Subjective Morality?

[bennyboy]

And this is why I compare this position to theism.  You claim it's objectively wrong, then put the burden of proof on me to prove it's not.  If it's objectively wrong, show that this is so.

Wrong.  I do not claim that it's objectively wrong.  I claim that it may have an objective basis.  That incurs no burden of proof.  You do, however, claim that it is not objective.  That does incur a burden of proof.

You are free to prove or not bother to prove anything you want. If you believe there are objective moral facts, and you can see that I do not, then you can go ahead and show one for consideration, and explain why any moral idea might be said to be correct (rather than, say, very popular in a given culture).

If you don't want to do that, then I will happily go along my way still holding the opinion that all value judgments are necessarily subjective, including judgments about what metrics to consider when forming ideas about how to behave.

Opinions about the nature of reality have varied over time, too.  Opinions about the nature of reality are still the most variable of facts in existence.  Ask a Muslim, a Buddhist, and an atheist about where we go after we die and you'll get three different answers. Are you suggesting that therefore there is no objective reality?  Opinions about mathematical truths have varied over time as well.  Not about 2+ 2, but about the axiom of choice, the question of whether math and logic are explicable in terms of the one or the other, and so on.  In morality, some basic facts like fairness is good haven't varied at all over time, so you're simply cherry picking your facts in order to support your conclusion.  Even if that were not the case, at best this argument would show that moral facts are not like mathematical facts or facts about apples.  That's a proof by analogy which only follows if we have reason to expect morals to be analogous to mathematical facts or cat facts in the way you suggest.  Ultimately it's a very weak and inconclusive argument.  Additionally, there are explanations for why morals have varied over time.  Your ignorance of them is just that.  Ultimately this is an argument that because certain epistemological facts hold, then certain ontological facts follow, and that's simply a non sequitur.

I expect that if something is objective, it may be observed to be so. If there are facts which are moral in nature, and the morality of which is not dependent on the feelings and ideas of a subjective agent, then bring a few forward, and we can talk about them.

If you can't demonstrate that objective moral facts even exist, then we might as well be talking about magical space monkeys or Zeus' thunderous cock or something.

My opinion doesn't depend on anybody getting anything right.  What makes you think that physical realist facts, or mathematical realist facts, or any other type of fact you can name are not in the same boat?  I don't know exactly what you mean by faith here.  It seems like you're simply trying to make an analogy between moral realism and something that you consider bad.  That doesn't lead to the conclusion that moral realism is wrong, so what's the point?

If there are real moral truths, then we have two choices: demonstrate at least one, and show it to be so, or have faith that somewhere out there is some kind of real truth, even though we have no direct gnostic access to it. In the latter case, this is only a couple sprinkles of holy water from a religious position.

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I can easily demonstrate that at least some mores are based on feelings or individual ideas-- moral values have differed vastly over history, among cultures and individuals.

This..is not the position of subjectivism.  The position of subjectivism states that -all- moral propositions are based on facts of things which are mind dependent.  If you accept that even some propositions are based upon facts of things which are not mind dependent, this is an acceptance of moral realism.  Both subjectivists and realists think that moral propositions express ideas.  Both subjectivists and realists reject that moral propositions are expressions of emotion.  Both subjectivists and realists think that those ideas are sometimes facts of something mind dependent.  

-Only- moral realists think that they are also..at least sometimes..facts of something mind independent.



That moral propositions differ over history, between cultures, and between individuals..is not the position of moral subjectivism, either.... nor does it demonstrate that position, nor does it in any way threaten moral realism or moral subjectivism.

I didn't enter this thread declaring myself to be of a particular school.  You've spent the whole thread trying to Socrates me into a box, but I'm not down with that.

My position is pretty clear, and has been oft stated: Morality is a mediation among feelings, ideas, and the environment, and is predicated mainly on feelings.  If this doesn't fit into your view of subjectivism, you can find a new box if you like.  But since feelings are subjective, I'm perfectly happy saying that morality is small-s subjective.