Does anyone own "The Moral Landscape"?

[vulcanlogician]

Thank you, I'll check it out

My objection is that moral realism doesn't seem to be actually saying anything. Everyone comes up with statements that apply to them, subject to the way they apply their values to the world. Those are their "ethical facts", if you like. How do you compare one person's facts to another? Is one "better" than another? It depends entirely on what ethics are trying to achieve, which has already been covered in their individuals values; hence it is circular. Maybe you're trying to achieve wellbeing, or survival of the species, or whatever. For these ethical facts to transcend the individual, there has to be a "correct framework", and I find that to be a meaningless idea.

I'll come back with more after I've read the suggested piece.

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Okay well... I agree that this looks like a better analysis than Harris, but I still find big problems in the framing used here.

The article discusses the idea of "correct ethics" or "correct systems of ethics", without ever defining what that is supposed to mean, as far as I can see. Correct in what way? To say cultural reletavism is or isn't correct is as meaningless to me as saying moral realism is correct. It talks about some objective standard for measuring the ethics of different cultures. Can there be one? Of course there can. There are infinitely many. But which one do you pick? This is again a circular problem. The correct one is correct, because it is the correct one. But correct for what purpose? If I want correct information about something, I need to specify what I actually want to know about it. There seems to be an implicit assumption that there is some "correct goal" of morality here. But morality means nothing until you've set the goal.

To me, cultural relativism is more a matter of observation than anything else. I don't use it to make statements about what is objectively right and wrong, because I find such notions incoherent on their face. The article talks about being unable to criticise other cultures. What I don't get is why this even matters, except to make one culture feel good about themselves; or to try and justify some sort of forcing of ethics onto another society. "We are right and you are wrong, so you should change!" To me, the discussion is all about the underlying values. Do the different cultures have the same values? If so, are they applying them in a logical, scientific and consistent manner? If the values are different, can one side convince the other to be closer to theirs?

So I'm still in the position of being unclear what a "true ethical statement" is supposed to be. If such a thing did exist, if there were somehow ethics that are inherent to the fabric of reality, then no one would care what they are. If they turned out to be different from our own ethics, no one would change them just because the new ones are "correct". A change in ethics requires a reason, and just "being correct" is not a reason.

Okay, so all moral realism (or ethical objectivism) is is the claim that there are moral facts. If I say "There is 20 mL of water in that glass," that is a factual statement. I could have my facts wrong, too-- but it is nonetheless a factual statement. Someone else may disagree: "No, there is actually 30mL of water in that glass." Even though this other person and I disagree on the amount of water in the glass, one thing we do agree upon is that there is a measurable portion of water in the glass.

There is a class of philosophers who are so skeptical to doubt that there is an objectively measurable quantity of water in the glass. They say all reality is subjective. Unless kicking a stone is going to prove the point, there isn't much that can be done about runaway skepticism such as this. At some point, you have to say, "No. It's reasonable to assume that the glass of water is objectively there," and get on with the business of measuring the amount. That's the nature of skepticism. It's mighty useful for cutting away errors: when someone claims their house is haunted, skepticism does well to show that this supposed haunting can be easily explained by mundane phenomena. But what do you do when the skeptic then goes on to cast the existence of the house itself into doubt?

Well, one solution is to get scientific... or more accurately... empirical. We can all see the house. So it's foolish to doubt it's there. Empiricism shores up a defense against runaway skepticism in that regard. Of course, our senses can sometimes fool us, so we therefore arrange empirical tests to learn more about what we see (that is science) and to ensure that what we do in fact see is there. Along this line of thinking, telescopes, infrared goggles, and other technology are merely and extension of (perhaps expansion of) our basic senses.

The moral realist contends that morals are real... much the same way that the house is real. But there is a problem. Moral facts are not empirical facts, and so can't be subjected to the rigors of science. Let me ask you this: is justice real? If one of your loved ones was wrongfully accused of a crime, you would want the investigation to be fair and just, wouldn't you? And in conceiving of what this "justice" concerning your friends treatment would be like, you would also see objectivity involved, right? You wouldn't just wish that the proceedings were "subjectively" in your friend's favor. You wouldn't just think "I hope the judge is in a good enough mood to let my innocent friend go." You'd wish that real objective justice was done.

Here's the thing. None of our five senses or scientific equipment will ever detect "justice." Yet, in my view, justice is a real and objective matter. As a moral realist, I also say that about morality. The problem is, however, since we can't detect morality with our five senses, there is no safeguard in place against the runaway skepticism we spoke of earlier.

Just so we are on the same page, I want you to forget about wellbeing for now. Wellbeing as related to morality is like saying there is 20mL in the glass. Other ethicists (like Kant) say that wellbeing has nothing to do with morality--rather fairness. So he is saying there is an amount of water in the glass but it isn't 20mL. We aren't talking about how much water is in the glass. We are talking about if you can measure the amount of water in the first place. We aren't talking about "Is morality related to wellbeing?" We are talking about if morality is objectively real in the first place. Once we figure out that it's real, THEN we can talk about if it's related to wellbeing or not.

Keep in mind, that all moral realism IS is the belief that there are moral facts of some kind. It doesn't say anything about if those facts are correct or incorrect. For instance, I think murder is immoral. Somebody could be a moral realist but still disagree with this statement, odd as that would be.

So there are two main branches of moral skepticism: relativism and nihilism. One way to determine if moral facts are real or not is to examine all the types of moral skepticism and see if they are "runaway skepticism" or not. Each branch has two main offshoots:

MORAL RELATIVISM
Cultural relativism: the view that moral values are only a construct of one's overarching culture [James Rachels successfully argued against this IMO, but if it is still a thing with you, we can discuss it.]

Individual relativism: the view that what ever one personally thinks right/wrong is all there is to morality.

MORAL NIHILISM

Error theory: Moral statements are in fact misstatements. They are errors. Just like when someone says "The grace of God carried me through the proceedings" they aren't talking about anything real, when I say "Murder is immoral." I am (similarly) not talking about anything real.

Expressivism: Moral statements are actually emotional expressions. When I say "Murder is wrong." What I'm really saying is "Murder--yuck!" or "Murder--blehhhh!"

So which mode of moral skepticism do you find most compelling? In order for me to defend moral realism, I need to know where you're coming from. You sound a bit like an error theorist, but I figured I'd lay them all out just so we could be clear before proceeding.