RE: How to easily defeat any argument for God
August 13, 2019 at 10:06 am
(This post was last modified: August 13, 2019 at 10:20 am by GrandizerII.)
(August 13, 2019 at 9:32 am)Acrobat Wrote:(August 12, 2019 at 7:49 am)Belaqua Wrote: Yes, I agree. Maybe some of the trouble comes from inaccuracy of language. We say "good" to mean both "I like this" and "this is a benefit for the world." But if something is a benefit for the world, then there must be an objective reality to it. It really does good in the world, regardless of my personal taste. We may disagree over exactly how much good it does, but this is still not a matter of taste.
But the good is not in the benefit for the world. We can reduce the benefits of the world to a series of statements of facts, but that thing we recognize as objective good, is not contained within them.
What we are seeing, when we acknowledge the objectiveness of good, the reality of good, is something supernatural, something immaterial, something like Plato's form of the Good. Now of course many people here who do believe that good and bad are objective truths, would disagree, and try to place the objectiveness of good, within some material statements of facts, but they're just hiding the elephant in the room.
Let's quote a bit more Wittgenstein again:
Quote:"Now what I wish to contend is that, although all judgments of relative value can be shown to be mere statements of facts, no statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value.
Let me explain this: Suppose one of you were an omniscient person and therefore knew all the movements of all the bodies in the world dead or alive and that he also knew all the states of mind of all human beings that ever lived, and suppose this man wrote all he knew in a big book, then this book would contain the whole description of the world; and what I want to say is, that this book would contain nothing that we would call an ethical judgment or anything that would logically imply such a judgment.
It would of course contain all relative judgments of value and all true scientific propositions and in fact all true propositions that can be made. But all the facts described would, as it were, stand on the same level and in the same way all propositions stand on the same level. There are no propositions which, in any absolute sense, are sublime, important, or trivial.
Now perhaps some of you will agree to that and be reminded of Hamlet's words: "Nothing is either good or bad, but thinking makes it so." But this again could lead to a misunderstanding. What Hamlet says seems to imply that good and bad, though not qualities of the world outside us, are attributed to our state of mind. But what I mean is that state of mind, so far as we mean by that a fact which can describe, is no ethical sense good or bad. If for instance in our world book, we read the description of a murder with all its details physical and psychological, the mere description of these facts will contain nothing which we could call an ethical proposition. The murder with be on exactly the same level as any other event, for instance the falling of a stone. Certainly the reading of this description might cause us pain or rage or any other emotion, or we might read about the pain or rage caused by this murder in other people when they heard of it, but there will simply be facts, facts, and facts but no Ethics.
And now I must say that if I were to contemplate what Ethics really would have to be if there were such a science, this result seems to me quite obvious. It seems to be obvious that nothing we could ever think or say should be the thing. That we cannot write a scientific book, the subject matter of which could be intrinsically sublime and above all other subject matters. I can only describe my feeling by the metaphor, that, if a man could write a book on Ethics which really was a book on Ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all other books in the world.
Our words used as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and converting meaning and sense, natural meaning and sense. Ethics, if it anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts ; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it. "
Murder takes away the life of another human being. The falling of a stone involves, well, merely the movement of a stone from a higher altitude to lower. We can look at these statements and see that there is something about murder that's just wrong (based on what it involves), but we don't see that same thing (or anything of the sort) about the second statement.
(August 13, 2019 at 10:01 am)Acrobat Wrote:(August 13, 2019 at 8:59 am)Grandizer Wrote: You have 2 apples. What you don't have is the "2". There's no "2" existing in a way that you physically grasp it. The only 2 that is real is that which is used to describe the quantity of the apples.
Similarly, for "good". There's no "good" in the sense that there is a physical referent. There's "good acts" and "bad acts" but not "good".
I have two apples. The two is referent to the physical amount of apples that I posses.
To the amount, yes. But remember that "two" is something we as a species have conceptualized. It's not something we pinpointed in nature in a concrete physical sense. 2 + 2 = 4, but only by having defined whole numbers and the operation of addition. 2 comes after 1, 3 comes after 2, 4 comes after 3 => 4 comes 2 after 2 => by definition, 2 + 2 = 4
Quote:Now when I use good in a subjective sense, such as when I speak of the how good my dinner taste. The referent of good here is my state of mind, my taste, my likes.
Meaningless last statement. Try again.
Quote:Since we acknowledge that moral good, unlike subjective goods is objective, the referent of good is not a state of mind, but something outside of it.
Another meaningless statement. One cannot speak of the color of the sky being "salty".
Quote:Quote: If you have a list of such criteria by which one can determine whether one is ugly or not, and you're measuring ugliness by reference to those criteria, then that would be an objective measure of ugliness. In what way is that not objective? Since when do physical facts not indicate objectiveness?
Because having objective measures for our subjective preferences, doesn't transform them into objective truth. They don't transform a subjective state of mind, to features of an external objective reality, outside our head.
Ugliness isn't reducible to physical facts about you. Your wife could acknowledge all the same physical facts about you, but see you as beautiful. If it were an objective truth, that you are objectively ugly, than your wife who disagrees would be wrong, like someone claiming that 1+1 = 4, or the earth is flat.
When you go down to the nitty gritty, even mathematics is subjective at the core (by your argument). Of course, we have to select the axioms or criteria or standards by which we can reasonably measure this or model that, but once you have that set it no longer becomes about my subjective state of mind. 2 + 2 = 4 is true regardless of what I think about it.
Whatever "magical objective thing" you're talking about, it's just not there. And remember, when we do the logic, your position doesn't even imply that "magical objective thing" is a thing.