Subjective Morality?

[Belacqua]

I'd add an important caveat to that.  While I accept that others respond to red, their version of "red-ness," whatever that might be, is not directly accessible to me.  We can both acknowledge the physical reality, i.e. that there's light of a particular wavelength.  What we cannot knowingly agree on is what it's like to experience redness.  In fact, "red-ness" does not exist outside our experience of it, and conflating the experience with the thing it is about is an error.

I see what you mean. This seems consistent with your take on moral realism, too.

I guess I think that experiences are real things. That is, to say "it's not real it's just an experience" seems odd to me. 

For example, pain is real, although it is "just an experience." I wouldn't want to tell someone that his suffering isn't real because it's just something in his head.