why do we enjoy poetry From the perspective of neuroscience?

[Alan V]

You speak pretty confidently.  Okay, let's walk through this.  First of all, given any system-- a computer, a highly-complex organism on a planet near Alpha Centauri, or a human brain-- how do you establish whether it is conscious or not?  You know. . . using trial-and-error, observations, and so on?

How do you differentiate, scientifically, between a "real" subjective agent and a philosophical zombie-- a machine which simulates all the behaviors of a real subjective agent, but which has no more actual subjective experience than a rock?  And actually, this is a non-trivial issue, unless you want perhaps within this lifetime to accept constitutional recognition to a billion Google-bots which smile at your dumb jokes and know what you want for breakfast before you do.

Second, given that 100% of your "objective" observations are necessarily made through the agency of mind, on what basis do you establish that the reality about which you are so confident consists of anything more than mind?  Why do you choose a materialist monism rather than an idealistic one?

So far as I can tell, there is no scientific theory which explains why any system is conscious rather than not.  The evolutionary narrative "Well, it's here, so must be evolution" is a cop-out.  First you have to demonstrate that it is in fact here.  So. . . how do you demonstrate that there is such a thing as consciousness at all, in order that it may sensibly be studied?  Because if you cannot demonstrate consciousness to be a real thing, then you might as well say "Evolution. . . so unicorns were inevitable!"\

As for probability-- how do you attach probability to a philosophical position?  From whence comes your sample?  Compared to what other philosophical positions would you weigh such a position?

I think you mistake a pragmatic approach for confidence.

You don't have to establish whether a computer or a brain are conscious to deal with them. In fact, if a machine is programmed to behave like a human conversationally, you can deal with it like you were talking to a human.

As far as I know, "philosophical zombies" are unknown in the real world. Again, you have the burden of proof before I would deal with anyone as if they were such creatures. As William James might say, what is the cash-value of such an idea? How is it practical at all?

As for choosing material monism over idealism, that's a matter of probability. The simplest explanation is the most probable.

I know I have consciousness, and assume since others are like me that they do too. I don't have to prove it at all, since I typically avoid engaging philosophers with their thought experiments in pursuit of something I don't believe in -- their hypothesized absolute knowledge.

As I said above, I attach probabilities to philosophical positions based on their complexity. I consider theism much less probable than atheism, for instance, since theism posits a whole other, spiritual level to reality which as far as I can see is unwarranted. Similarly I dismiss alternative "brains in vats" scenarios and idealism as promoting unwarranted complexities.