Is Moral Nihilism a Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

Is there a difference between normative and logical correctness in moral realism?

Yes, because the latter only deals with metaethics. Saying "moral realism is false" doesn't mean "moral realism is morally wrong" and saying "moral realism is true" doesn't mean "moral realism is morally right." Those would be additional normative statements added on top of the metaethics. You'd at the very least have to also believe that the truth is morally good, and falsehood is morally bad, in addition to that, first.

Moral realism can be true, and you can, therefore, be correct to believe in it (logically correct, not morally correct), without you making any normative statements. And moral realism can be false, and you can, therefore, to be correct to not believe in it (logically correct, not morally correct), but you can still make normative statements. A nihilist can make a normative statement and say "I ought to do X", despite the fact that it contradicts their own position and a moral realist can refrain from making normative statements, and never say anything like "I ought to do X", or anything similar, regardless of the fact that they're a moral realist. Whoever is right and whoever is wrong doesn't change who is making normative statements and who isn't.

What I actually said was that saying that moral nihilism is logically incorrect and incoherent isn't making a normative statement or saying that nihilism is morally wrong.

Do you not remember this?  Does nihilism say that moral realism is false?  Yes it does.  

Even more embedded, is saying that nihilism is logically incorrect and incoherent - false, a normative statement?  Yes. It imposes a set of restrictions not on what can be - as we both agree that a nihilist or some nihilist position -could- offer..say an incoherent semantics, but instead as a comment on what should be, if we're to do nihilism correctly or to do logic correctly.

There is normative content in nihilism, and normitive content in your statements about nihilism.  You think that it's logically normative, rather than morally normative.  You simply don;t acknowledge your normative statements as such.  The latter is unimportant but actually was half of my original contention.  The former is what you've spent so much time waffling over since.

Our only disagreement is as to whether this normative content, which we both acknowledge to exist, can be expressed as morally normative content, I suppose, consistently with the framework of nihilism.

I think that it can, or at least could, for the reasons addressed at length. It is not clear what the distinction between nihilisms normative content and moral realisms normative content (as examples of how normative content is produced) is supposed to be in principle...and coming at it from a less generous angle I'm just not wedded to the idea of denying this statements truth aptness and truth value in order to avoid the consequence of nihilism rendering itself logically incoherent with respect to whatever it is you're discussing, nor can I be sure...again for reasons stated at length, that doing so would actually prevent that consequence from arising.

That would be nihilisms problem, not mine - and not your,s either. Not ours. I'm only wondering and asking you to wonder whether the normative content in nihilism is, genuinely, qualitatively different than the normative content in moral realism, such that distinguishing between the two sets of normatives in this conversation starts to make some sort of sense beyond the inistence of what one or another position claims about itself or the other positions.

I do think that between nietzsche, blackburne, frege, jorgensen, moore (courtesy of vulcan), Hare and Gibbord you have plenty to chew on and could understand what I'm expressing if you chose to dig into any of those examples. Ive assumed that your description of nihilism is an accurate one (which i don;t believe) and I;ve assumed that your assessment of nihilism's coherence is accurate (which I can agree with, but don't believe). You could do me or any of these gentlemen the same courtesy by imagining that maybe, just one piece of all of this might have some truth to a bit of it, lol. Right?

We have this one area of disagreement, and unless we can find at least a tiny smidgeon of common ground in all of that, a basis of shared facts- we're not going to be able to reach a point where you could say - "I don't believe that, I entirely reject your reasoning - but I understand why you or any other nominally rational person would/could believe that" - are we?