Morality without God

[vulcanlogician]

I guess I have a less negative view of the word "dogma." To me it meant just a set of guidelines or rules that we know to be unprovable -- committed to, rather than proved. But I guess it's more negative than I thought. 

To me, the word "dogma" has a very negative connotation. To me, it means beliefs we are supposed to accept without question. And any admirer of Socrates (one would think) would be uncomfortable with that notion.

"Dogma" as you've defined it sits slightly better with me. But I still don't like the idea of being committed to something unproven. I guess that most charitable example I can think of is "family"... that's something I feel I should be committed to even when such a commitment is perilous. But beliefs about society or morality? Hell no. I only want to commit to things that are reasonable to commit to... things that have been demonstrated to be "right" or "good commitments" through analysis, argument, evidence, and logic. That sort of commitment is the anathema of dogmatic assumptions.

I have a very negative view of "dogma" I guess is what I'm saying. Even your definition of it. But I think most people assume a definition closer to mine.

On the topic of Humanism being an ideology? It's a discussion worth having. I think Humanism is (the the most basic sense) an ideology. But the word "ideology" is a loaded term. In popular use, it can be almost synonymous with dogma. I think when dogmatic and non-dogmatic (or even anti-dogmatic) ideologies are differentiated, a humanist may feel more comfortable referring to humanism as an ideology.

So I think the discussion is more properly basic. "My tire is low on air. Therefore, I OUGHT to go fill it at the gas station." This isn't a scientific statement. But it is nonetheless reasonable. You don't get the ought from the "is." You get it from understanding the ideal state of your tires, and comparing it to its current state.

How do you know the ideal state of your tires, or it's current state?  You see where this is headed.  Both of those statements are at well at-home in natural sciences.  Talking about psi and materials and load after all.  Those sentences are missing, but would provide clarity - ofc they're only missing in the sentences above (and also in how we communicate our oughts, fwiw) - but that shouldn't be taken to mean that they aren't there.   We love silent premises.

Appropriate to the thread, Hume was considering those moral systems of his day and began his problem thusly -

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when all of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.

He may not have been so skeptical of the moral systems discussed today, particularly in that it's been resolved multiple times for different moral systems, though no particular way of resolving the issue means that we can't pose the question still and again (the silent premise in that being that those resolutions are inaccurate).

I think that if a person begins with the notion that moral x's are or must be something other than natural or analytic x's - it's not going to be surprising that they fail to find their moral x' in those places - even if those moral x's were there, and obviously so, staring them right back in the face.  We may desire more from morality than it is.  The "deeper" explanation that we sometimes reach for.  Maybe there is such a thing, and maybe there are oughts and moral questions that must refer to such a thing.  I don't personally think that there is, but assuming that there were, there are probably still at least some oughts that resolve to synonymous claims in the natural sciences.

The go-to example being pleasure-ought.  A pleasure-ought is almost trivially accommodating to scientific (or empirical..if we prefer) inquiry.  It's hard to maintain that there's no way to bridge the two.   More an issue in that silent premise up above that we believe that's an inaccurate response, not an impossible response.
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Well then let's get this silent premise "unsilented":

1) My tires run most efficiently at 32 psi
2) My right front tire is at 25 psi
3) It is good that my tires run efficiently.
4) I ought to do what is good.
Therefore, I ought to fill my right front tire to 32 psi

Premise 1 and 2 are based on empirical observation. I mean ethical non-naturalists love empirical date in their premises, but they also see that premise 3 comes from an understanding of what is good. I don't see how the logic follows (how the ought gets into the conclusion) without premise 3. Yeah, premise 3 is a no-brainer. But it isn't derived from studying sense data in the world. It is derived from reason/understanding alone. Premise 3 is not a description of a feature in the world. Premise 4 is an axiom. Probably one you accept. As you probably agree, it isn't worth debating. If someone disagrees with premise 4, they simply aren't interested in morality. I put premise 4 there for due diligence, since invisible premises came up. You could replace this with other axioms "I desire that my car run efficiently"... "I ought to do what I desire" etc. But I left it the way it is to keep parallels with moral thinking easy to see.

That's where I am. I don't want to see more in morality than there actually is. But, but I think premise 3 (an understanding of some kind of good) is necessary for moral propositions to follow logically. I'm not starting with the assumption that "moral x's are or must be something other than natural x's." I'm starting with the assumption that premise 3 is needed to make the proposition follow. And, upon examination, premise 3 is not discoverable by bare empirical investigation.

There has been a revival of an old discussion among ethicists (where some ideas are revised) that has breathed new life into Moore's non-naturalism. YouTube lecture. I'll post it here if I find it.