Subjective Morality?

[Angrboda]

Well, first off, an argument based on some hypothetical "semantic level" is pathetically ridiculous.  But more substantively, I noted in the original post that responding to the phenomenological differences isn't definitive, as the phenomenology of numbers is also different from that of perception, yet no one in their right mind would argue that numbers are necessarily subjective due to that difference.  Likewise that's not a sufficient argument against the objectivity of morals, and note, it isn't the moral feelings and intuitions which are claimed to be objective, but rather the things they refer to, the moral reality itself.  Your arguments simply aren't a successful refutation of the points I made.

Numbers can be non-arbitrarily represented by putting forward a thing, then another, and calling that number of things by a name, "one" or "two."  If someone would like to clearly lay out objective morals, then they are free to do so.

DLJ's way of explaining it is good.  Supposed objective "moral facts" are also facts about any other idea you'd like to apply to the real world.  That's because they aren't moral facts, but just facts which one subjects to a moral treatment.

I can pretty easily give examples of subjective morals-- all of them, really, since mores are ideas, and since they vary greatly among individuals.  But would you care to demonstrate that any particular more is objective?

Your account of numbers is one account from several which are not definitively proven. So, that's a nice assertion, but it doesn't actually carry any water.

You believe that you can give examples of subjective morals because you believe that all morals are subjective -- a belief you haven't yet abetted. For any specific moral that you can identify, you have no way of demonstrating that said moral is not objectively true. So your claim that you can give examples of subjective morals is hollow and based on nothing more than your confidence in your belief that morals are subjective. I'm not holding that morals are necessarily objective, only that they might be. That carries essentially no burden of proof. You, on the other hand, appear wedded to the idea that objective morals don't exist. That's a claim that does carry a burden of proof, which you haven't met. I haven't claimed that I can demonstrate that a specific moral is objective. I presume your question is intending to imply that if I can't demonstrate an objective moral, that morals are then likely subjective. But that is nothing more than an argument from ignorance, and carries no water.

Your belief in the subjectivity of morals seems lacking in evidence or sound argument. Have you provided some that I've missed?