walk around and declare that they have conquered death and provided a way for man's redemption and as such, this is an obvious, rather big, supernatural claim. 
     In support of P1 and P2, we have the following:
     a. Jesus most certainly was born, baptized, and died in the time period claimed. (other sources)
     b. Pete, James and John were known eyewitnesses to both the public and private events of Jesus' three year ministry (every other NT writer)
     c. They presided over the early church (Paul, Acts, first/second century docs)
     d. This early church instructed Paul (Paul, Acts)
     e. As evidenced by Paul's letters, this early church believed the claims later outlined in the gospels (long before they where written). We can infer from this the source of these beliefs were a critical mass of people who believed these events really happened which actually prompted immediate and significant action on their part--to evangelize the Roman world.  
     f. Peter, James and John eventually wrote letters emphasizing the themes found in the gospels
     g. Luke wrote Luke and Acts with the purpose of outlining the events from the birth of Christ through his present day
     h. The editors of Matthew, Mark, and John were all alive during the lifetimes of these people above (it is unknown if the actual people with the pen were eyewitnesses)
     i. The editors would have been know to the recipients of the gospels. The books were name by which apostle influenced that particular book
     j. The early church, who we know believed the claims of Jesus already, accepted the gospels. There is nothing in the early church writings that questioned them.
     k. The gospels dovetail nicely with Paul's writings based on his training directly from all the eyewitnesses (completing a loop)
     l. Alternate theories of the NT and early church provenance lack explanatory power of the evidence on all sorts of levels 
P3. The main promise of the NT is a series of specific supernatural effects on a person
P4. An untold number of people have reported such effects
P5. An untold number of people have reported minor miracles (defined as person-oriented miracles for which the goal is very narrow -- as opposed to the NT miracles which had broad application and goals). Ranges from healing, bringing about events/experiences/encounters/open doors, extraordinary strength/peace/perseverance, evangelistic success, etc.
P6. The question why anything at all exists has no naturalistic explanation (and most likely none forthcoming). 
P7. The question of why the universe exists has no metaphysically sound naturalistic explanation. There is no reason to think one will be forthcoming. 
P8. The question of why our universe has the narrow range of physical constants which seem necessary to form matter and conserve energy but under naturalism has no other explanation than fantastically amazing chance that would not be accepted in any other case.
P9. The question of why our minds seem non-physical but have causal powers over the physical undercuts hard naturalism and seems to have parallels to the concept of the supernatural (not that they are necessarily supernatural). 
P10. The question of why there seems to exist a knowledge of basic morality in most people and most people believe it to be based on an objective set of principles (moral Platonism) not derived from any evolutionary process. 
P11. There is physical evidence for the supernatural (from P1, P2)
P12. There is a persistent, growing, unbroken chain of personal reports of the supernatural (from P4, P5)
P13. There are reason to think that naturalism is an insufficient worldview and the existence of the supernatural has better explanatory powers in a variety of these gaps. (from P6, P7, P8, P9, P10)

---

THEREFORE: There are multiple lines of evidence/reasoning that infer the supernatural. Bayes showed us that that more data points that you have that infer a conclusion, the higher the probability the conclusion is true. Additionally, you can apply the math the other direction and examine the probability of these events all happening/reasoning given that the supernatural does not exist. I think there has also been sufficient connections made between cause and effect to understand the framework. Claiming that because the supernatural-->natural cause/effect have a different relationship than natural-->natural cause/effect and therefore somehow lacks sufficient connection, is a category error. 

To the PeanutGallery™: You can call into question any of the premises above, but unfortunately for you, they increase each other's probability, so you have to show how almost all of them are untrue or unlikely with logical reasons and/or evidence (as opposed to asserting). Simply claiming that each one separately has not been "proven" may be true, but nevertheless is simply inadequate argumentation.

For an inductive argument to be persuasive it both needs data points and an absence of defeaters.  I'll ignore the latter for the moment.  As regards to your list, the only data point in that list appears to be the cases argued in the bible, which has problems which I won't go into here.  The other observations of the supernatural fail, generally, because the inference to the supernatural doesn't have a rational foundation.  If a man in Bedlam believes he is Napoleon Bonaparte because he's insane, that doesn't count as an inductive data point for the proposition that he is Napoleon Bonaparte.  If people inferring the source of their experience was supernatural exists because of previous belief, assumption, or error in their thinking, it doesn't count toward the conclusion.  You only get to count those data points that are arrived at through rational justification, which gets back to the problems outlined before. 

Two points:

1. Alvin Plantinga has written extensively about Reformed Epistemology Justification is a property of a person holding a belief. Warrant is a property of the belief. 

According to Plantinga, a belief, B, is warranted if:

(1) the cognitive faculties involved in the production of B are functioning properly…; (2) your cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to the one for which your cognitive faculties are designed; (3) … the design plan governing the production of the belief in question involves, as purpose or function, the production of true beliefs…; and (4) the design plan is a good one: that is, there is a high statistical or objective probability that a belief produced in accordance with the relevant segment of the design plan in that sort of environment is true.[53]
....
Plantinga's warrant theory is the basis for his theological end: providing a philosophical basis for Christian belief, an argument for why Christian theistic belief can enjoy warrant. In the book, he develops two models for such beliefs, the "A/C" (Aquinas/Calvin) model, and the "Extended A/C" model. The former attempts to show that a belief in God can be justified, warranted and rational, while the Extended model tries to show that specifically Christian theological beliefs including the Trinity, the Incarnation, the resurrection of Christ, the atonement, salvation etc. Under this model, Christians are justified in their beliefs because of the work of the Holy Spirit in bringing those beliefs about in the believer.

James Beilby has argued that the purpose of Plantinga's Warrant trilogy, and specifically of his Warranted Christian Belief, is firstly to make a form of argument against religion impossible—namely, the argument that whether or not Christianity is true, it is irrational—so "the skeptic would have to shoulder the formidable task of demonstrating the falsity of Christian belief"[56] rather than simply dismiss it as irrational. In addition, Plantinga is attempting to provide a philosophical explanation of how Christians should think about their own Christian belief.

This type of belief is different than

2.  An argument from personal experience does not have to presuppose the belief to start off with. I think all that is necessary is such an argument presupposes that you trust or rely on some other faculty of some other belief-producing or cognitive process. In other words, you can reason from any of the premises above that your experiences are probabilistically related to God.  

As to the occurrence of post-biblical miracles, the general pattern is one where there is no foreknowledge that the events are going to occur, as well as the inference being made on the basis of an argument from ignorance (we can't explain it naturally, therefore it's a miracle).  So those aren't justified inferences either.

The inference is justified if the probability of the event happening given there is no God, is sufficiently low. For example, bumping into a person that changes your life: you may not have justification to label it a miracle (although it may be). On the other hand, disappearing tumors from a boy's brain when there are hundreds of people asking for a miracle have an extremely low probability of happening in the timeframe of a week given there is no God. It is not proof, but the inference is reasonable. Example is my brother-in-law as a boy. They still have the scans. They scanned again to map the tumor in pre-op and there was no trace. Doctor said "if you believe in miracles, that's what it was". 

As far as the natural theology arguments, while I haven't conducted the relevant survey, they all seem to follow the same general pattern as post-biblical miracles in asserting that because there is no natural explanation for some fact or phenomena, the explanation must be supernatural.  None of the aforementioned data points really count as any kind of contribution to an inductive argument, or at the very least, they are so insignificant that they generally can be dismissed.

Now, as to whether the accounts in the bible count as justified inferences to the supernatural or not, I'm currently mulling that over some more, so in the meantime, we'll simply have to agree to disagree.  I think we're both aware of the problems involved in using the bible to make a strong inductive argument.  Regardless, at the very least, I've demonstrated an argument, successful or not, against accepting the personal experiences argument that doesn't rely on question begging.  I can think of another such argument, but since the debate was about Mathilda's conclusion, I'll leave her to make her own case.  So, from my perspective, there do appear to be legitimate non-question-begging arguments for Mathilda's conclusion.  Whether her argument is one such, I don't know.  Nonetheless, your jumping to the conclusion that her argument was necessarily question begging appears not to have been sound, and, dependent on whether or not your rephrasing of her argument was valid or not, was likely a result of either flawed thinking or uncharitable interpretation.  So, it remains to be seen whether your characterization of her argument was or was not a straw man.  But it seems to be the case that you haven't shown that it wasn't with your "almost all universal negative claims" argument.  You actually need to engage with her argument, as I stated before.

Now, given that I'm still mulling over certain relevant issues, specifically whether the biblical testimony can count towards the conclusion that the supernatural exists on a naive acceptance of its reports, and that this was essentially aimed at supporting Mathilda's arguments in the first place, I'm going to bow out of this discussion for now.

Perhaps I'll add something later.

[Succubus]

According to Plantinga, a belief, B, is warranted if:

Stevell can you tell me what point Alvin the not so lucid is trying to make here...

But then clearly enough if  or [the Christian beliefs given above] is true, it could be produced in me by a reliable belief-producing process.  Calvin’s Sensus Divinitatis, for example, could be working in the exclusivist in such a way as to reliably produce the belief that ; Calvin’s Internal Testimony of the Holy Spirit could do the same for. If (1) and (2) are true, therefore, then from a reliabilist perspective there is no reason whatever to think that the exclusivist might not know that they are true.

a reliable belief-producing process.