RE: why do we enjoy poetry From the perspective of neuroscience?
January 20, 2019 at 11:07 pm
(This post was last modified: January 20, 2019 at 11:18 pm by bennyboy.)
Not sure what to say, except nope.
In the case of a bridge, it doesn't matter to me if it's a simulation. So long as the Matrix bridge built of Matrix material stands up when I walk on it, that is sufficient for me. But in the case of sentience, a simulated mind is not sufficient to me.
These are not mutually exclusive. The brain is clearly different from non-brain things, by definition. And when you wave toward the brain as an explanation of consciousness, then you are saying that it allows for consciousness when other systems do not, but without explaining why that would be. Implied is this: most systems do not sustain consciousness, but the brain does 'just cuz it does. That's special pleading.
I think there are several options worth considering:
1) idealism: the brain (and everything else) is real, but is a representation of a complex set of ideas that we virtualize. Note that this doesn't preclude objective truth.
2) panpsychism: all material is intrinsically capable of allowing for consciousness, and all energetic interactions represent elemental consciousness.
3) physical supervenience: the universe and its parts are not intrinsically sentient in any sense of the word, but something like a field (metaphorically) may be spawned under certain special conditions.
I personally am an ambiguist-- I believe that reality encompasses all three of those in a paradoxical manner, and that which one is true is dependent not on its objective reality but upon which angle you are examining it from-- much like a QM particle in a double-slit experiment is both of / neither of / one of a particle or a wave. I really do not think there's a truth to be had outside the context imposed by a thinking agent-- or rather, that a thinking agent is required for that superposition to be resolved and to appear monist.
In the case of a bridge, it doesn't matter to me if it's a simulation. So long as the Matrix bridge built of Matrix material stands up when I walk on it, that is sufficient for me. But in the case of sentience, a simulated mind is not sufficient to me.
(January 20, 2019 at 10:51 pm)Gae Bolga Wrote: There's only two ways that can end. Either the brain really is different, fundamentally, than everything else, or we've engaged in special pleading. I'll let you decide, like the example of Benny from AF cracking nueroscience, above, which is more likely..between those two possible and exhaustive outcomes.
These are not mutually exclusive. The brain is clearly different from non-brain things, by definition. And when you wave toward the brain as an explanation of consciousness, then you are saying that it allows for consciousness when other systems do not, but without explaining why that would be. Implied is this: most systems do not sustain consciousness, but the brain does 'just cuz it does. That's special pleading.
I think there are several options worth considering:
1) idealism: the brain (and everything else) is real, but is a representation of a complex set of ideas that we virtualize. Note that this doesn't preclude objective truth.
2) panpsychism: all material is intrinsically capable of allowing for consciousness, and all energetic interactions represent elemental consciousness.
3) physical supervenience: the universe and its parts are not intrinsically sentient in any sense of the word, but something like a field (metaphorically) may be spawned under certain special conditions.
I personally am an ambiguist-- I believe that reality encompasses all three of those in a paradoxical manner, and that which one is true is dependent not on its objective reality but upon which angle you are examining it from-- much like a QM particle in a double-slit experiment is both of / neither of / one of a particle or a wave. I really do not think there's a truth to be had outside the context imposed by a thinking agent-- or rather, that a thinking agent is required for that superposition to be resolved and to appear monist.
