Van Tillian/Clarkian Presuppositional Apologetics.

[Statler Waldorf]

You borrow in order to attack.

Nope, it’s called an internal critique, I am forcing you to be consistent with your worldview; I know it probably hurts.

Let me explain a few basic points of logic to you Stat Wal

1. Skepticism isn't a claim (extraordinary or otherwise)
2. Atheism is a lack of belief in any god or gods, not a claim.
3. Appeal to popularity is a fallacy, not a proof.

The day I start taking tips from you in logic will definitely be a day of regression in my critical thinking skills.

1. We are not talking about general skepticism; we are specifically talking about atheism.
2. According to the Routtledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Atheism is the position that affirms the non-existence of God. It proposes positive belief rather than mere suspension of disbelief”, so it most certainly is a positive claim.
3. I didn’t use an appeal to popularity; I used an appeal to definition. If you want to know what the extraordinary claim on a particular matter is you must first define what the ordinary claim is. This by definition is the claim that people ordinarily make, namely that the supernatural does exist.

The point I was trying to express was that I hold that interactions between particles on various scales determines the appearance and behaviour of objects in the macroscopic universe. Given a purely naturalistic position, we would expect that these interactions would be necessarily limited and not random. Given this limitation on the number of possible interactions we could further postulate that nature would have a certain uniformity and predictability to it, and this is what is expressed as "Natural Laws". I'll concede that my phrasing was perhaps a little vague previously but as you can see, I do not in fact believe that these 'natural laws' have any controlling role.

Interesting, why is there a limitation on the possible number of interactions? How could these interactions be anything but random? How do you know they will continue to be limited in the future? Just trying to be sure I understand your position.

That’s true, if nature was in a constant state of flux, never returning to the same state twice induction would have no power what so ever. However, some non-uniformity would not cause this issue because as I said, induction provides for probabilistic knowledge so uncertainty is inherently accounted for.

I agree with this, but isn’t the real issue why there is any uniformity at all in nature? Rather than why is there some degree of non-uniformity?

Could you explain why given naturalism, we should expect such a situation where nature is in such flux, as opposed to the situation I outlined above?

Well because nobody can figure out where this uniformity comes from. Why don’t objects just pop in and out of existence? Why does a stone remain a stone? We can detail natural laws describing these interactions and properties but we really can’t explain why these interactions happen and properties are present. Philosophers like Hume recognized this problem, generalizations, cause/effect relationships, and essences do not make any sense in a purely chance unguided universe.

I'm quite sure that is what you believe. Unfortunately for me personally appealing to the God of Scripture would necessitate me holding far weaker positions, primarily because I hold none of your axiomatic beliefs nor share your faith.

Well maybe you should…no?

I would hold that a well corroborated theory, supported by the views I have outlined is more than adequate under the 'Principle of Sufficient Reason of Knowing' (If a judgment is to express a piece of knowledge, it must have a sufficient ground.)

But so far, as best I can tell all of your justifications sneak the principle of induction in through the back door as a premise. You assume that the interactions at the microscopic level will remain a good explanation into the future because they have remained one in the past. This of course banks off of the assumption that the future will resemble the past. If I am not following your position please correct me, but that is what I am seeing.

You’re just posing a non-problem now and trying to leverage it.

Reasonably, why should we assume otherwise? The situation you propose it far more improbable and perhaps even logically impossible compared to that which is accepted. Unless you can explain why a naturalistic worldview should assume otherwise I struggle to see any point here.

You see though, you used the term improbable. Probability is based off of induction, the very thing we are discussing, so you are really just begging the question.

So your explanation here relies on several dubious axiomatic assumptions. Further, to even comply with those you have to clearly demonstrate that this is in fact revealed in scripture.

The fact that my axiomatic assumptions provide a framework that solves the problem of induction actually makes them the opposite of dubious.

This passage hardly seems to say that God will 'govern in a predictable manner'. It simply assures certain basic occurrences which, given your definition of God and its properties could easily be done without reference to any fixed natural uniformity. You’re taking the passage and manipulating it to fit your requirement for this particular argument.

Harvest which involves seasonal changes in angle of sun to the earth, photosynthesis, respiration, the second law of thermodynamics, precipitation, constant gravitational forces, and moderated atmospheric pressures to just name a few necessary conditions could happen without uniformity in nature? I beg to differ. The things listed in the verse, although certainly not exhaustive, definitely point to God’s consistent upholding of His creation.

Further, the bible indicates a litany of non-uniform occurrences ('Miracles') which further imperil your assumption. Simply, you have no grounds for assuming uniformity because God, at any moment could change the functioning of reality or impose on them; as illustrated in the bible.

Oh, seems you have been brushing up on Martin’s TANG. Well as Frame pointed out when he refuted Martin, miracles are by definition an extremely rare violation of the uniformity of nature or act of God. So a person can still make predictions without worrying about God suddenly breaking the rules (something He usually gives warning about doing before He does it, and something He is no longer actively doing on a great scale like in Biblical times). God can also use natural means to achieve a miraculous end such as the strong wind found in Exodus 14.

P.S. I omitted replies to certain things which weren't pertinent to the subject at hand. I hope that's okay.

Not a problem, it’s best to keep these posts at a manageable length anyways.