Morality

[Acrobat]

So it’s not  the moral facts and values, that exist independently of “we” that reveal moral aims? But “we” do? So moral aims are a human construct?

Do you require my assistance to have this argument with yourself?  Yes, moral aims are a human construct..regardless of whether moral facts of a matter exist.  A fact just is, and this would be equally true of any potential moral fact.  Aims are the product of intentional moral agents..like ourselves.  We may attempt to construct our aims with rference to those facts (and we may not) but throughout all of this it;s very clear that the moral fact is not the aim, but the evaluative metric of any potential or hypothetical aims.

If moral values and facts exist independently of us, then they define our moral aims, not us. If you disagree you should rethink your supposed moral realism.

If moral facts exist independently of us, then moral facts exist independently of us.   They do not define our aims on sheer account of their existence.  No more so than the sheer existence of Total Drama Island compels me to watch it with my daughters.

If moral facts exist and values existent idenpendently of us, they define our moral aims. Or else you’re just describing some cold fact of the world. In order to be moral it has to be both prescriptive and descriptive, be the source of is and ought.

If the ought is human construct as you suggest, then you’re really arguing for moral relativism, or some sort of confused moral realism.

This is far more evident in Plato:

“Plato was a moral realist who thought that there are ideal forms (abstract objects) that exist in the world as ideal “perfect” things. There’s perfect goodness, perfect virtue, perfect courage, and so on. In some sense what ought to be the case really does exist—as the forms. We can somehow know these forms through contemplation or intuition. Perhaps we experienced the forms before we were born and can remember them throughout our lives. For Plato certain forms are “moral facts” that exist in a way similar to any other state of affairs. We ought to acquire characteristics of the forms, such as goodness, virtue, justice, wisdom, and moderation. Once we have those characteristics (perfections or virtues), we will do what we morally ought to. No one acquires virtues completely, and people who do so well are better people who don’t.

Simply put, the Platonic solution is that what ought to be the case is based primarily on actually existing abstract objects, and we are “what ought to be” insofar as we approximate these objects. What we ought to do is based on what we will do naturally once we are perfect.”

I am guessing you reject Platos form of the good? Because clearly for Plato the ought, moral aims is not a human construct.

If moral facts exist independently of us, then moral facts exist independently of us.   They do not define our aims on sheer account of their existence.  No more so than the sheer existence of Total Drama Island compels me to watch it with my daughters.

If that were the case why even call them moral. If it’s moral fact that stealing your wallet is wrong, but this fact is not saying that I ought not steal your wallet, then it’s not really a moral fact, it may be a fact about the unpleasantness on having your wallet taken, but it’s not a moral fact, if it’s not implying what I ought not do. Calling it a moral fact is just semantic trickery.

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I recommend leaving terms like “subjective” and “objective” our the equation completely. That’s 18th century thinking and again, weak semantics.

Well I mean it as "objective". That the wrongness of something exists as objectively as the yellow of my wife's dress, as 1+1 = 2, independent of you or I.

That when I observe the wrongness of something, I'm recognizing something true about reality itself, independent of myself, like the cup in front of me, that doesn't merely exist in my mind.

If atheists who consider themselves moral realist, but don't see it as such, they should perhaps think of dropping moral objectivism.