Morality

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In platonic moral realism moral facts and moral obligations are not distinct subjects.

So?  In reality, they are.  That's always the problem with idealism, huh..lol?

In reality they are. The ought, of that I ought to do what’s good, I ought not to do what’s immoral, doesn’t merely exists in my head, but out there, in objective reality as well. To doubt it’ existence, is like doubting the existence of other minds besides my own. Or that the cup in front of me, only exists in my mind.

You might deny this,  but I would view you as a solipsist in this regard.

Not so much.  What you're discussing is deontological ethics.  

I’m still discussing within the concept of Plato's Form of the Good.

Holocaust is morally wrong. I'm assuming you accept this as a moral fact?

I do, yeah.

Now explain why this is morally wrong, without reference to obligations, or oughts.

Harm.

Is it just a description of the negative societal impact of the holocaust? Or something akin to such explanations?

Could be, sure.  When we refer to negative societal impacts we're referring to conceptual harm..but it's sheer presence doesn't compel us to avoid it, and we may have good reason to do that harm (or to let it be done) - so..you can see, that no specific obligation presents itself at this point or level of scrutiny.  

Remember what we said awhile ago, that moral nihilism and moral realism can’t be both be true, because one is a negation of the other. 

Let's use harm.

Harm is morally wrong, this a moral fact. I ask what makes it morally wrong, you say “harm”. Do you see the tautology yet? Harm is morally wrong, because harm is harm. 

When I say harm is wrong, I don’t mean harm is harm. I mean we ought not harm. That we ought not harm is a moral fact. 

If my view,  is as you say false, that there is no such thing as the moral realty that I’m implying here, I would subscribe to moral nihilism. 

Now try and indicate why moral nihilism is false, in relationship to your supposed moral realism. I wouldn’t believe anything is intrinsically moral or immoral, that I have no moral obligations, or duties.

You claim this is false, the holocaust is wrong is a moral fact. It’s wrong because its harmful.

I say I acknowledge that’s it harmful, but I don’t see it as morally wrong or right. What is that labeling it as morally wrong saying that it’s harmful isn’t saying? If it’s not as you imply, that I ought not do it?

All you’re doing is attaching the label “moral” to things that are harmful, but it’s a hallow and empty attachment, that contributes no additional meaning, or facts to the statement x is harmful. Hence why your argument for moral realism fails, and my.  moral nihilism is true

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If Plato conception of The Good, constitutes as a God, than you can’t be an atheist and subscribe to Plato’s conception of the Good.

Ummmm, no. I've known quite a few professional philosophers (ie they have doctorates) who find Plato's theory of forms compelling and yet are thoroughly atheist. The form of the Good is goodness itself- full stop. Plato thought that goodness (all by itself) was intelligible to the intellect- full stop. If you accept these conclusions, then you are (at least somewhat) in agreement with Plato. No God belief whatsoever required.

But what if Plato did (in the back of his mind) think that the form of the Good was (in fact) some kind of God. It still doesn't matter. People who appreciate Plato's thinking are under no obligation to swallow his philosophy whole. I reserve the right to say that Plato was absolutely right about X, except for one particular idea concerning X, which is completely wrong.

I think if you're going to start pick and choosing what you want to retain in regards to Plato’s form of the Good, you’d have put some serious thought into how those parts relate, and whether the parts you like can be retained while rubbishing the parts you don’t.

Secondly if I’m using Plato’s conception of the Good pretty much in it’s entirety, and you mean some modified version of it, you should perhaps indicate which aspects you stripped from it, so it doesn’t appear as if we’re talking about the same thing.

I would argue, as Alsdair Macintrye has in After Virtue, what these atheists moral realists, and many others atheist moral philosophers suffer from, is a great of incoherency, because they haven’t carefully parsed out the teleological assumptions implicit in moral view like Platos, and their own. Morality absent of such assumptions, is incoherent, whether they realize it or not. Morality is a concept people hold very deeply and dearly, so that the fact that cognitive dissonance readily exists in attempts to reformulate it, shouldn’t be surprising. I would suggest Macintyre work, for a better understanding of what I am suggesting.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/After_Virtue

I think there is something compelling about the notion of "goodness itself"-- that goodness can be understood apart from this or that particular "good" thing. The whole point of the forms is that they are intelligible to the intellect but not the senses. They can be understood but not seen, heard, or felt. How is God intelligible to the intellect? Believers say (rightly) that it takes faith-- not thought -- to believe in God (read Paul's diatribes against philosophy some time). At the very least, belief in God is a matter of the heart and has little to do with intelligibility. Plato was concerned with something altogether different.

Let’s start by asking which parts of Plato Conceptions of the Good have you removed?

I’m assuming all the parts that lead others to conflate it with God, or the One? But let be clear as to what those parts are.