Morality

[Acrobat]

Not at all, which is why I've been trying to familiarize you with moral realism.  


To a non natural realist, the badness of the thing is directly apprehended by the intellect.  It's a non empirical fact which is only coincidentally informed by the empirical facts of the matter (say, harm).  A property that some object has, that many otherwise disparate objects -can- have. 

To a natural realist, the badness of the thing is shorthand for observing a grab bag of empirical properties.  Harm is used illustratively as an umbrella term for these...but it can get needlingly specific depending on which variant of natural realism one refers to.  

So, on the one hand, it's not actually true that a moral fact is an evaluative premise or proposition on it's face..but, if it were..that poses no more difficulty than certifying any other list of empirical premises or propositions.

Do you find that objection difficult to handle in your own divine morality, and how do you address it?

You just seem to be dancing around the question.

So we'll simply if for, with Yes or No, which you can elaborate on if you choose: 

Calling the holocaust morally bad, is a value judgement. Yes or No?

Values judgements are evaluative proposition, Yes or No?

Will you actually answer these questions head on, or just dance around them like Sarah Huckabee?