(August 13, 2019 at 7:55 pm)Belaqua Wrote: Thank you for the passage from Wittgenstein. I've found and read a couple of essays on this topic this morning, and I'll try to read his Lecture on Ethics today. It's only 8 pages!
I'm beginning to understand your argument better, from this and from skimming more of this thread.
In a way, people are agreeing with you on the main point, I think. There is clearly nothing quantifiable in the material world which can be identified as good or bad. It's not something we can see in a microscope. But people here seem to agree that there are obvious moral facts. For example, if you cut the head off a baby, it's clearly bad. And if they demand "why?" we can say "because it deprives the baby of life, liberty, and happiness." And we can respond, "but why is it bad to do that?" And eventually the argument is just "because it just is." So in a sense people are agreeing with you. It's not something material, but it's clear and true.
Let's think of three types of questions, to see the distinction between them.
I had a slice of pizza the other night, and it was good.
A.) If someone ask me why was it good?
It seems perfectly adequate to respond with certain physical characteristics of the pizza, the crispiness of the crust, the balance of the topping, the cheese to sauce ratio, etc....
B.) What if someone asked why is it subjectively good?
I can respond because I liked it, i like the taste of pizza cooked and made a certain way.
B.)What if someone asked why is it objectively good?
Answer: ???????
I couldn't just repeat the response I provided in A, just because it contains objective facts about the pizza. Because such answers don't actually answer the question, for the same reason that A isn't a satisfactory answer to B either.
Quote: if you cut the head off a baby, it's clearly bad. And if they demand "why?" we can say "because it deprives the baby of life, liberty, and happiness."
Such an answer is acceptable for the question, why is it bad?
But it's not acceptable for the question of why it's objectively bad? Repeating a series of scientific and historical facts about cutting off the head of the baby, while it may sound to us likes it's answering the question but it's not.
In my view, what's taking place, is that we see a non-natural/immaterial Good, and it's through this that we see things like cutting a babies head off as bad, or doing things conducive to wellbeing as good.
Those naturalist who acknowledge the objectiveness of goodness, see this as well, but attempt to reject this perception, and try to place it within the natural and scientific facts about x, and hence the problem.
But let's say no non-natural reality like this exists. What could be a naturalistic explanation of the phenomenon here?
That would perhaps be the position of Alex Rosenberg. While he acknowledge the perception of objectiveness of morality, he views it as just an illusion, an illusion of objectivity caused by our biology, like free-will. We think we see something objective about the goodness and badness of morality, but it's just a mirage. But this view seems more driven by a desire to protect naturalism, than the truth.