RE: Subjective Morality?
November 10, 2018 at 8:50 pm
(This post was last modified: November 10, 2018 at 8:55 pm by bennyboy.)
(November 10, 2018 at 11:39 am)Khemikal Wrote: Who's conflating anything? A realist is simply telling you that the facts which comprise their moral positions are exactly like cat facts. Their oughts, are like everyone else's oughts.
If a realist cannot see that abstract ideas and the perception of cats are a different category, then they have a pretty poor understanding of the experience of mind. In addition to moral ideas, you might as well add that God and invisible pink unicorns are no more or no less real than cats-- cuz, you know, they're all just facts. Right?
(November 10, 2018 at 11:39 am)Khemikal Wrote: Who's conflating anything? A realist is simply telling you that the facts which comprise their moral positions are exactly like cat facts. Their oughts, are like everyone else's oughts.
Facts, combined with an evaluative premise.
............?
Do we both agree that cats and harm exist? Do we both agree that cats and harm are mind independent? You can object to my use of harm as (at least one of) my evaluative premises...but if you're objecting to the existence of harm and harmful things...then there really can't be any productive discussion between us. If you think that cats are mind independent in some way that harm isn't..then what you require.... is an argument to -that- effect.
If we both agree that cats and harm both exist and that this existence is a mind independent fact (iow, it doesn't actually matter whether I, personally, believe it) and you would instead object to my use of harm as a valid evaluative metric or premise..then you need an argument for that.
You'll have to explain why, and how, harm isn't a valid metric for moral propositions.
(full disclosure, it would be an academic endeavour at best, since I'm also a moral pluralist and can derive my moral conclusions by working..instead of from the bottom as I have been..from the top by reference to consequence or utility..or even deontological values. Like a biologist, for example...I don't think that any single moral fact provides a full description of morality anymore than any single biological fact provides a full description of biology.)
You are still conflating two kinds of "facts": those about something which you are considering morally, and those which are intrinsically moral in nature. The former is meaningless since any objective state can be considered in a million different contexts, and the latter non-existent.
I'm still waiting for a description of your bridge between is/ought. How do you go from "X is harm" to "we shouldn't do X"?