(November 1, 2018 at 7:40 am)Khemikal Wrote: But here, you insist that they are descriptions of feelings, rather than states of belief. This is a non-cognitivist objection. If it is true, then realists and subjectivists are both wrong for the same reason - and you were mistaken before in your answers to my questions. You don't actually think that you believe that x is wrong describes a state of belief. You don't actually believe that begging the question is wrong is something that you take to be true, it just makes you feel icky.
Actually, the definition I've given of morality from the start is that it is a mediation of feelings, ideas, and the environment, but that it is predicated on feelings. It's possible to have ideas, without feelings, and those would not (could not) be called moral ideas.
I don't know if you'd describe belief as a feeling, or as an idea. Do I sense (read: feel) that something is true, for whatever reason, and say I believe it? Or is it a cognitive assessment that an idea represents some objective reality?