Is Moral Nihilism a Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

You don't understand any of these terms, even ones you've been dropping every third line, and don't remember the things you've previously said, and don't realize that you're asking things I've been giving examples of in every post.

WTF am I supposed to do with that, lol? Sure, though, it's probably a me issue. I'm a nutbar for saying the things that ethical theorists say, to you, lol.

We disagree, ultimately, about the grand total of one thing - whether or not nihilism could qualify as a morality. This is a relatively simple disagreement, at least between us, that hinges on whether or not the distinction between logical and moral normativity is valid in some discussion of moral principles derived from meta-ethical positions. Again, neither of us denies that there is the potential for normative content in nihilism. One of us contends, only, that this normativity is not moral normativity.

I understand the contention of difference between the two, though we're having a conversation of pretty limited scope... so it doesn't help to say that sometimes they're different when I'm asking you to ponder the question of whether this might not be one of those times.

Understand?

Before getting into any of this again, understand that from a linguistic standpoint it;s very likely that meaning and content are essentially normative. It may be that we can;t help but do this even if we don;t want to and shouldn't (from the perspective of some limitation in any given moral framework, that is, don't read too much into it - but notice that normative language is here again? I literally can't express this to you without using it, any more than you were able to express your own view without drifting into comments like correctness and which position deserved what. Maybe it's a linguistic tick. But...

You will be hard pressed to find a morality that doesn't at least contend that it's statements are derived logically from it's principles. You may be unsatisfied with the logical or descriptive bridge into moral normativism, but that would be a dissatisfaction present in any such contention. If nihilism entails or embeds a set of normative statements that are derived logically from it it, in what way are those normative statements different from the others? Those other statements are -also- logically normative, which is the force by which their moral normativity - in the same statement, is argued. This is so even if we allow that the initial statement may be a non truth apt statement, like an opinion or a taste for or against this or that or just a pure expression of emotion. I use the exclamation point to describe potentially non truth apt statements and refer you back to the link on jorgensens dilemma in imperative logic - wherein, even if we side with the notion that these arguments don;t follow (assaulting our intuitions about them) and thus are incoherent - they still express content and meaning.

Hurting people is bad!
John is a person.
Hurting John is bad.

or

Don't hurt people!
John is a person.
Don't hurt John.

or this fun combo.

Hurting people is bad!
Don't hurt people!
John is a person
Therefore don't hurt john, that would be bad.

and Blackburnes formulation of a solution to content and meaning in a valid framework from noncognitivism.

(a) H!(B!p --> B!q)

Are you following me thusfar? Can nihilism produce such statements? Yes. Does it produce those statements by the ame means as the other candidate moralities? Yes. Is the production of those statements taken to qualify those candidates -as- moralities? Yes.

What reason is there, then, to place the wall of seperation between those candidates as moralities and nihilism as -not that-, other than some insistence that nihilism says so - which in point of fact it actually doesn't?

It's not due to the non rule of how noncognitivism can't produce such statements, either. Mostly because normative expressions can be derived from non cognitive statements.

It's not due to how they're logically normative statements, because those morally normative statements are also logically normative statements in moral realism, for example.

We could potentially, and to use your language from before, say that it's relatively empty. That there's not enough there, there, to qualify - but in truth we'd only be asserting that it were a relatively -small- morality, not that it doesn't meet the qualifications that other approved candidates meet, just that it does so in a minimalist way. There isn't alot therefore not enough of this content, in effect.