Van Tillian/Clarkian Presuppositional Apologetics.

[Sam]

However, natural laws don’t control or cause anything; they are merely descriptions of the uniformity we observe. Your position is the same as saying the coast line on a map controls what the coast looks like on the ground. If nature behaved differently tomorrow we’d revise the laws of nature just like if the shape of the coast changes we revise the map.

Okay, it looks like my initial explanation was a little coarse as so there has been some confusion. It’s sufficient to say; that is not my position.

The point I was trying to express was that I hold that interactions between particles on various scales determines the appearance and behaviour of objects in the macroscopic universe. Given a purely naturalistic position, we would expect that these interactions would be necessarily limited and not random. Given this limitation on the number of possible interactions we could further postulate that nature would have a certain uniformity and predictability to it, and this is what is expressed as "Natural Laws". I'll concede that my phrasing was perhaps a little vague previously but as you can see, I do not in fact believe that these 'natural laws' have any controlling role.

I disagree here too, if the laws of nature were changing all the time it would be impossible to make any future predictions since the very notion of probability assumes some degree of uniformity.

That’s true, if nature was in a constant state of flux, never returning to the same state twice induction would have no power what so ever. However, some non-uniformity would not cause this issue because as I said, induction provides for probabilistic knowledge so uncertainty is inherently accounted for.

Could you explain why given naturalism, we should expect such a situation where nature is in such flux, as opposed to the situation I outlined above?

Well if you believe in the God of scripture you don’t have to hold to such a weak position, the “problem of induction” is a non-problem for the believer.

I'm quite sure that is what you believe. Unfortunately for me personally appealing to the God of Scripture would necessitate me holding far weaker positions, primarily because I hold none of your axiomatic beliefs nor share your faith.

Additionally, this only a justification of the use of induction pragmatically if nothing else. I believe I have attempted to outline other arguments as well as this. As such this does not constitute 'my position' in its entirety.

Well Popper believed that you could gain no real knowledge from science at all, a position that very few atheists would hold to today.

Popper had a very skeptical and prudent approach to knowledge derived by science best expressed in his theory of Critical Rationalism.

I don't believe your assertion that he believed 'no real knowledge could be gained from science' is accurate though. Popper held that all knowledge; Scientific, Theistic or otherwise was irreducibly conjectural and hypothetical so he did not specifically distrust knowledge gained from science.

My point was that some aspects of Poppers work highlight an issue with the 'Problem of Induction', showing that its implications may not be as far-reaching as you seem to hope.

I think you are trying to prove a point that we both already agree upon.

I'm not trying to prove anything. I'm outlining my view on the matter as you requested.

I support the principle of induction just as much as you do; it just violates the principle of sufficient reason to not be able to give account for your assumptions.

I would hold that a well corroborated theory, supported by the views I have outlined is more than adequate under the 'Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing' (If a judgment is to express a piece of knowledge, it must have a sufficient ground.)

Namely, in an atheistic universe why would we even assume the there will continue to be uniformity in nature? Induction does not make any sense in a purely naturalistic universe.

You’re just posing a non-problem now and trying to leverage it.

Reasonably, why should we assume otherwise? The situation you propose it far more improbable and perhaps even logically impossible compared to that which is accepted. Unless you can explain why a naturalistic worldview should assume otherwise I struggle to see any point here.

In the Christian worldview it is believed that God upholds His creation in a consistent and predictable manner.

So your explanation here relies on several dubious axiomatic assumptions. Further, to even comply with those you have to clearly demonstrate that this is in fact revealed in scripture.

We derive this from many areas of scripture but one of the best is Genesis 8:22 where God tells us that until the end of the age he will conduct His governing in a predictable manner.

As long as the earth endures, seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night will never cease (New International Version - 1984)

This passage hardly seems to say that God will 'govern in a predictable manner'. It simply assures certain basic occurrences which, given your definition of God and its properties could easily be done without reference to any fixed natural uniformity. You’re taking the passage and manipulating it to fit your requirement for this particular argument.

Further, the bible indicates a litany of non-uniform occurrences ('Miracles') which further imperil your assumption. Simply, you have no grounds for assuming uniformity because God, at any moment could change the functioning of reality or impose on them; as illustrated in the bible.

Obviously this illustrates the weakness of your own position as seen by someone without your own assumptions and belief structure.

Regards

Sam

P.S. I omitted replies to certain things which weren't pertinent to the subject at hand. I hope that's okay.